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ABSTRACT
This study is a rhetorical analysis of the public
speaking of Harold L. Ickes, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
Secretary of the Interior.

The analysis is limited to

Iokes’ major radio broadcasts in the presidential
campaign of 1936.

In that campaign, Ickes was the

acknowledged "hatchet-man" of the New Deal.

His speeches

were devoted almost exclusively to attacks upon the Repub
lican candidate, Alfred M. Landon, and upon Landon’s
leading supporters.

Ickes* own Republican background

and his reputation for lnveotive and innuendo were
among his special qualifications for his campaign role.
This study analyzes the nature of Ickes* cam
paign task, the characteristics of his persuasion, and
the effectiveness of his speaking efforts.

The first two

chapters discuss Democratic campaign strategy and Ickes’
place in that strategy.

Chapter III analyzes the

speaker's general methods of preparation and delivery.
In the next five chapters, five network campaign broad
casts are studied.

The analysis of each speech is based

upon the following-named factors:

background and setting,

purpose and thesis, organization and lines of argument,
forms of support, use of language, and reactions to the
speeoh.

The final two chapters synthesize characteristics
vi

of the speaker's persuasion and evaluate his performance
as a speaker in his campaign role.
One of the principal sources of material for this
study is the Ickes Papers deposited in the Manuscripts
Division of the Library of Congress.

This collection

contains speech files, including all drafts of speeches,
and memoranda and letters concerning them; letter files,
including political correspondence; and scrapbooks,
which Include an extensive collection of press clippings
pertinent to Ickes' activities as a campaign speaker.
Personal interviews with people closely associated with
Ickes in his department or in the campaign are also a
source from which information was gathered.
This study concludes that Ickes achieved a large
measure of success in his role as a campaign speaker.
His attackB on Landon were widely publicized and, in
the opinion of observers both friendly and unfriendly,
achieved their desired result.

The chief sources of

Ickes* persuasion were psychological techniques of
suggestion.

Among these techniques were "name-calling,"

the argument of "guilt by association," the constant and
varied repetition of unproved premises, and the use of
persuasive humor.

These psychological appeals were not

always supported by Bound logic or evidence, nor doeB
it appear that all of them could have been.
vil

In this

respect, Iokes failed, to demonstrate a maximum awareness
of M s

responsibility to M s audience.
Ickes1 campaign oratory was neither elevated in

theme nor statesmanlike in substance.

It nevertheless

captured public attention, and it apparently constituted
politically effective persuasion in the 1936 campaign.

viil

INTRODUCTION
A unique figure in American public life is lost
to the nation and a phase of the New Deal comes to
a close with the death of Harold Ickes. 1
On February 3» ^952, President Harry S. Truman
marked with these words the death of Harold L. Ickes,
the Illinois Republican who for thirteen years served
as Secretary of the Interior under Democratic presidents.
President Truman’s comment was appropriate, for the
public record of Ickes, like the man himself, was Indeed
unique.

That record ended with words of high praise from

the president who had six years before accepted Ickes1
heated resignation.

Its most Important phase had begun

in 1933 when Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed to his
cabinet a life-long Republican who had never held public
office, a man he had never before seen, and a man
virtually unknown outside his own state.

In a matter of

weeks, Harold Ickes also became head of the Public YJorks
Administration, and three years later he was one of the
leading Democratic speakers in the Roosevelt campaign
for a second term.
During the 1936 oampalgn, Iokes delivered ten

^New York Times, February

1952, p. 18.

major political addresses.^

Five of these speeches were

broadcasts, thirty minutes each in length, over national
networks.

According to Paul C. Aiken, 1936 head of the

Democratic Speakers' Bureau, the Republican Secretary of
the Interior was in great demand as a campaign speaker.3
This position was Itself unusual for Ickes, who once ad
mitted that he was "in no demand as a speaker anywhere or
at any time" before becoming a member of the Cabinet,
because he was "a perfectly rotten speaker.
The most noteworthy aspeot of Ickes* campaign
activity was not, however, the number and importance of
his speeches; it was his unique role in the oampaign.
For Ickes was the Administration's political "hatohetman."

His assignment was to attack the Republican

candidate for president, Governor Alfred M. Landon of
Kansas, Landon*s leading supporters, his platform, and
his party in general.

That Ickes filled such a campaign

role has been generally agreed upon by his associates

2
Manuscripts of these speeches are in Harold L.
Ickes' Private Papers (hereafter referred to as Iokes
jPapers), Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division.

3Personal interview, February 1, 1955*
^Harold L. Ickes, The First Thousand Days (Vol.
I of The Seoret Diary of Harold LV Ickes'. 3 voTs.; New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1953)7 P. 702. Hereafter
referred to as Seoret Diary, Vol. I.

in the campaign and by later commentators.^
Ickes1 role was one for which he had undoubtedly
certain qualifications.

Despite his high position, the

Secretary never hesitated, on or off the platform, to be
blunt and outspoken.

He was always the same man who, in

his autobiography, said:
If, in these pages, I have hurled insult at
anyone, be it known that such was my deliberate
intent, and I may as well state flatly now that
it will be useless and a waste of time to ask me
to say that I am sorry.®
He was an officer of cabinet rank whose sense of dignity
would not prevent his calling Governor Landon, in 1936,
"the friend of the common millionaire, 11 Wendell L.
Willkie, in 19^0, the "simple, barefoot, Wall Street
lawyer," and Governor Thomas E. Dewey, in 1948, "Mr.
Thomas Elusive Dewey, the candidate in sneakers."?
Ickes’ willingness to engage in personalities, usually

^This role has been described in personal inter
views by such Administration associates as Paul G. Aiken,
Thomas G. Gorooran, Michael W. Straus, and Joel David
Wolfsohn. It has been further confirmed, and with the
term "hatchet-man" specifically employed, by two books
dealing, in part, with the 1936 campaign: Harold F.
Gosnell, -Champion Campaigner: Franklin D. Roosevelt.
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 181; and
Donald Rlchberg, My Hero (New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1954), p. 235.
^Harold L. Ickes, The Autobiography of a Cur
mudgeon (New York: Reynal and Hitchcook, 19^3T> P*
?New York Times, February 4, 1952, p. 18.

through invective and irony, has been noted by Harry S.
Truman as a factor which "made him a formidable opponent
in public debate."®
In 1936, Secretary Ickes led the Democratic attack
on Landon and the Republican party, and he did so with
language seldom heard in the public pronouncements of a
oabinet officer.

The 1936 campaign was his first in the

role of political hatohet-man.

The purpose of this study

is to analyze, first, the factors which drew Iokes into
this unusual oampalgn role, second, hiB performance in
that capacity, and third, the effectiveness of his
efforts.
Detailed study of Iokes* speeches is limited to
the five addresses broadoast by national radio networks.
A study of his other five 1936 campaign speeches would
reveal much duplication of both method and arguments.
Further, it was the nationally broadcast attacks which
were most widely heard on the air, most widely reported
in the nation's press, and most significant in the
campaign.
The organization of the study is as follows:
Chapter I sets briefly the background of the campaign
and analyzes Democratic problems and strategy.

8Ibid..

Chapter

II analyzes the role of Secretary Ickes as a speaker
In the campaign, with special attention to how his role
fitted into Democratic strategy.

Since Ickes* methods

of preparation and delivery were, in the case of his
radio addresses, almost Identical In each speech,
Chapter III analyzes general methods of preparation and
delivery.

Each of the next five chapters Is devoted to

an analysis of a network radio address.

Those speeches

were as follows:
"What Shall the Republican Platform Be?"— N.B.C.
— June 7 .
"Governor Landon, Practical Progressive"— C.B.S.
— August 3 .
"Hearst Over Topeka"— C.B.S.— August 27.
"Landon, Coughlin,

'etAl'"— N.B.C.— October

9.

"Is Landon Sincere?"— C.B.S.— October 20.
In the analysis of each speech, the following aspects
are considered:

background and setting, purpose and

thesis, organization and lines of argument, forms of
support, use of language, and reactions to the speech.
The final chapter, Chapter IX, seeks to analyze
and evaluate Ickes* performance in his special role. It
attempts, first, to disoover what persuasive methods and
techniques characterized the political hatchet-man, and
second, to evaluate, so far as it is possible, the

effectiveness of his rhetorical efforts.

The chief

oriteria used in this study for evaluating effectiveness
are (1) the publicity given to Ickes1 attacks, (2) the
degree to which Democratic strategists considered that
he had accomplished what they desired, and (3 ) the
opinions of political observers of both parties, or of
neither party, concerning the value of Ickes* rhetorical
efforts to the Democratic party.
Although the man’s historical importance and his
unique political role certainly appear to warrant such an
undertaking, there have been no previous studies of the
speaking of Harold Ickes.
biographies except his own.

Indeed, there have been no
Incomplete biographical

data can be obtained from Ickes* The Autobiography of a
Curmudgeon^ and from the first three volumes of his
partially-published d i a r y . T h e following chronologioal
sketch is presented as a compendium:
I8 7 A— Born on March 15 on a farm in Blair County,
Pennsylvania.
I8 9 0 — Moved to Chicago; entered Englewood High
School.
1 8 9 3 — Graduated in the top ten of his high school
class; entered the University of Chicago.

9 Ickes, o£. olt.
■^Ickes, Seoret Diary. Vols. I-III.

7
1897— Graduated "cum laude" from the University
of Chicago; began work as a news reporter.
1901— Worked in the headquarters of John Harlan,
candidate for the Republican nomination
for Mayor of Chioago.
1 9 0 3 — Wrote oampaign speeches for Graeme Stewart,
Republican oandidate for irtayor; entered law
school at the University of Chicago.
1 9 0 5 — Managed Harlan's campaign for mayor.
1 9 0 7 — Received law degree.
1911— Managed Charles E. Merrlam's campaign for
mayor; married Anna Wilmarth Thompson.
1912— Joined the Progressive party of Theodore
Roosevelt; made chairman of the Cook County
Progressive Committee.
1916— Served on the campaign committee of Charles
Evans Hughes, Republican candidate for
President.
1917— Worked for the Creel Public Information
Committee.
19 1 8— Worked in France as XMCA representative.
I9 2 0 — Opposed Warren G. Harding at the Republican
convention; later announced for James Cox.
192^— Managed the presidential oampaign in Il
linois for Hiram Johnson, Progressive
candidate.
1 9 2 8 7 -Remained aloof from the campaign; voted
for Alfred E. Smith.
1932— Headed the Western Independent Republican
Committee for Roosevelt.
1933— Appointed Secretary of the Interior; later
appointed administrator of PWA and the Oil
Code.
1935— Mrs. Ickes killed in automobile accident in
New Mexico.

1 9 3 6 — Active In the presidential campaign.
1937—-Active as a speaker in Roosevelt’s court
fight.
1 9 3 8 — Married Jane Dahlman, then in her twenties.
1 9 4 0 — Active as a speaker in the campaign against
Wendell Willkle.
19&L— Appointed Petroleum Coordinator.
19*t4— Active as a speaker in the campaign against
Thomas E. Dewey.
19^6— -Resigned his cabinet post because of Presi
dent Truman' 8 support of Edwin C. Pauley
for Secretary of the Navy.
19 *19— Campaigned in New York for Senator Lehman
against John Foster Dulles.
1952— Died on February 3 in Washington, D. C.
Of the materials available for a study of Ickes,
the most rewarding for the rhetorioal critic are the
Iokes Papers In the Manuscripts Division of the Library
of Congress.

Among the 117,000 individual items col

lected and indexed there are all drafts of the Ickes
speech manuscripts, including the actual reading copies.
The preliminary drafts are acoompanied by memoranda in
the form of suggestions for revision from the Secretary's
staff; the final reading copies have the reading time
marked off into minutes, and many of the words to be
stressed are underlined.

This collection also includes

all correspondence about the speeches, both before and
after delivery.

It includes, further, a set of

scrapbooks which contain newspaper clippings from all
sections of the nation, many of which reflect the news
coverage of Ickes' speeches
them.

and editorial reactions to

Favorable and unfavorable comments alike were

collected by Ickes.
Two other collections of contemporary papers have
been helpful:

the Raymond Clapper Papers in the Library

of Congress and papers from the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library in Hyde Park, New York.
A great deal of pertinent information has been
secured by personal interviews with friends and associates
of the late Secretary of the Interior.

Two Chicago

acquaintances of long-standing, Edward Eagle Brown and
Walter T. FiBher, were helpful for information concern
ing Ickes* background, his Illinois activities, and an
insight into the man himself.

Among the New Deal as

sociates Interviewed were Rexford Guy Tugwell, James A.
Farley, Thomas G. Corcoran, Benjamin V. Cohen, Michael
Straus, Joel David Wolfsohn, and Miss Helen Cunningham,
a personal seoretary.

The Secretary's widow, Mrs. Jane

Dahlman Ickes, provided first-hand information and kindly
granted permission for use of material from the Iokes
Papers.

Also through Mrs. Ickes, a recording of a 1937

speech favoring President Roosevelt's Supreme Court plan
was secured.

No recordings of 1936 campaign addresses

were available.

Of unquestionable value for some specific infor
mation and much background knowledge have been the wealth
of volumes concerned with the New Deal— some by its ad
herents, some by its enemies, and several by historians.
Newspapers and periodicals of 19 36 have provided not only
acoounts of the presidential campaign, but also an in
sight into the sooial and political atmosphere into which
Narold L. Ickes' speeches were projected.

CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEMS AND STRATEGY OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PARTY IN THE 1936 CAMPAIGN
The speaking of Harold L. Iokes In the 1936 cam
paign can he studied best when placed in the political
setting of that day.

The purpose of this chapter is to

describe significant elements of that setting, giving
particular attention to apparent Democratic prospects,
major Democratic problems, and Democratic campaign
strategy.
President Roosevelt's campaign opponents were
selected in early June by the Republican convention at
Cleveland.

Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas, who had

received widespread newspaper support for several months
prior to the convention, was nominated for President on
the first ballot.

Frank Knox, unsuccessful aspirant for

the presidential nomination, was chosen to complete the
tloket.

TJie Democratic convention met in Philadelphia

in the last week of June and quickly renominated Franklin
D. Roosevelt and John Nance Garner.
APPARENT DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS
Democratic leaders had several reasons to antici
pate an easy Roosevelt-Garner vlotory as they weighed
11

their prospects in early 1936.

In 1932, Roosevelt had

turned Alfred E. Smith’s 1928 deficit of over six million
votes into a plurality of over seven million.^

In 1934,

the Democrats had reversed the usual trend of congression
al losses between presidential elections, increasing their
House majority to 332 and their Senate majority to 6 9 .
The economic recovery whloh had swayed voters in 1934
continued in 1935 and 1 9 3 6 .^

In his book, The History

of the New Deal, Basil Rauch wrote that the New Deal’s
record of reoovery was "its greatest asset" in the
campaign.^
The Roosevelt candidacy possessed also the
electoral advantages of the party in office,

usual

plus others

whloh resulted from recovery and relief legislation.
According to a reported estimate by Democratic Chairman
James A. Farley, the 296,500 new federal appointments

•^-Review of Reviews, XCLL (March, 1 9 3 6 ), 21.
2Atlantlc Monthly, CLVII (January, 1936), 93.
^By April of 1936, business was reported to be
ninety per cent of normal. Current History, XLIV (April,
1936), 1.
•

York:

^Basll Rauch, The History of the New Deal (New
Creative Age Press, Inc., 1944), p. 2 2 3 .
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might insure a block of over eleven million votes.5

The

Democrats also counted on drawing heavily from the votes
of the twenty-four million people who were receiving
l

•

relief or work-relief checks from the government. 0
Labor and farm groups were also expected to support
the re-election of Roosevelt.

Except for a few craft

unions of the American Federation of Labor, organized
labor supported Roosevelt almost solidly; farm groups,
except for a few leaders of the Grange, also supported
the President.?

So strong were labor and farm support

for the President that Raymond Clapper, Washington
political correspondent, commented upon "Roosevelts new
Q

party, dominantly farmer-labor in character."
These were the encouraging signs as Democrats
assessed their campaign prospects in early 1 9 3 6 , but
some disoouraging facts and possibilities had to be faced
too.

On May 27, 1935, the Supreme Court handed down three

anti-New Deal decisions, the most important being the

^"Assuming careful selection of appointees, Mr.
Farley estimates, from long experience and careful checks,
that every Job, on average, is worth forty votes in the
next election." Lawrence Sullivan, "Our New Spoils
System," Atlantic Monthly, CLVII (February, 1936), 190.
^Review of Reviews. XCIII (April, 1936), 35.
?Rauch, o£. clt. , p. 2^5.
^Review of Reviews, XCIII (May, 1936), 2 5 .

lif
Sohechter Poultry Corporation decision.

This decision,

which declared the National Industrial Recovery Act to
he in violation of the constitution, constituted both a
blow to the New Deal and a potentially good campaign issue
on constitutional government for the Republicans.9

Also

in 1935, the Republicans, in the off-year elections,
captured the New York General Assembly, elected mayors
in Cleveland and Philadelphia, carried formerly-Democratic
Hudson County in New Jersey, and defeated a Democratic
Congressman in Rhode Island.

These Democratic reverses

heartened New Deal opponents and brought forth their
attacks with new vigor.

Of these New Deal critics,

Frederick Essary said this:
Still another practical effect of the Schechter
decision and the Rhode Island turnover was to bring
from cover countless Administration critics, long
in hiding. They emerged by the thousands. One
heard them pillorying the New Deal in the halls of
Congress. One heard them reviling it in the market
places, arraigning it in the press and in convention
assembled, in the clubs, and wherever else a hearer
could be found.
Accompanying these discouraging developments were

9 "A unanimous court decision had found the Adminis
tration and the Congress to be guilty of a violent as
sault upon the Constitution. At last an issue had been
raised, perhaps a winning issue. Republicans were over
joyed." Frederlok Essary, "An X-Ray of the Campaign,"
Atlantic Monthly, CLVII (January, 1 9 3 6 ), 93*
10Ibid., p. 9*K

15
some unfavorable results of public opinion polls.

The

poll of the American Institute of Public Opinion, for
example, indicated that President Roosevelt's popularitydeclined sixteen per cent between February, 193^ &n(l
October, 1935. 11
Most of the President's political advisers were
keenly aware that not all signs pointed to an easy
Democratic victory in 1936.

Samuel I. Rosenraan, for

example, indicated that Roosevelt aides were alert to
the presence of unfavorable indications:
Although the President was to carry every state
but Maine and Vermont in 1 9 3 6 , in the spring the
prospects for re-election did not seem quite that
bright. Political opposition had begun to crystal
lize. The close Democratic unity had begun to dis
solve; many of the old-line Democrats, especially
from the South, had come to feel that the New Deal
was a little too strong for their tastes. The American
Liberty League had been organized, and it included
among its prominent members a number of national lead
ers of the Democratic party. Its purpose was to pre
vent the President's re-election. . . , 12
Charles Mlchelson, publicity director for the National
Democratic Committee, also indicated that these unfavor
able developments did not go unnoticed among Democratic
strategists.

Mlchelson admitted that fear of these

T1
A In February, 193^. sixty-nine per cent of those
polled supported the President; in October, 1935/ this
figure fell to fifty-three per cent. New Republic,
LXXXV (November 13, 1935), U .
York:

12Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New
Harper and Brothers, 1952 )> P* 98.

16
adverse developments getting out of control was respon
sible for the Democratic decision to begin active cam
paigning one month earlier than originally planned.^
MAJOR DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN PROBLEMS
Democratic strategy had to be based, in large
part, upon the specific campaign problems which confront
ed the party.

Some of the major problems faced were the

almost solid opposition of business, the hostility of
most leading newspapers, the defection of many Democratic
leaders, and the strength of the early boom for Governor
Landon.

Still other problems were embodied in several

potentially vulnerable, spots in the New Deal record.
These included the broken 1932 economy pledges, the con
tinuation of widespread unemployment, the admitted
presence of some degree of administrative Inefficiency,
and the increased centralization of government which
many Americans feared.

A brief consideration of these

problems is pertinent to understanding the strategy of
the Democratic campaign as a whole and of the part played
by Ickes in that strategy.
That most businessmen opposed the Administration
in 1936 was clear.

The brief era of good feeling between

-*-3New York Times, November 15, 1936, Sec.

p. 10.

17
the New Deal and business, which the NRA had for a time
effeoted, was short-lived.

The opposition of the American

Liberty League, an organisation sponsored primarily by
conservative business interests, severely tried this
relationship in the 1 9 3 ^+ congressional elections; the
President’s security program and Wealth Tax Act of 1935
strained the truce still further; the successful op
position of business to the New Deal in the November
1935 elections and the President’s subsequent attack on
business in his Annual Message to Congress in January,
1 9 3 6 , completely ended the political honeymoon.

By 1936,

the "First New Deal" was over and the "Second New Deal"
had b e g u n . ^

A program which was to represent primarily

farm and labor interests had emerged, and business was no
longer a partner in the undertaking.*^5
tility in the 1936 campaign was assured.

Business hos
Rauch notes

■^Basil Rauch, in The History of the New Deal,
refers to the "First New Deal11 as that "chiefly benefi
cial to big business and large farmers"; the "Second New
Deal," whloh began in 1935, was "chiefly beneficial to
labor and smaller farmers." Rauch, ojd . olt. . p. vl.
■^"By 1 9 3 6 , the administration had virtually
abandoned its initial program of carrying out plans which
were formulated by all three of the major interest groups
in the nation, business, farmers, and labor, and of making
each of these groups the direct beneficiary of government
action to help it improve its status. Business had in
effect been dropped from the coalition." Ibid.. p. 225.

18
that '‘virtually all the substantial organizations of
16
business were officially in opposition."
Among these
organizations were such well-financed groups as the
United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Associ
ation of Manufacturers, and the business-backed American
Liberty League.
Another Democratic problem was the hostility of
a large section of the American press.

The President

asserted that about 85 per cent of the American press
opposed him in the 1936 c a m p a i g n . R a u c h , without
giving an exact estimate, notes that "the press was
TO
overwhelmingly favorable to Landon."
This antipathy
toward Roosevelt made it difficult for the Democratic
campaign to receive fair and equal treatment in the
press.

The President himself stated:

"Many newspapers

and magazines went to the length of coloring, distort
ing, or actually omitting Important facts in the news
columns as well as in the editorial

p

a

g

e

s

.

The hos

tility of a large segment of the nation's press presented

l6r b ld., p. 2^+5.
*1 « .

■‘•'Samuel I. Rosenraan (ed.), The People Approve
(Vol. V of The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin
D. Roosevelt. I3 vols.; New icrk: Random House,' 1938),
p. 3 . Hereafter referred to as Public Papers, Vol. V.
^Rauch, o£. clt. . p. 2*1-6.
^Rosenman, loc. clt.
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a problem to the Democratic campaign.

Getting Democratic

arguments forcibly before the voters was a much more dif
ficult task than it would have been with an evenly divided
or friendly press.

Farley called it "a serious handicap
20
that has to be met right at the start."
Another apparently serious Democratic problem was
the defection of many prominent party leaders to the
Republican candidates.

The most publicized and perhaps

serious Democratic defection was that of Alfred E. Smith.
In late January of 1936, Governor Smith addressed the
American Liberty League at the Mayflower Hotel in Washing
ton, D. 0.

For an hour his audience "chortled and chuckled"

while the former presidential candidate "belabored and
ridiculed the New Deal policies and accomplishments of his
political ally, Franklin D. Roosevelt. . . . "21

Smith

later declared for Governor Landon and actively campaigned
for him.

Still other conservative Democrats of some

prominence who publicly opposed Roosevelt and the New Deal
were James A. Reed, former Senator from Missouri; John B.
Ely, former Governor of Massachusetts; Bainbridge Colby,
former Secretary of State; Daniel F. Cohalan, former New

20James A. Farley, Behind the Ballots (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 193&)»' P« 3°9«
21 Ibld., p. 2 9 3 .

'*

York district Judge; John W. Davis, Democratic president
ial nominee in 192^; John J. Raskob, former Democratic
National Chairman; Jouett Shouse, former chairman of the
Democratic National Committee; and Senator Royal Copeland
of New York. 22

Some of these men undoubtedly had personal

followings of varying sizes, and their influence would
be felt in the returns of several states.

Representative

Joseph Martin, Republican Minority Leader in the House of
Representatives, estimated that Alfred E. Smith alone
would bring three million votes to the Republican candi
dates. 23

The defection of men like Smith, Davis, Ely,

Colby, and Copeland alarmed many Democrats, who expeoted
the bolters to influence a great many votes, and their
loss appeared to constitute an eleotion hazard as the
campaign got underway.
For a time it also appeared that Roosevelt faced
a very formidable Republican opponent.

Almost unknown

outside of Kansas until 193^, Governor Landon rose
rapidly into contention for the presidential nomination.
In 193^, in the midst of Republican defeats elsewhere,
Landon was re-elected Governor of Kansas.

His repu

tation for governmental eoonomy and a balanced budget

22Chlcago Tribune, July 19, 1936, Seo. I, p. 4.
2 3?he New ¥ork Times, October 3 , 1936, p. 1.
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was brought to the attention of the nation In general and
of Republican leaders in particular.

Shrewdly managed

by John Hamilton, Kansas legislator and later Republican
National Chairman, Landon won the support of William
Randolph Hearst in early 193 6 .
began to develop.

The Landon "boom" then

Despite the opposition of such avail

able candidates as William E. Borah, Arthur Vandenberg,
Frank Knox, and Herbert Hoover, Landon won the Republican
nomination in Cleveland on the first ballot.

Speaking

later of Landon1s stature at the convention, Farley said:
f

The advance publicity had been cleverly handled.
The public was interested in this new Plumed Knight
of the Republican Party, and the opinion was wide
spread that an appealing political figure was about
to come forward to ohallenge President Roosevelt on
equal terms. The interest in Landon was especially
keen in the agricultural states adjoining Kansas
and in some of the Eastern industrial centers. His
ability as a ’budget balancer' had travelled before
him, and people really believed that he would be
able to cut out this ’wasteful Federal spending'
and at the same time continue to make benefit pay
ments to agriculture and take care of the array of
unemployed.2^
Republicans believed they had found in Landon a candidate
who would appeal to a wide range of voters:
From the point of view of Republican strategists,
Landon was a business man associated with the oil
industry who was at the same time identified with
a great farm state, so that he might be made at
tractive to farmers without risking the 'irrespon
sibility' towards business of a Borah. He had

2 ^Farley, op. olt., p. 3 0 9 .
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supported the Bull Moose campaign of Theodore
Roosevelt in 1912, which would appeal to liberals.
He was not identified with the adamant opposition
to the New Deal, but, on the other hand, he had
shown little Interest in the progressive leglslation which Western governors usually advocated.
Apparently the strategy of selecting a candidate who
could be all things to all men proved effective during
the early stages of the campaign.

A Current History

editorial feature noted in July that "He ^/Landon/ may be
a genius in disguise.

His build-up has been perfect, if

the objeot was to satisfy rank and file cravings." °
Though Landon looked considerably weaker by November, in
the early phases of the oampaign his successful build-up
posed what appeared to be a serious problem to the
Roosevelt forces.
All the Democratic campaign problems to whioh
referenoe has been made so far have been expressed in
termB of opposition forces to be overcome.

Democratic

strategy also had to take cognizance of some of the
strongest attacks being pressed against the New Deal
record.

The defense of parts of this record was dif

ficult enough to constitute a serious problem.

Among

the charges to which the Roosevelt record was most

2^Rauch, o£. oit. , pp. 237-38.
2% . E. Traoy, "Log of Major Currents," Current
History, XLIV (July, 19367, 10.
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vulnerable were failure to fulfill the 1932 platform of
government economy, continued unemployment, administra
tive Inefficiency In relief, and an apparent trend toward
centralization of government.
In 1932, the Democratic platform promised an
economy administration.

In line with that promise, the

President submitted his economy bill to Congress on March
10, 1933. .This measure reduced normal government ex
penditures, especially In the field of federal salaries
and veterans* benefits.
March 11.

It was enacted by Congress on

This early Indication of reduced federal ex

penditures was, however, short-lived.

By early 193^ >

Congress had begun passing appropriation measures over
the President* 8 veto,*2? and by 1935 the President's
relief and public works programs had helped to pile up
an increasing federal deficit.

By June of 1936 this

deficit reached the sum of $3^,0 °°>0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , an increase
of about $13,000,000,000 since March,1 9 3 3 .28

This was

despite the Increased revenues brought about by tax
raises.
The Administration was well aware that the In
creased federal deficit, representing as It did an

27Rauch, 0£. clt., p. 63 .
28These figures were released by the Treasury
Department and published In the New York Times, June 30 ,
3-936, p. 6.

2k
apparently discarded, campaign pledge, would be strongly
used in the Republican campaign of 1936.

In June of 1936,

the New York Times editorialized that it was "the issue
about which Mr. Roosevelt feels probably the most selfconscious, "29 and Arthur Krock later wrote that since
1933 the President "had realized the dangers of the
budget issue in his campaign for re-election."3°
As expected, Republican campaigners kept up a
constant fire on the federal debt and the broken economy
plank of 1932.

James Hagerty, newspaperman accompanying

Governor Landon on his campaign tour, liBted this as one
of the five Issues most stressed by Landon, 3^- and it was
a chief subjeot in the Governor* s August
Buffalo, New York.

2

6

address at

It was apparently an attack which

brought good crowd reaction.

The New York Times report

ed of the address that the rather passive audience of
20,000 "warmed up a little to his attack upon the Roose
velt administration for failure to balance the budget. "32
Attacks upon this phase of the Roosevelt record posed a
threat to which Democratic campaigners, including Ickes

2^New York Times, June 21, 1936, Sec.

p. 3 .

k ,

3°New York Times. August 16, 1936, Sec.
3^-New York Times, October 18, 1936, Sec.
32New York Times, August 27, 1 9 3 6 , p. 1.

k

, p. 3 .
k , '

p. 3 .
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and the President, gave definite attention during the
campaign.
Despite some advance against the unemployment
problem, the Roosevelt administration was censured dur
ing 1936 for itb failure to obtain widespread re-employ
ment of the idle.
no one denied.

That serious unemployment still existed,

In an October 2, 1935 address in San

Diego, General Hugh Johnson, former NRA Administrator,
referred to "this most dangerous of our national
problems— ten million Jobless," and added that "although
we have tried valiantly, we haven't done anything ef
fective yet.

. . ."33

Among Franklin D. Roosevelt's

three very "vulnerable spots," Raymond Clapper listed
in July, 1936, "the 1 0 ,000,000 unemployed."3^

Democratic

campaigners were able to point to employment increases,
but Republicans charged that New Deal policies were
actually preventing further re-employment.

Lewis H.

Brown, President of the Johns-Mansville Corporation, told
the U. S. Chamber of Commerce that ninety per cent of the
nation's-businessmen believed that anti-business policies
"are definitely preventing

re-employment.

"35

Colonel

33sugh Johnson, "Ten Million Jobless," Vital
Speeches,11 (October 21, 1935), 53-56.--.
3**Raymond Clapper, "What Landon Offers," Review
of Reviews, XCIII (July, 1936), 26.
35Lewis H. Brown, "Industry," Vital Speeches, II
(May **, 1936), **83-85.
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Henry Breckenrldge, Asslstant-Secretary of War under
President Wilson and a Democratic foe of Roosevelt in
I9 3 6 , charged that at least a third of the unemployment
was because of “Wallace’s and Tugwell's economy of
s c a r c i t y . T h e s e attaoks upon the New Deal’s claims
for reoovery were serious enough to require denial or
explanation during the oampaign.
The Republicans also levelled criticism upon the
New Deal raethodB of trying to combat unemployment,
primarily upon the Works Progress Administration— the
controversial WPA.

Some top Democratic leaders, while

favoring the aims of WPA, privately admitted that its
administration was very vulnerable to attack and con
sidered it a oampaign liability.3?

The New York Times,

which eventually declared editorially for the Presi
dent's re-election, termed WPA a leading issue in the
campaign and enumerated five main charges often made
against it:

waste and extravagance in planning, ex

cessive coat of supervision, preference of relief to
re-employment by many WPA workers, disparities in
contributions of the various states, and use of WPA by

3^Henry Breckenridge, “The Valley of Decision,"
Vital Speeches, II (March 2 3 , 1936), 38937jaraes A. Farley, Jim Farley’s Story (New York:
Whittlesey House, 1948), p. 63.
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Democrats as a political Instrument.3®

The vulnerability

of WPA affected the oampaign tactics of the New Dealers
and Influenced their use of Harold Ickes, administrator
of the less controversial PWA, as a frequent campaign
speaker.
Still another Republican attack which was potential
dynamite to Democratic chances was the charge that the
President was leaning toward alien philosophies of govern
ment.

James A. Hagerty listed this as one of the Issues

most stressed by Landon, 39 and It was on the lips of most
of the President's enemies, both Republicans and conser
vative Democrats.

Alfred E. Smith was foremost in the

van of the attacking Democratic minority, associating
the President with Socialists, Communists, and "a shower
of crackpots." ^ 0

Probably very few voters believed

the New Deal was really communistic, but It was possible
that a great many really feared that the trend was
toward some form of collectivism.

Some may have given

weight, too, to the oharge that the President was ap
proaching dictatorial power in some areas.
ship of Congress and the

His leader

powers granted to him during

3^New York Times, October 11, 193o, Sec.

k ,

39^ew York Times, October 18, 1936, Sec. 4,
**°New York Times, November 1, 1936, p. ^-3 .

p. 3.
p. 3 .
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the depression emergency were undeniably greater than
they had been under Presidents Hoover, Collidge, or
Harding.

The fears his opponents tried to arouse In the

public mind needed to be choked off or dispelled by
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his campaign aides.
The opposition of business, of the press, and of
many conservative Democrats; the successful early build
up of Governor Landon as a challenging candidate; and the
principal attacks upon the New Deal record and trends—
these were Democratic problems, or apparent problems,
which Influenced Democratic campaign strategy In general
and the campaign role of Ickes in particular.
DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
In this as in other national campaigns, a large
portion of strategy planning was done as the campaign
progressed, and many people pldyed a part in Its formula
tion.

Benjamin V. Cohen, close adviser to the President

In 1936, omphasizes that this was true of the RooseveltLandon campaign.^ 1

It is possible, however, in retrospect,

to observe definite campaign lines which gradually took

Lr\

Personal Interview with Mr. Cohen on January 29,
1955. This same opinion was also expressed by Michael
Straus, Ickes' Director of Information, In a personal
Interview on January 25, 1955.
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shape and to note certain broad approaches which were
taken from the outset.

The following list suggests some

main principles which appear to have guided the strategy
of the Roosevelt forces:
(1) The Democratic campaign was one of "watchfulwaiting," standing on the broad record of com
parative economic recovery and attacking
Republican weaknesses and errors as they appeared.
(2) The oampaign capitalized to the fullest extent
on the personal appeal and official prestige of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, utilizing him as an asset
both on the stump and in pursuit of his executive
duties.
(3 ) Maximum effort was made, especially in the
early stages of the campaign, to prevent an ef
fective Landon build-up.
The Democratic strategy of "watchful waiting" was
described by the noted American historian, Charles A.
Beard:
Tacticians on the Democratic side seem to operate
on the assumption that the password should be ’watch
ful waiting.' President Roosevelt will make no
radical departures from the record already written,
avoid sharp criticism of the Supreme Court, give
some attention to economy, and, as in the campaign
of 1 9 3 2 , count on Republican errors to carry the
election
. * *

^2Charles A. Beard, "Campaign Preliminaries,"
Current History, XLIV (April, 1936), 71.
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Beard desoribed the actual oourse of events rather
closely.

The Democrats stood on their claim for progress

toward recovery, proposing no new programs and avoiding
the dangerous court Issue; they more often than not pre
sented only a broad defense of the New Deal, comparing
it favorably and forcefully with the previous Republican
administration, and they did "wait the Republicans out,”
pouncing upon what they thought to be vulnerable spots
and taotical errors as they appeared.
Efforts by Democratic strategists to make the
campaign approach a positive one are described by Laura
Crowell in her study of the President's speeches in the
I9 3 6 campaign:
The Republicans, as challengers, should have
taken the offensive, driving Roosevelt to a de
fense of the policies of his administration.
In
this oampaign, however, the incumbents became the
challengers, constantly enforcing the comparison—
with the powerful aid of the nation's recovery—
between the New Deal years and the preceding Repub
lican administrations, and never allowing the
Republicans to consider the Roosevelt administra
tion as a single factor.^3
The Roosevelt forces were equally Intent upon
finding vulnerable spots in the Republican oampaign
upon which they could capitalize.

The first apparent

campaign error of the Republicans was that of letting

^Laura Crowell, "An Analysis of the Audience
Persuasion in the Major Addresses of Franklin D. Roose
velt in the Presidential Campaign, 11 (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, 1946),
pp. 476-77.

the American Liberty League carry the brunt of the precorrvention assault upon the Administration.

The Democrats

decided that the Liberty League was so palpably an
organization of men of wealth that public opinion would
not support it.

As a result, New Deal speakers and

writers launched rhetorical assaults upon the Liberty
League during the first few months of 1936.

Farley later

wrote that this organization was so thoroughly discredit
ed by convention time that "the Republican party was
frantically trying to denounoe and disown i t . " ^
The Republican platform, placed under heavy
Democratic fire, may also have been a handicap to Landon.
Ickes devoted a great deal of attention to this document
which Democrats denounced as "weasel worded."

Arthur

Krock wrote after the Cleveland convention that the
Republicans' long, compromising platform had "helped the
Democratic campaign prospect."^

Krock further believed

that the uncertain tenor of the whole Republican campaign
was a mistake, trying as it did to attack the New Deal,
but actually retaining almost all of its parts.

This

#

"shotgun strategy," he concluded, permitted Roosevelt to

^^arley, Behind the Ballots, p. 29*4-.
New York Times, June 21, 1936, Sec. ty, p. 3 .
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attack Instead of defending. °

Basil Rauch arrived at

the same conclusion in his analysis of the 1 9 3 6 campaign.
Aided by some of the Republican campaigners, the
Democrats worked to place Landon in an untenable position
in another respect.

Landon attempted to prevent any im

pression that his program was linked to that of the "Old
Guard."

Stung, however, by the presistent Democratic

attacks, such Republican speakers as John Hamilton and
Frank Knox more and more defended the Hoover line.

In

addition, Hoover himself took an Increasingly active part
in the contest.

This forged between the last Republican

candidate and the current one exactly the link which
Landon hoped to a v o i d . S u c h a seeming link encouraged
Democratic attacks on the Republican party as the party
of depression and arch-conservatism.
Democratic strategy also involved capitalizing
heavily on the acknowledged abilities of Franklin D.
Roosevelt as a vote-getter.

Democratic campaign leaders

decided early that Roosevelt himself was to be the basic
issue in the election.

They further believed that no

one could make a more favorable presentation of himself

^ New York Times, September 27, 1936, Sec.

b ,

^Rauch, o£. clt. , p. 2 5 6 .
^ New York Times, September 2b, 1936, -p. 2b,

p. 3 .
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and his policies than the President, who was described
by Arthur Krock as "unsurpassed as a campaigner.
The chief problem was to get Roosevelt before
the voters.

In view of newspaper opposition, the radio

was the selected medium, a medium in the use of which
Roosevelt was an admitted master.

To put the President

on the air frequently from convention time to election
time was financially out of the reach of the party's
treasury.

The solution hit upon fitted very nicely into

the strategy of "watchful-waiting":

Roosevelt remained

"non-political" until the last month of the campaign.
At that time he conducted a whirlwind one-month
oampaign— touring doubtful states, answering whatever
attacks had to be answered, and getting network radio
coverage for every major address.

Until the final month,

the Democratic candidate attended strictly to his duties
as President, making a "non-political" visit to Texas and
Arkansas while the Republican convention was in progress
and making an extended "non-political" tour of the
drought-strioken Midwest during the summer.

Some Repub

lican newspapers accused the President of playing polltios.
The President, however, continued to tour.

As Farley

later put it, the President simply "busied himself with

^ N e w York Times, September 27, 1936, Seo.

p. 3 .

those duties which kept him before the public eye In
legitimate fashion without indulging in direct political
action. "5°

The New York Times got to the heart of the

matter when it said:

"The value of suoh a trip, regard

less of motive, two months before an election is in
estimable."^'1' Roosevelt appeared before the people,
talked with them, and probably won votes every "nonpolitical" mile of the way.

Meanwhile, Ickes and others

carried on the active campaign, keeping the Republicans
busy.
On September 29, in Syracuse, New York, Roosevelt
initiated his openly political campaign and began to talk
on the issues.

That one month has been very effectively

desoribed and analyzed by the Crowell study and will not
be set down in any detail here.

Farley summed it up as

"the greatest piece of personal campaigning in American
history." ^ 2
Another important part of Democratic strategy waB
to prevent the threatening Landon boom from ever reaching
its most dangerous proportions, especially during the

■5°Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 3 0 9 .
^ New York Times, August

J O ,

1936, Sec.

52Farley, Behind the Ballots, p.

J

1

6

.

p. 10.
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time that the President was not actively campaigning.53
Farley has described the Democratic tactics employed to
prevent such a possibility:
While President Roosevelt was giving a good
positive picture of public leadership during the
summer of
the Democratic National Committee
was engaged in the task of puncturing the Landon
•myth1 and thus preventing the Kansas Governor
from making gains. . . . We had a minute study of
Governor Landon's record compiled at headquarters,
and a vigorous fire was directed constantly at his
official acts.5^
1

9

3

6

,

The attacks upon Landon, coming primarily from Xokes and
never from the President himself, will be discussed later
in considerably more detail.
This describes in general the broad strategy of
the Democratic oampaign.

A brief consideration of

specific taotics employed to meet the particular cam
paign problems discussed earlier sheds additional light
on Democratic efforts.
The hostility of business to the New Deal was, in
some respects, a serious problem.

It was most damaging,

however, only if old party lines were intact.

The

Roosevelt strategy was to see that they were not intact.

53uThe Democrats began the oampaign with the theory
that the correct strategy was to insure, if possible, that
the candidate of the opponents should not be built up to
an inspiring figure." New York Times. November 15, 1936,
Seo.
p. 10.
•S^arley, Behind the Ballots, pp. 310-11.

The Democrats knew during 1935 that they were alienating
■businessmen; but they also knew they were attracting
labor and farm support.

They deolded to aocept the

hostility of large business interests and form the
fanner-labor coalition which such opposition actually
encouraged.

In May of 1936, Raymond Clapper noted that

such a party, superimposed on the old Democratic organi
zation, was already in e x i s t e n c e . W h e n the Democrats
attacked certain big business practices and Interests, or
when business attacked Roosevelt, the result was a natural
strengthening of the new farmer-labor coalition.
Also brought into the coalition were political
progressives of both Republican and Independent status.
Just as they had done in 1932, the Democrats won the
support of leading liberals like Senator Norris, Senator
Couzens, and Mayor LaG-uardla.

Suoh organizations as the

Progressive Party for Roosevelt, the Good Neighbor
League, and Labor’s Non-Partisan League were set up to
facilitate the campaign activity of such liberal and
Independent groups.

This helped to counter the defection

of Smith and other conservative Democrats,

though Demo

crats also oountered with direct attacks upon some of
these insurgents.

55Raymond Clapper, “Roosevelt's New Party," Re
view of Reviews, XCIII (May, 1 9 3 6 ), 2 5 .
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The hostility of the press was met primarily by
reliance on the extensive use of radio to get facts, as
the Democrats saw them, before the voters. The Presi
dent's tours were also used to a large extent, partly
through personal contact and partly through furnishing
news which could not be entirely Ignored by the most
hostile papers.

But radio had to be the mainstay.

In

a post-election analysis, Farley gave large credit for
Democratic victory to the use of that medium:
I have already said that the influence of the
radio in determining the outcome of the 1936
election can hardly be overestimated. Without
that unrivaled medium for reaching millions of
voters, the work, of overcoming the false im
pression created by the tons of written propa
ganda put out by the foes of the New Deal would
have been many times greater than it was, and,
to be candid, it might conceivably have been an
impossible Job.36
To the specific attacks on portions of the New
Deal record, the Democrats made occasional replies.
For example, Harry Hopkins occasionally would reply to
charges against W P A , ^

Secretary Morgenthau depreciated

the amount of the national debt for whioh the New Deal
was accountable ,-5® and the President himself took up

56Fariey, Behind the Ballots, pp. 318-19.
^Hopkins was not very active as a speaker, since
Farley believed him and his organization so vulnerable
in the campaign. Farley, Jim Farley1s Story, pp. 63-6^.
58{jurrent History, XLIV (August, 1 9 3 6 ), 16.

the charges of New Deal adherenoe to alien philosophies
in his Syracuse address.

The primary defenses of the

Democratic campaigners against these attacks, however,
were embodied in the recognized emergency confronted in
I933 and in the partial recovery achieved by 1936.

If

WPA had made mistakes, it had provided income for several
millions; if taxes and the national debt were higher due
to pump-priming, recovery was being achieved; if there
was still unemployment, it had been reduced since 1933
Using these general recovery claims as a springboard,
Democrats then usually proceeded to attack the "inactivity"
of the Hoover administration.

Instead of making specific

and detailed defenses, they more often took the offensive.
This chapter has described the principles of
strategy used by the Roosevelt forces in the 1936 cam
paign.

The November results attested, in part, to their

success.

The Democratic candidates entered the campaign

with enough political assets to make their re-election
prospects very good, but they also faced problems which,
if improperly handled, could have ohanged the course of
the election.

This was the political setting in which

Harold L. Ickes, Bull-Moose Republican in the Democratic
camp, played his part in the campaign of 1936.

September, 1936> employment was at 88.7 per
cent of the 1929 levels and still increasing; this com
pared to a level of 56 per oent in 1933. Hew York Times,
September 24, 1936, p. 24.
5
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CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF ICKES IN THE CAMPAIGN
Harold Ickes was one of the most active speakers
in the Democratic campaign of 1936 *

Between June 1,

1 9 3 6 , and the close of the campaign, he made twenty
soheduled and prepared addresses.

Ten of these speeches

were openly political in nature; the other ten were de
livered at public works dedications and on other
essentially non-political occasions.

Of the ten cam

paign speeches, five were broadcast over national radio
networks and four others were carried by speoial state
on regional networks.
The following-listed campaign speeches, together
with information on radio coverage given them, are ineluded in the speech files in the Ickes Papers:
June 7— Studio Broadcast— "What Shall the Repub
lican Platform Be?"— N.B.C.
July 17— University of Virginia— "Representative
Government vs. Dictatorship"— No Badio.
August 3— Studio Broadcast— "Governor Landon,
Practical Progressive"— C.B.S.
August 27— Studio Broadcast— "Hearst Over Topeka"
— C.B.S.
October 9— Columbus, Ohio— "Landon, Coughlin, 'et
Al' "— N.B.C.
October 19— Philadelphia, Pennsylvania— "Landon*s
Angels"— State Network.
39
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October 20— Studio Broadcast— "Is Landon Sincere?"
--C.B.S.
October 21— Northwestern University— "Only Thirteen
More Days to Save America"— C.B.S. (500
mile radius).
October 2?— Altoona, Pennsylvania— "Why Plnohot
Ban Out"— State Network.
October 28— New York City— "The Crossroads"—
Special Eastern Network.
Ickes was sponsored as a speaker by the Democratic
National Committee, the Progressive National Committee
for Roosevelt, and the Good Neighbor League.

According

to Congressman Sam Rayburn of Texas, he was the most
requested of all Democratic speakers. 2

The President,

during the course of the campaign, indicated to his
Republican Secretary of the Interior that what the Demo
cratic campaign needed was "four Harold Ickeses. " 3
Secretary Ickes, seldom guilty of any display of false
modesty, concurred in these sentiments.

On August 19,

1936, Ickes wrote:
Thore is not any doubt that I have been putting
more licks into this campaign on the speaking and
publicity side than any other member of the Ad
ministration. As a matter of fact, I have been
doing more than all the other members of the
Cabinet combined.^

•^Ickes Papers.
2Ickes, Seoret Diary. Vol. I, p. 682.
3Ibid., p. 659.
^Ibid., p. 6 6 3 .

REASONS FOR ICKES' IMPORTANT ROLE AS A SPEAKER
An analysis of possible reasons why Ickes figured
so prominently as a Democratic speaker Is a pertinent and
Interesting Inquiry.

Certainly it was not because of any

long-standing reputation he had as an effective speaker.
On September 19, 1936, Ickes commented In his diary:
I certainly was in no demand as a speaker any
where or at any time before I became a member of the
Cabinet. And the reason is not far to seek. I was
a perfectly rotten speaker. I was scared to death
when I stood before an audienoe and it wasn't any
wonder that I was not in demand. If I ever did have
a chance to speak, I avoided it if I possibly could.5
While his friends and associates in Chicago do not recall
that Ickes was "perfectly rotten," some of them have In
dicated that prior to attaining cabinet office he
certainly had no special reputation or ability as a
speaker.^
Ickes' effectiveness as a speaker undoubtedly
improved while he was Secretary of the Interior and Ad
ministrator of PWA.

These positions gave him new prestige

and, at the same time, required that he speak more

Slbld., p. 683.
^Personal Interviews with Walter T. Fisher, promi
nent Chicago lawyer who was a neighbor and associate of
Ickes for several years, and Edward Eagle Brown, Chairman
of the Board of the First National Bank of Chicago and an
Ickes family friend of long standing. Mr. Fisher was
interviewed on December 27, 195^-, and Mr. Brown on December
29, 195*K

frequently.

Marked Improvement was noted by some of Ickes'

assistants,? and one or two of the Secretary's speeches
In late 1 9 3 5 and early 1 9 3 6 attracted the attention of the
President and his advisers.

In early Deoeraber, Ickes ad

dressed a forum In Detroit, delivering a fighting, pro
gressive type of attack on certain national economic ills;
in early January, he followed much the same fighting line
Q

in Rochester, New York.

These speeches aroused Interest

more, however, through the blunt ideas and the fighting
language in the manuscript than through the platform
ability of the speaker.

The primary reasons for the

willingness of Democratic strategists to use Ickes so
extensively lay elsewhere.
Actually, a combination of several factors pushed
Harold Ickes into the political limelight:

his eagerness

to campaign, the good reputation enjoyed by both the
Interior Department and PWA, the respect aocorded the
Secretary of several minority groups, the shortage of
effective campaigners in the Administration, and, finally,

^Personal interviews with Michael Straus, Assis
tant to the PWA Administrator, and Joel David Wolfsohn,
Mr. Ickes' Executive Secretary. Mr. Straus and Mr.
Wolfsohn were Interviewed on January 23, 1955> and Feb
ruary 1 , 1 9 5 5 , respectively.
^Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, pp. ^77-78.

the presence of a special Job in the campaign which Ickes
was qualified to handle— that of attacking the Republican
party, Its candidates, and its leading supporters.
A definite shortage existed of Cabinet officers in
the New Deal who were effective as speakers and yet were
politically expedient for the Democrats to use.

Morgen-

thau and Dern were of little value as campaigners; Miss
Perkins had little appeal outside New York; Hull was
respected by voters, but was a dull speaker; Cummings was
a good speaker but did not want to do much campaigning;
W

a

l

l

a

c

was politically effective only in farm areas.9

e

Some leading New Dealers outside the Cabinet could be
used little or not at all in the face of adverse public
opinion.

National Chairman Farley advised Harry Hopkins

to speak very l i t t l e , a n d Rex Tugwell not at a l l . ^
Hopkins* WPA was believed to be a campaign liability,
and Tugwell was under heavy fire for what many thought
was a political philosophy too far to the left.
Any member of the Administration who was political
ly "good medicine," and who was eager to campaign, was

^These were the opinions expressed to Ickes by
Farley in July, 1936. Ickes, Seoret Diary. Vol. I, p.
632.

James A. Farley, Jim Farley* s Story (New York:
Whittlesey House, 1 9 ^ 8 ) , p V S 3 .
■‘■•^Personal interview with Mr- Tugwell on December

29, 195*K

welcomed to the thin ranks of leading New Deal campaign
ers.

The Secretary of the Interior was both.
The public works program which Ickes administered

received more favorable public reaction than did WPA and
some of the other alphabetical agencies.

Emil Hurja, New

Deal statistician, reported that a survey of newspaper
editorials showed widespread support of PWA but that
only six per cent approved completely of WPA;-*-2 Frances
Perkins believed that PWA was a definite asset to the
President's cause;^^ Farley also considered PWA a cam
paign asset and advised that its administrator be used
as a speaker to capitalize upon i t . ^

The honesty and

incorruptibility generally attributed to Ickes' operation
of the Interior Department also helped to establish public
confidence.
*

The standing of Ickes with certain minority groups,
especially Jewish and Negro v o t e r s , e n h a n c e d his

1 2 Ickes, Secret Diary. Vol. I, p. 598.
■*■3"Never has there been a breath of scandal about
it
This was to be a great help to President Roose
velt In the days to come." Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt
I Knew (New York: The Viking Press, 19^-6), p. 27JI
^Jira Farley's Story, p. 57.
■^The popularity of Ickes with Negro voters was il
lustrated by a March 11 letter from Walter White to Ickes,
in which Mr. White said:
"Negro Americans have more con
fidence in and knowledge of yourself than of any other
member of the Cabinet," Ickes Papers, Container 2i+6.

potential value as a campaign speaker.

This standing

was illustrated by his frequent invitations to address
them.

These addresses, while ostensibly non-political,

certainly possessed political value in an election
season.

In early 1936, Ickes addressed two Negro groups

and one large Jewish rally.

On March 2, 1936, he deliver

ed the Charter Day address at Howard University; on May
Z

k

,

he addressed a United Palestine Appeal dinner audi

ence at New York's Hotel Astor (this address was broad
cast by N.B.C.); and on June 29 (again before an N.B.C.
microphone), he spoke to an NAACP meeting in Baltimore.
Iokes was eager to be used as a speaker.

He had

taken some part in almost every national polltioal con
test since his graduation from college.

He was intensely

partisan, and he loved the excitement of a campaign.

As

early as December, 1935, be urged the President to use
his services in any way possible in the coming campaign;1**
in April, he called Governor Horner to volunteer his
17
services in the gubernatorial contest in Illinois;
'

and, on May 8 , he assured Chairman Farley that he was
available for speaking assignments.1®

1 6ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p.
1 7 Ibld.. pp. 557-58.
1 8 Ibid., p. 5 8 0 .
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Of greater significance than the preceding factors,
however, was that Ickes filled one of the biggest needs
of Democratic campaign strategy:

the Democrats needed a

political "hatchet-man" in 1936* Ickes appeared to be
the best man for the Job.
THE NEW DEAL*3 “HATCHET-MAN"
In Chapter I it was pointed out that Democratic
strategy in the 1936 campaign followed three main lines:
(1) Watchful waiting:

not rushing to defend

against specific Republican attacks, but resting
on the broad New Deal record and moving to the
attaok whenever the Republicans showed a weakness
or made a mistake.
(2) Utilizing Franklin D. Roosevelt's appeal and
prestige as a non-political President until October
and as a campaigner thereafter.
(3 ) Preventing the full development of a Landon
boom.
The effectiveness of this strategy depended in no
small degree upon the extensive use of a well-known cam
paigner who would launch strong and unceasing attacks
upon the Republican party, its platform, its candidates,
and its prinolpal supporters; it required a good political
hatchet-man.
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If the Democrats refused to give speoific defense
to their opponents' charges, they needed someone to
launch a vigorous counter-attack.

If they withheld the

President until the Republicans had fully committed them
selves, they needed a strong covering offensive during
the tactical delay.

Democratic morale had to be kept up

by strong counter-fire, and the impression that the
Republicans had the field unchallenged had to be prevent
ed.

This required at least one political sniper prominent

enough and colorful enough to get his shots publicized by
a hostile press.
The type of personal campaign which the President
wanted to conduct also called for someone else to keep
the Republicans under heavy fire.

President Roosevelt

preferred to proceed on a discussion of broad issues,
never indulging in personalities in a speech or even
mentioning the name of his opponent:
In this campaign, as in all subsequent ones,
the President adhered to his policy of never
mentioning his opponent by name, and seldom even
by any allusion. There were several reasons for
this deliberate practice. Since he was the Presi
dent running for re-election, an attack by him
could only result in giving his opponent more
publlolty than he otherwise would get. It would
give his opponent a ohance to answer him, and
the very fact that he was answering a President
would build up publicity for the answer.

York:

■^Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New
Harper and Brothers, 1$52), p. I2 8 .

U-8
While it may have been expedient for the President to
keep himself on a higher and more general plane, obvious
ly someone needed to mention some names occasionally.

In

the opinion of at least one inside New Dealer, it was
specifically with this strategy in mind that the President
assigned himself a 'hatchet-man.^0
The third phase of broad Democratic strategy, that
of preventing a successful Landon boom, was oertainly
consistent with the assignment of at least one leading
campaigner to oonoentrate his speeches upon the Repub
lican platform and candidates.

Landon1s early build-up

could be neither ignored nor met in mere general terms.
His rapidly increasing popularity and prestige needed to
be oountered by strong and persistent attack on his
record, his platform, and his supporters.

When Ickes

beoarae the New Deal's "orator of the attack," this be
came his number one Job.
The evidence indicates clearly that Ickes was
given such an assignment.

The number of his attacks and

the importance apparently ascribed to them by the Roose
velt forces support this conclusion.

During the few weeks

of the campaign, Ickes attacked Governor Landon, Frank
Knox, Herbert Hoover, Alfred Smith, William Randolph

20
^Personal interview with Thomas G. Corcoran,
Presidential adviser in 1936, on January 28, 1955*

Hearst, Father Coughlin, Gifford Plnchot, Colonel Robert
McCormick, William Hard, an assortment of duPonts, the
Republican platform, and the Republican party in general.
The Democratic National Committee, and other organizations
supporting the Democratic ticket, considered these attacks
important enough to put nine of them on some kind of
radio network.

Five of them, totaling two hours and

fifteen minutes of radio time, were sent out on coast-tocoast networks.
In retrospect, many writers have pinned the hatchetman label on Harold Ickes.

Donald Rlchberg, one-time

administrator of the NRA, says of Ickes:
His intense partisanship made him the anointed
'hatchet man' of the Administration. He oould be
relied upon to attack any opposition with a
vehemence which would Insure bruised, battered, and
angry opponents wherever he swung his war club. 21
Harold F. Goenell, in Champion Campaigner:

Franklin D.

Roosevelt, also refers to Ickes as Roosevelt's hatchetman. 22
Pcrsonal interviews with several men aotlve in
the 1936 election produce unanimous agreement that Ickes
filled this role of attack in the campaign.

21Donald Rlchberg, My; Hero (New York:
Putnam' 8 Sons, 19540 » p. 2 3 8 .

Paul C.

G. P.

22Harold F. Gosnell, Champion Campaigner: FrankD. Roosevelt (New York: The Maomlllan Company,

27, p. 181.

Aiken, who directed the Democratic Speakers Bureau In
1 9 3 6 , referred to Ickes as the Administration’s "axe
man," adding that Roosevelt and Farley made calculated
use of Ickes’ talents In that direction.2^

Thomas G-.

Corcoran, while agreeing that Ickes was the appointed
hatchet-man of the New Deal, added still another term.
According .to him, Ickes was often referred to by New
Oh.

Dealers as "the king's champion."

This reference to

the special knight of old, whose Job It was to do the
king's fighting for him, seems to fit Ickes1 relation
ship to Roosevelt.

Some of the Secretary's close

associates, while agreeing that he played the part Just
described, indicated the opinion that he made his own
role— It was not one simply assigned.2^
undeniably has some accuracy.

This version

Ickes had always been a

reform agitator, albeit an unsuccessful one, and his
speeches had often been characterized by Invective be
fore I9 3 6 .

Two suoh addresses have already been cited,

one in Detroit and one In Rochester.

It was shortly

2 3personal interview with Mr. Aiken on February
1, 1955. .
2^Corcoran interview.
2^Both Straus and Wolfsohn, in interviews pre
viously cited, stated the opinion that Ickes, with his
eagerness to attack, made his own role, and that the
President and Farley approved— but did not originally
designate— this special function.

after these speeches that Steve Early, Presidential
Secretary, told Michael Straus that his Republican boss
o/C

would undoubtedly be sent out for more New Deal speeches. °
In this sense, Ickes made his own job.

Further, Ickes

was usually in the forefront of those suggesting that
various attacks be made, and he often volunteered to make
them.

As early as January 18, 1936, he urged Early to

get someone assigned to go after Alfred E. Smith and
William Randolph Hearst.27

He first suggested that

attacks be aimed at Landon on May 22 but found the Presi
dent unwilling for him to open up so soon.

Combining as

he did a firm belief in a strategy of attack and an ob
vious availability as a speaker, Ickes made himself the
logical candidate for the job of "king's champion."

Thus

his role was partly created by himself, partly assigned
as deliberate strategy, and partly developed by circum
stances as the campaign progressed.
That the President called the shots for his Secre
tary of the Interior, as for all

Administration campaign

ers, is certain.

President told Ickes to

On June 1, the

prepare his attack on the Republican platform for broadcast

2^The Early comment, coming on the same day that
another Roosevelt secretary, Grace Tully, told Iokes the
same thing, was construed by Ickes to represent the views
of the President. Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, 512-13.
2 7 Ibld., pp. 517-19.
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on June 7 . 2 8

On July 7, the President conducted a

strategy meeting at which he discussed with Farley and
other advisers the strategic moment at which to turn his
"champion" loose on Landon. 2^

By this time, Ickes1 role

as chief orator for the attack had apparently become a
confirmed part of Democratic plans.

On July 1, the Presi

dent described the assignment to him In a general way:
I /Iokes7 asked the President what part he ex
pected me to play in the campaign and he said he
wanted me to attack. I told him that I hoped he
would feel free to call upon me for anything that
I could do at any time and he said again that I
made such a grand attaok that that was what he
wanted.3°
Before the oampaign progressed very far, some
Republicans and Republican newspapers were apparently
aware of the nature of Iokes1 assignment.

In August,

the Kansas City (Missouri) Times called Iokes the Ad
ministration^ "oatch-as-catoh-can" f i g h t e r , t h e Ban
Diego Tribune labeled him the Administration's "dragon
hunter,"32 and Congressman Joseph Martin designated him
the "chief mudslinger" of the New Deal. 33

As a matter

2 8 Ibld.. p. 6 1 5 .
29jlm Farley^ Story, p. 6 3 .
3°Ibld.. p. 6 2 7 .
31Kansas City Times. August

k ,

1936.

32San Diego Tribune, August 2 9 , 1936.

33New York Times. August 29, I936, p. 5.
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of fact, suspicion existed before the campaign got under
way that Ickes was going to be used in a special and
active capacity.

The Springfield (Massachusetts) Repub

lican made this editorial comment on May 28, 193

6 :

The activity of Secretary Ickes as a widely
traveled speaker in behalf of the Roosevelt ad
ministration lends interest to a report which has
been current for some time and which has cropped
up again as the date approaches for the Republican
national convention at Cleveland. According to
the report, the Job of smashing Governor Landon,
in case he beoomes the Republican candidate, will
be assigned to Mr. Ickes, who Is mysteriously
credited with having 'something on 1 Governor
Landon which will enable him to carry out his as
signment.^
Whether the term

hatohet-man*' or some similar

word-pioture be applied to the campaign role of Ickes,
certainly his primary Job was leading the attaok on the
Republican party and particularly on its presidential
candidate.

This was not, to be sure, Ickes’ only

function in the campaign.

He continued to dedicate

PWA projects as his share in the Democratic emphasis
upon recovery through planning, and he made "non-politi
cal" addresses to minority groups where he could prove
effeotlve.

His big Job, however, was to press the attack

against Landon and company, and It Is with this aspect of
the campaign that the present study is primarily con
cerned.

3^Sprlngfleld Republican, May 28, 193 6,
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ICKES* QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE JOB
Aside from his general availability as a campaign
speaker, the Roosevelt forces felt that Ickes possessed
some special qualifications for the role he played.

To

begin with, he was a Republican who consistently declined
to switch to the Democratic label.

Moreover, he was a

Progressive Republican of the old "Bull Moose" variety.
He had managed the Cook County campaign for Theodore
Roosevelt in 1912 and the Illinois campaign for Hiram
Johnson in 1924.

In I936 Landon was strongly represent

ed by his backers to be a Theodore Roosevelt type of
Republican.

The presence in the Democratic Inner camp,

therefore, of a Republican with an unquestionable back
ground as a leading progressive was a Roosevelt asset
not to be ignored.

The Democrats had a progressive

Republican to loose against a Republican candidate who
himself claimed to be a progressive.

Acoordlng to Paul

C. Aiken, director of the Democratic Speakers* Bureau
In I9 3 6 , this waB one of the chief reasons why the
Roosevelt forces were eager to use Ickes so often against
Landon and his followers

.

^

5

Another qualification Ickes was thought to possess

Aiken Interview.
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aa a hatchet-man was hia relative invulnerability to
counter attack.

John Hamilton, Landon1a campaign manager,

aaid early in the campaign:
by being nice."36

"You can't win the campaign

Certainly if the Republican forces

had been able to discredit the man who attacked them ao
peraiatently, they would have done so.

The fact is that

Ickes was not particularly vulnerable.

His administra

tion of the Interior department and of PWA had been free
of scandal and of serious charges of political influence.
While the self-styled "curmudgeon"3? had made many
enemies, both inside and outside the Administration, he
had won respect for his honesty and hiB painstaking care
as an administrator.-^®

Ickes' record before entering

the Administration was, apparently, also able to bear
close scrutiny.

His opponents expended money and great

effort in Chicago trying to find something which could
be effectively used to discredit him, apparently without

36&OSnell,

OjD.

cit., p. 1 5 6 .

3?Harold L. Ickes, The Augoblography of a Curmud
geon ,(New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 19^3)» P- 2 *
38"PWA is one alphabetical agency which even the
Republicans have not dared to ridicule." Newark Ledger,
June 16, 1936.
"The gimlet-eyed Chicagoan who has kept
PWA so amazingly free from graft." Columbia (South Carolina) Reoord. June 19, I9 3 6 . "There have been few charges
of favoritism
".11 Washington Star. August 2, 1936.
/ T t l P j
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result.39

The most damaging personal Item which was

turned up against Ickes during the election was his secur
ing for his son, Robert, a minor clerkship on a federal
housing project in Boston.^

For the most part, the

Republicans had to be content to refer to him as a
“mudslinger“ and to emphasize the excesses of his attacks.
He proved difficult to discredit, either as a public of
ficial or as a private oitizen.

After the 1936 election,

he was still referred to as “Honest Harold.“
Ickes had another qualification which Democratic
campaigners thought would make him a good hatchet-man:
he was good “copy"; his speeches would be listened to
and read.

By campaign time, he had a reputation as a

hard-bitten, colorful oharaoter.

He had battled publicly

with Henry Wallace, Harry Hopkins, Robert Moses, Governor
Talmadge, Senators Long and Tydlngs, and numerous congressIci

men.

When he spoke his mind, he pulled no punches;^ this

had landed him often in print.
Newsmen considered him good copy, partially because
of his use of colorful expression.

Drew Pearson and Robert

3?Brown interview.
^Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 616.
^Ickes said of himself in this regard:
"I have
always envied the ability to thrust with a rapier but
since I can't do that I must be content with a bludgeon."
Letter to Henry J. Allen, editor of the Topeka State
Journal, August 18, 1936. Ickes Papers.
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Allen, in their “Washington Merry Go Round,“ said of him:
“Not only is Ickes the boss of an outfit that makes news
by its activity, but also the sardonic turn of his mind
produces words that make headlines." ^ 2

Ernest K. Llndley,

along this same line, referred to the Secretary of the
Interior as "the Cabinet w l t . " ^
His reputation as a political scrapper who did not
pull punches, his ability to make news by his use of
forceful and humorous language, and his Important posi
tion in the Administration all gave Ickes publicity
potential.

The radio audience was likely to listen to

him and the newspapers to print what he sa l d . ^

This

fact undoubtedly increased his qualification for the
special Job assigned him in 1936.
In summary, then, Harold Iokes was used In a
unique and important oapaclty as a speaker In the 1936
campaign.

It was his Job to lead the Democratic attack

on candidate Landon and indeed upon any Important op
position to the President.

His assignment was one which

he took with enthusiasm, one to which the President gave

^ Washington Post, November 19, 1935.
^Ernest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution
(New York: The Viking Press, 1933)» P* 290.
^**The President himself expressed this as a reason
for using Ickes so frequently as a speaker. Ickes,
Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 659*

complete approval, and one for which Ickee appeared to
he well qualified.

It is the further purpose of the

present study to inquire into the performance of Harold
L. Ickes in his assigned role.

CHAPTER III
PREPARING AND DELIVERING THE ATTACK
All of the five speeches given special consider
ation In thlB study were broadcast to a national radio
audience.'1' Radio broadoast required that each of these
speeches, be carefully prepared and timed for manuscript
reading.

It further required their delivery under the

physical limitations of microphone usage.

For this

reason, the general methods and techniques employed by
Secretary Iokes for the preparation and delivery of his
speeches were almost Identical for all five speeches.
Mr. Ickes had systematized his preparation and delivery
to a very high degree by the time the 1936 campaign was
underway.

The frequency with which he had acoepted

invitations to speak had virtually necessitated suoh
systematic preparation, if not delivery, of speeches.

O

To avoid chapter-by-chapter repetition, a gener
alized treatment of the speaker's preparation and
delivery is, therefore, presented in this chapter.

AIn only one of them, the speech delivered at
Columbus, Ohio, was there a "live" audience; the other
four were studio broadcasts.
2 Ickes' speech files show that at least 110
speeoh manuscripts were prepared between 1933 and June,
1936. Icke s Papers.
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Especially pertinent to the study of the speaker18 prepa'
ration and delivery are these factors:

the origin of

the speeoh ideas, the preparation and revision of the
manuscripts, publicizing the speeches, and the delivery
of the speeches.^
ORIGIN OF THE SPEECH IDEAS
The specific subjects with which Ickes dealt In
his attacks on Republicans were usually Ickes1 own Ideas.
The first all-out assault on Governor Landon, which was
eventually delivered on August 3, was suggested and outh,

lined to the President by Ickes on June 17.

Ickes had

^The information concerning speech preparation has
been gleaned chiefly from two sources: the collection of
Ickes1 private papers in the Library of Congress, and
personal interviews with several of his assistants and
other close associates. The Iokes collection contains
such items as letters concerning the formulation of speech
plans and Ideas, first drafts of speeches as diotated, all
subsequent drafts as revised (including the final copies
from which Ickes read), and memoranda from the Secretary’s
staff suggesting possible speech revisions.
Informants who proved most helpful in picturing
Ickes’ system for preparing and publicizing speeches were
Michael Straus, Joel David Wolfsohn, and Miss Helen Cun
ningham, all of the Secretary’s staff; Thomas Corooran and
Benjamin Cohen, presidential advisers and close friends of
Ickes; Paul C. Aiken, who directed the Democratic Speakers
Bureau; and Mrs. Jane Dahlman Ickes, Harold Ickes’ widow.
All of the people on this list were also helpful in regard
to information about delivery.
The Seoret Diary of Harold L. Iokes: The First
Thousand Days was a fertiTe source for information on the
genesis-of speech ideas and on general methods of prepa
ration.
^Ickes, Seoret Diary, Vol. I, p. 618.
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agitated for some kind of attack on Governor Landon even
before Landon was officially nominated and had already
noted ideas upon which he later based assaults on Landon’s
record.

The same may be Bald of the speeches castigating

William Randolph Hearst.

The first attack aimed primarily

at Hearst came on August 27, though Ickes had paid passing
respect to him in an earlier speech on June 7.

The broad

outline of the attack was suggested by Ickes to the Presi
dent and to Jim Farley early in July.^
The only major attack made by Ickes which was
definitely somebody else's idea was his June 7 attack on
the Republican platform.

The suggestion for the general

lines of that speech came to Iokes from the President,
though the idea originated with Stanley High, one of
Roosevelt’s "ghost writers."^

It is not to be inferred

that Iokes had a completely free hand as to subjeot
matter and time of attack.

All of the speeohes were

screened by the President or one of his advisers, modi
fications sometimes being effected, and the time of the
delivery of speeohes was determined by Roosevelt and his
closest political advisers.
The ideas in the oontent of his speeohes were,

^Ibld., p. 6 3 3 .
6Ibid., p. 6 1 3 .

62
according to Ickes, largely his own.?

Presidential ad

visers screened Iokes' speeches, hut they never wrote
them.

The insinuation was made several times in Repub

lican newspapers that Charles Nlchelson, publicity
direotor for the Democratic National Committee, was the
real author of the speeches.®

The fact Is that, ac

cording to Ickes' associates, Mlohelson did not write
any of them, nor did anyone else but Iokes.*7

A few

people might make suggestions for them before the first
draft was written, several people assisted in revising
and editing them, but the Secretary himself was the
author of the speeohes.
THE PREPARATION AND REVISION OF SPEECH MANUSCRIPTS
In his personal diary, Iokes has desorlbed briefly
the routine used for preparing his speech manuscripts:
After I have dictated a speech and revised it for
the first time, I send copies to several members of
my staff for corrections and suggestions. They go
over the draft very carefully and then I go over the
speech again, giving considerations to their sugges
tions. Some of them I adopt and some of them I do

?Ibld., p. 669.
^Examples of such suggestions of “ghosting" ap
peared in both the Indianapolis Star and the Washington
Herald on August
1936. Iokes took resentful note of
such charges. Iokes, Seoret Diary. Vol. I, p. 669.
^stated by Mr. Corcoran, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Straus, Mr.
Wolfsohn, Miss Cunningham, and Mrs. Ickes in personal
interviews between January 23 and February 1, 1955.

not adopt. And yet I have never felt that any of
these men were writing my speeohes. I adopt this
method merely because I think that every one in ray
position, speaking to a national audience, needs
some checks not only as to his faots but as to his
expressions.10
The first draft of Ickes* speeches were dictated,
with the assistance of only a few notes, to a private
seoretary.

This dlotation was usually done at the

Secretary’s office or home, though he dlotated at least
one speech while riding a train.^

According to one of

his secretaries, Miss Helen Cunningham,

12

Ickes could

dictate rapidly and well, with only a very few references
to previously prepared notes.

This first draft was typed

double-spaced with numbered lines to facilitate later re
vision.

The first revision was made by Iokes, and then

the manuscript went to several assistants for criticism
and further revision.
Among the advisers who were frequently asked to
make oorreotions and suggestion

were Michael Straus,

Harry Slattery, Milton Fairman, Aubrey Taylor, R. B.
Armstrong, and Joel David Wolfsohn.

All of these men

l°Ickes, Secret Diary. Vol. I, p. 619.
■^The first draft of the speech "Governor Landon,
Practical Progressive" was dictated in part to Iokes1
private secretary, Mr. Cubberley, enroute from Washing
ton to New York. Ibid., p. 650.
12personal interview, January 3 1 , 1955.
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exoept Slattery were former newspapermen from Chicago.

A

study of memoranda suggestions from them, found In the
Iokes Paper8 , reveals that they were thorough In their
work.

For the speech "What Shall the Republican Platform

Be?," for example, Straus made twenty-nine suggestions,
Slattery nine, and Taylor thirty-eight.

The Slattery

memorandum, the shortest of the three, Is quoted here, in
full, to illustrate the type of suggestions usually made:
June 5, 1936
MEMORANDUM for Seoretary Ickes:
I have read this draft over and it certainly is
a bull's eye.
I suggest on page 1, line 9, you delete the word
miscegenetio. You might say the 193^ marriage.
On page 3, line 10, I would suggest the wording
"so that the child can later play he is a farmer."
On page
lines 1^ and 15, I think because of
the radio you will have to identify Colonel Robert
R. McCormick. You might call him the newspaper
Colonel.
k ,

On page 5, line 20, I think you Bhould include
Mr. Hearst.
On page 6 , line 22, might it not also be wise to
add Mark Hanna?
On page 10, line 13, I suggest eliminating Senator
MoNary and substituting Senator Dickinson.
On page 12, lines 6 and 7, I think that this
sentence does not stand up well.
On page 1 3 , I suggest that you delete the sentence
from line 13 to 1 5 .
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On page 20, line 22, X think you will have to
Identify more definitely to your radio audience Lord
of San Simeon.
Harry Slattery ^
Of these nine suggestions, only two were completely re
jected, the rest being followed entirely or in part.
I* should be noted that Slattery’s suggestions
touohed upon subject matter as well as mechanics and
style.

The same was true of the longer memoranda of the

same date from Straus and Taylor.

Taylor went so far as

to submit an entirely new first page, and Straus offered
a new concluding section; these two suggestions were
ignored in the final draft, but most of the others were
not.1^
The preparation for an Ickes campaign speech was
thorough.

From three to six members of the Interior and

PWA staffs worked on each speeoh, and as many as seven
different drafts were sometimes prepared and revised
before a final manuscript emerged.

Any excesses in

thought or language which may have appeared in Ickes’
attacks were not the result of hasty or skimpy prepara
tion.
It should also be emphasized that these attacks
were never made without the approval of the White House.

13lokes Papers, Container 315.
l^Ibid.
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They were often read by the President, and they were
almost always checked by Stephen Early, presidential
secretary, or his assistant, W. D. Hassett.^

For ex

ample, Hassett read the speech entitled "Is Landon Sin
cere?" and sent a memo to Early referring to It as "a
foroeful address, a stinging Indictment of the Republi
cans."

Early then read the speech and sent the following

approval to Straus:
Bill /Hassett/ and I think the Secretary's speech
Is a masterpiece of Ironical and logical analysis of
the issues of the campaign. Let me know when he goes
on the air with this. I don't want to miss it. 16
PUBLICIZING THE ATTACK
One of the chief objectives of Ickes and his
staff, which Included several former newspapermen, were
being sure that a radio address would be well publicized.
They wanted It not only widely-heard, but also widelyread.

Consequently, IckeB fought for radio time and

extensive radio coverage; he arranged advance publicity
for his broadcasts; and he selected controversial

•^Memoranda from Straus to Early, from Hassett to
Early, and from Early to Straus. Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, Hyde Park, New York. These memoranda reveal that
Straus normally sent Ickes' speeches to Early. Either
Early or Hassett— or both— read the speeches and sent
White House approval.
1936.

■^Memorandum from Early to Straus on October 2,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

subjects and provocative speech titles to help gain both
radio listeners and newspaper readers.^7
For Ickes* speeches, securing a nation-wide, or at
least regional, radio audience was almost a "must.14
Michael Straus was under instructions to have sponsors of
the Secretary's speeches secure the widest possible radio
coverage.

This became an important criteria in determinTO

lng which speaking invitations would be accepted. °
Indeed Paul G. Aiken of the National Democratic Committee
organization found it almost impossible to get Ickes to
accept engagements unless network facilities were prom
ised.1^
To insure further their being widely heard, Ickes*
speeches were announoed several days in advance, usually
in a way calculated to create curiosity and interest.
For example, two announcements were released to the press
prior to the August 27 attack on Landon and Hearst.

On

August 24, the New York Times carried advanoe notice
under the heading "Iokes To G-lve Talk Over Badlo Thursday"
the sub-heading was "Secretary's Subject Not Disclosed."

•^From personal interviews with Straus and Aiken.
■^Straus interview.
^ A l k e n interview.
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Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, will
speak on a national radio hook-up over the Columbia
Broadoastlng System at 9:^5 P.M. (E.S.T.) Thursday,
the Democratic National Committee announced last
night from Its headquarters In the Hotel Biltmore.
Secretary Ickes' subject was not disclosed, but
it was Indicated that he would discuss some of the
questions raised In Governor Landon's talks at
Chautauqua Lake and in Buffalo.20
As a matter of plain fact, Ickes1 speech was to
ignore almost completely the two Landon addresses just
cited, but this hint could be expected to create interest.
Closer to the truth, though indirectly promising more
than the speech would deliver, was the preview carried
by the New York Times on the eve of the address.

This

item of advance publicity was headed "Secret Documents
Promised by Ickes," and the sub-title was:

"Democratic

Committee Says He Will Give Hearst Letters In Radio
Address."

The Committee’s release was quoted, in part,

as follows:
Secretary Ickes has sources of information of
his own which without aid of the committee have
produced documentary evidence of a raoBt enlighten
ing charaoter. It appears from these documents,
involving not only the Republican candidate but
also the Republican Vice Presidential candidate and
Republican National Committee members, that when
Landon followers want to convey suggestions to their
hope, the method they consider most effective is via
William Randolph Hearst. When 'suggestions’ come
from San Simeon, they rate as ’orders’ in Topeka. ■
1

20New York Times, August 2k, 1936, p. 6 .
2lNew York Times, August 27, 1936, p. 11.

By hints which were varied hut not always aocurate,
and by predictions which captivated Interest but perhaps
promised too much, Ickes* major addresses were given
build-up publicity.

The potential listener or reader

might have been tempted, too, by the titles selected for
the Secretary’s broadcasts.

Such announced titles as

“Governor Landon, Practical Progressive," "Hearst over
Topeka," "Is Landon Sincere?", "Landon, Coughlin,*et Al',“
and "Landon's Angels" were probably provooative enough to
win many listeners and assure more than average news
paper publicity.

These titles became especially effective

when coupled with Ickes’ reputation for vitriolic attack,
withering sarcasm, and sharp invective, a reputation upon
which Ickes capitalized and which he apparently fostered
in order to secure a wide hearing.

The effective use of

publicity was one of the strongest elements in Ickes*
efforts as a campaign speaker.
DELIVERING THE ATTACK
Ickes’ prepared addresses were all read directly
from manuscript.

The final reading copy of the manuscript

was typed double-spaced on half sheets of heavy paper,
each half-sheet being designed for a reading time of one
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minute.22
Little distinction needs to be made between Ickes*
delivery for broadcast speeches before a live audience
and for those which were studio broadcasts.

For the most

part, Ickes paid little or no attention to the audience
present.

He very infrequently looked up from his manu

script, and he seldom used any bodily action beyond head
gestures.

The only characteristic gesture recalled by

informants who were present at Ickes' addresses was one
used to halt audience applause.

Fearful of running over

his radio time, Ickes would raise one arm to request
silence when applause threatened to be at all prolonged.23
This gesture was necessitated by the fact that Ickes
frequently rebelled at cutting his speeches sufficiently
to get them comfortably Into radio time.

Straus, Wolf-

sohn, and Corcoran all observed that this was a serious
problem to those attempting to revise Ickes1 manuscripts.

2 2 Ickes» speaking rate was between I 35 and 150
words per minute. It was 14-7 for the June 7 address,
for the August 3 address, and 135 for the October 9 ad
dress. This compares with the average of 120 words per
minute for representative college orators reported in
William Norwood Brigance's "How Fast Do We Talk?",
Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, XII (November, 1926),
pp. 337-42.
1

^

5

23Mr. Straus, Miss Cunningham, and Mrs. Ickes all
mentioned this use of a common gesture on Ickes' part.
Mrs. Ickes tried to get him to allow time for applause
so the radio audience would be aware of the local res
ponse. Interviews.
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Ickes hated to see anything cut and sometimes restored
passages cut for time economy by his aides.

He

usually wound up trying to pack a thirty-minute

or

longer speech into twenty-seven minutes.
Ickes’ voice, while somewhat "dry,”2^ was strong,
and his articulation and pronunciation were considered
exceptionally good by some who heard him.

His tendency

to have to rush his rate of delivery, however, made him
a little difficult at times to follow.

Upon occasion,

also, his voice tended to beoome harsh and shrill.

This

was only during the most denunciatory sections of his
27
speeches. '
Despite these faults, most of them because of a
tendency to have to rush the reading of the manuscript,
Ickes’ delivery was effective.
important saving feature:

His delivery had one

a driving sincerity which

2**Personal interviews with Mr. Straus, Mr. Wolfsohn, and Mr. Corcoran.
2^ !!H1 b voice is dry, without melting oadences or
dramatic overtones.” Louisville Herald Post, October 26,
1936.
26Mr. Straus and Mrs. Ickes both expressed this
opinion of his articulation and pronunciation, and the re
cording of his 1937 speech favoring the President’s Supreme
Court plan supports that opinion. According to Straus,
Ickes made almost constant reference to a large dictionary
on his desk to confirm both word usage and pronunciation.
2?Straus Interview.
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carried conviction.2®

Ickes was an enthusiastic partisan

who believed in the Roosevelt oause and believed in his
own speeches.

His voice reflected this feeling and

carried a certain contagious sincerity, even amid the
saroasm and sometimes cruel humor.

It was this animated

presentation which compensated for delivery deficiencies
which otherwise might have rendered him ineffective as a
speaker.
In summary, Ickes1 preparation for his verbal
assaults on the Landon camp were both systematic and
thorough; his advance publicity was extremely wellhandled; and his delivery, while suffering from several
weaknesses, was generally effective.

2®Thoraas G. Corcoran believes this the outstanding
characteristic of Ickes* delivery, and Miohael Straus
also commented favorably upon it. Interviews. That
quality of animated sincerity is unmistakable in the 1 9 3 7
recording previously cited.

CHAPTER IV

"WHAT SHALL THE REPUBLICAN PLATFORM BE?"
Ickes’ first important 1936 campaign address was
delivered on June 7 and was broadcast over an N.B.C.
network.

Entitled "What Shall the Republican Platform

Be?", this speech satirized and denounced the Repub
lican party on the eve of its convention.
BACKGROUND AND SETTING OF THE SPEECH
The assignment to deliver the speech on the Repub
lican platform came to Ickes on short notice.

On June 2,

he explained:
The President asked me whether I was willing to
make a speech over the air on Sunday night for the
purpose of somewhat taking the wind out of the sails
of the Republican National Convention with respect
to its platform. This convention will meet in
Cleveland next week. He outlined one or two things
that he thought I might develop In my speech. The
plan appeals to me as being a good one, provided I
can deliver on my end of it. The subject can be
handled in such a way as to deflate the platform
pomposities and insincerities of the Republicans to
a considerable extent. It seems that Stanley High,
who is now very close to the President in a confi
dential capacity and who appears to be a highly
Intelligent and certainly a progressive individual,
first conceived the Idea. He approached Senators
Norris and LaFollette to see whether either of them
would make suoh a speeoh, but they did not get the
point. They both said they would rather wait until
after the convention and then oritloize the platform.
73

7b
Then thoughts turned to me, with the result that
the President made the proposal to me and I
accepted.
That afternoon, after discussing the proposed
speech with Stanley High, Ickes set to work on it.
June

By

copies of his once-revised draft were in the

hands of four of his assistants:
Taylor, and Falrman.

Straus, Slattery,

On June 5> eaoh presented a memo

randum containing suggestions for revision.

On the basis

of these suggestions, Ickes revised his speech and pre
pared it for final delivery.

Copies of the original

draft were also sent to the President and High, both of
2
whom expressed enthusiastic approval.
Ickes was also pleased with this speech.

He had

been chafing at the relative inactivity in the Democratic
campaign.

He considered the American Liberty League,

William Randolph Hearst, Landon, and several other enemy
targets to be extremely vulnerable, and this speech gave
him an opportunity to get at most of them in a single
effort.

The Landon candidacy, in particular, he thought

should be attacked; and the only direct referenoe to the

^Ickes, Secret Diary. Vol. I, p. 6I3 .
2Ibld., p. 615.

75
Kansas Governor so far had proved a mistake.^

It seemed

evident at this time that Landon would secure the Repub
lican nomination.

On May 20, Herbert Hoover indicated

that he would not be aotive in any "stop-Landon" cam
paign, thus severely handicapping the efforts of con
servatives who desired to rally about the ex-Presldent.^
On June 3 , Landon1s prospects were further enhanced by a
break in a three-state Eastern bloc which had been
thought opposed to him.

J. Henry Rorabaok, Republican

leader in Connecticut, announced that his state's nine
teen votes would go to the Kansan on the first ballot.
The next day, Charles Michael of the New York Times re
ported that some Republican leaders were freely predicting
his nomination on the first ballot.-’ It appeared that
Landon was the candidate Roosevelt would face in November
and that the time had come to open fire upon his party.
The problems the Republicans faced in drafting a
platform made them appear vulnerable to the type of attack
the President wanted.

To maintain serious hopeB for

3ln May, Farley publicly referred to Landon as
the Governor of "a typioal prairie state." This was
pounced upon by Republicans as a slighting reference to
a Midwestern state and the President considered the
referenoe a definite error. Samuel I. Rosenman, Working
with Roosevelt (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952)
p. 1.25:
^ e w York Times, May 20, I936,.p. 15.
^New York Times, June k, 1936, p. 1.

victory, the Republican party needed to win back the
support of the progressives of their own party, who had
supported Roosevelt In 1932, and to appeal to liberal
Independents.

Yet, at the same time, they had to retain

the wholehearted backing of the conservatives who consti
tuted the bulk of the party's strength.

To write a plat

form guaranteed to appeal to these almost antipodal
groups was indeed a herculean task.

On the same day that

Ickes was to deliver his address, Arthur Krock noted the
extreme difficulty of framing a platform upon which
Landon could run and yet upon which the supporters of
Herbert Hoover, Arthur Vandenberg, and William E. Borah
could agree.^
Some specific planks upon which Eastern business
interests and Western agrarian factions were already
divided before the Republican convention were those con
cerning currency, business regulation, foreign policy,
and the farm program.

On June 1, the Supreme Court

created another divisive factor; by a 5~^ decision, it
invalidated the New York state minimum wage law.

Pre

viously, Republicans had been united in praising the
Supreme Court in its defense against New Deal “assaults
upon the constitution"; now the Court had rendered a

^New York Times, June 7, 1936, Seo. 4, p.
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deolsion manifestly unpopular with labor groups and
liberal elements within the party.

Hamilton Fish, Repub

lican congressman from New York, asserted that this
decision would cost the Republicans a million votes.

7

It undoubtedly presented another headache to the already
beleaguered Republican platform framers.

Into such a

background, Harold Ickes projected his pointed and parti
san observations about the forthcoming Republican platform.
PURPOSE AND THESIS OF THE SPEECH
The purpose of the June 7 address, as stated by
the President, was "taking the wind out of the sails of
O
the Republican party with respect to its platform."
In
the face of such divergent interests within the Republican
party, Democratic leaders felt certain that the platform
adopted at Cleveland would be vague and fence-straddling
on many difficult issues.

It was possible, however, that

these unresolved conflicts could be camouflaged beneath
generalized language In some places and covered completely
by strong attacks on the New Deal In others.

It was Ickes'

task to expose these conflicts to public view, indicating
to voters what they should examine olosely in the finished
platform.

The emphasis upon irony and sarcasm whioh Ickes

7New York Times. June 3> 1936, p. 1.

8lckes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 613.
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gave to the speech was not without purpose either.

Making

the efforts of the Republican convention an object of humor
and ridicule was calculated to undermine the picture of a
"crusade" against the New Deal which Republican leaders
were painting.
Locating the thesis of this speech is much more
difficult than analyzing Its purpose.

At no place in the

development did the speaker make any perceptible effort
to clarify for the listener the proposition which he was
supporting.

A close study of the manuscript reveals no

single, definite proposition, and Ickes’ own analysis of
the speech Indicated none.^

As a later analysis of his

forms of support reveals, the speaker seemed more intent
upon creating oertaln audience attitudes than upon sup
porting any specific thesis.

That Ickes’ specific purpose

in this address required support of no single proposition
is a recurring factor in the further analysis of the
speech.
LINES OF ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION
Briefing an IckeB speech is not a simple task.

So

numerous were the targets which Ickes attempted to hit
and so varied the ideas which he injected during the course
of a speech, that the organization was often loose and

9lbld.. p. 615.
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Indefinite.

From the June 7 speech, however, four main

lines of argument oan be seen:
(1) Republicans are trying to produce a platform
which will appear new and progressive but which
will, in reality, remain ultra-conservative.
(2) The Republican platform-makers must serve
too many conflicting Interests to be able to pro
duce a frank and definite platform.
(3) Republicans face serious dilemmas on several
specific planks.
(4) The Republican convention, ostensibly free,
will still be controlled by bosses and special
interests.
Actually, since he was trying more to create
audience attitudes than to support a particular thesis,
Ickes probably considered these four lines of thought
less important than the treatment of personalities which
accompanied them.

His own synopsis of the speech gives

weight to such a conclusion:
I gently kid the Republican leadership, the
platform makers, and Governor Landon, who, from
every indication, will be the Republican nominee,
perhaps on the first ballot. I even poke fun at my
old friends William Allen White, Clifford Pinchot,
and Frank Knox. I do discuss possible Republican
party planks in a serious vein, but I go no further
than to point out the dilemma in which the Republi
cans will find themselves at Cleveland. I comment
on the fact that William Randolph Hearst was the
discoverer of Governor Landon, and I picture him as
the dictator of the Republican platform and the
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absentee boss who will determine the deliberations
at Cleveland aB successor to former Republican bosses,
such as Tom Platt, Murray Crane, Mark Hanna, Matt
Quay, and Boise Penrose. I point out that an effort
has apparently been made to select as the candidate
of the Republican party the man who Is the least
troubled by views on any subject and who Is least
qualified, on the basis of experience, to be President
of the United States.^-0
Always Jealous of his speech time, Ickes spent
little of- It In introduction or conclusion.

In this par

ticular speech, the introduction proper consisted of one
paragraph of three sentences:
You have all heard about the mountain that con
ceived and brought forth a mouBe but have you ever
heard about the mouse that conceived and brought
forth a mountain? This may seem to be an Impossible
achievement but nevertheless it Is about to be at
tempted at Cleveland, Ohio. There, If you are
sufficiently interested, you will be able this week
to witness a supreme effort on the part of a politi
cal mouse to produce a platform which will lift Its
peaks in sheer rugged grandeur into the very heavens
from an arid and barren waste.
Prom this point, Ickes went directly into a satiri
cal description of the personnel charged with delivering
and caring for "baby platform."

Each man was assigned a

role presumably based on his special funotlon at the
convention.

For example, Herbert Hoover was the obste

trician; William Allen White was the plastic surgeon;

3-0Ibid. , p. 615.
■^All quotations from the speech are taken from the
final manuscript from whloh Ickes read. A copy of this
manuscript is in the Ickes Papers.
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William E. Borah supplied the anti-monopoly bib and
isolation tucker; Gifford Pinchot donated a conservation
romper; Frank Lowden supplied overalls and toy pitchfork
for playing farmer; and William Randolph Hearst and
Robert R. McCormick sponsored the baby.

In this section

of the speech, Ickes did more than set the stage for
further argument.

While apparently presenting it for

humorous effect, he nevertheless made the point that the
platform would be progressive in superficial appearance
but conservative in reality.
Next, departing from figurative exposition, the
speaker noted that the varied interests which the Repub
licans would attempt to satisfy made a clear-cut platform
impossible.

Among the groups Ickes cited were, political

ly, the "rugged individualists" of the Hoover line, and,
economically, the "vested interests."

Among the indivi

duals whose views had to be considered were Andrew Mellon,
William E. Borah, Ogden Mills, Gifford Pinchot, Frank 0.
Lowden, and, finally, William Randolph Hearst.

Ickes

said he excluded Landon because "since first he was dis
covered by William Randolph Hearst and his fellow wise men
from the East, Governor Landon has had no clear-out, forth
right view's— at least none that he has ventured to express
openly."
After a brief digression to attack Hearst, considered
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by many a political liability to Landon, the speaker then
took up the dilemmas of the Republicans on specific planks.
The New York Times in a June 8 summary of the speech list
ed these six planks:

attitude toward the Supreme Court

(after the New York minimum wage law was struck down), the
gold standard, balancing the budget, the farm program,
social security legislation, and relief.12

To these six

should be added the subjects of banking and federal
housing.

In each area, Ickes pointed up what he believed

to be dilemmas from which the Republican platform could
not escape with credit.

On several points he challenged

Republicans to present specific improvements over the New
Deal.
Finally, Ickes charged that the convention would
not be a "free” one, that Its platform and its candidate
would in reality be dictated by William Randolph Hearst.
He added that the candidate selected would be the one
"whose record is the most colorless, whose views on the
burning-issues of the day are least known, and whose con
victions are most accommodating."
The conclusion of the speech was even more brief
than the introduction.

Spending no time In summary, it

concluded in a single sentence:

"Of a truth, it does

ISflew York Times, June 8 , 1936, p.
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appear that the Republican party la about to fare forth
on a blind date, the location of which is unknown."
THE FORMS OF SUPPORT
For the purposes of organization and clarity, the
analysis of Ickes• rhetorical forms of support is based
on the Aristolelian classification of three types of
appeal:

ethical, emotional, and l o g i c a l . T h e s e appeals

are not, to be sure, always used separately; a single
argument may rest on a combination of elements of all
three types of appeal.

They do, however, present

functional divisions of the basic character of arguments,
and as such they have become almost stereotypes in
rhetorical criticism:
Rhetoricians sinoe Aristotle have generally
accepted his concept that the modes of persuasion,
depending upon the effect they produce in hearers,
•are of three kinds, consisting either in the moral
character of the speaker or in the production of a
certain disposition in the audience or in the
speech itself by means of real or apparent demon
stration. • These, in the order mentioned by
Aristotle, are usually called the ethical, the
pathetic or emotional, and the logical. Most
rhetorical estimates are based in some degree upon
this classification, many being so firmly founded

3-3“Of the means of persuasion supplied by the
speech Itself there are three kinds. The first kind
reside in the character /etho
'
e
second consist In productlng
attitude in the hearer; the third appertain to the
argument proper, in so far as it actually or seemingly
demonstrates." Lane Cooper (trane.), The Rhetorlo. of
Aristotle (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1932),
p. tJ.
~r

t

84upon it as to become noticeably stereotyped.1**'
In Ickes1 address entitled "What Shall the Repub
lican Platform Be?", his argument, judged by rhetorical
standards for logical demonstration, was weak; nor was
the appeal through the character of the speaker especial
ly strong.

His strongest appeals were directed toward

the emotions of his national radio audience.
The speech did not suffer greatly from demonstra
ble inaccuracies of fact, from inconsistency, or from
fallaoies in the reasoning process.

It simply did not

lay much stress upon logical proof.

Little attempt was

made, for example, to establish the validity of the
factual matter involved in the speech.

Facts for a

speech are normally established by use of statistics,
testimony, or example;1^ to a very large degree, Ickes
shunned two of these.

A study of the text of this

thirty-minute address reveals only one use of statistics
and only one of authoritative testimony.
pear in a single argument.

These both ap

When refuting the claim of

Henry J. Allen of Kansas that Great Britain was achieving

^ L e s t e r Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech
Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1928),
P. 331.
■^Glles Wilkeson Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public
Speaking: Principles and Practice (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 195i)» P. 285.
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bettor recovery than the United States at a lower cost,
Ickes presented this brief argument:
In his enthusiasm to make an onslaught on the
New Deal, Mr. Allen did not tell all the facts.
According to the Wall Street Journal’s London cor
respondent, Great Britain paid more than two
billion dollars last year, or about one seventh of
its Income, for Its elaborate system of health, un
employment, old age, widows and orphans1 pensions,
grants to keep children in school, low cost housing
and other projects. To equal this the United States,
with three times England’s population and a present
Income of fifty billion dollars, would have to spend
about seven billion dollars a year, a figure far
beyond the current outlay.
In this argument lay the only attempt In the
entire speech to establish a conclusion by use of statis
tics or testimony.

The speaker was somewhat less stinging

with the use of example.

He used, in fact,a large number

of examples, but In only one Instance were the examples
used as "argument11 in the strictest sense of the word.
Most of the examples were used as exposition and ampli
fication.

Since, however, exposition and amplification

can be, and often were, used as less direct forms of
persuasion, these instances should not be entirely
Ignored.

The more obvious use of examples as argument

occurred when Ickes attempted to demonstrate that the
Republican record gave little reason to expect a favor
able Republican agricultural program.

First, he alluded

to their recent record while in opposition:
It is to be taken for granted that a soft pedal
will be put upon such men as Senator Daniel 0.

/
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Hastings, representing the State of the libertyloving duPonts, who insulted several thousand farmers
not long since when he declared that they had been
bribed to
come to Washington topresent their griev
ances. It is to be doubted whether the platform will
applaud the decision of the Supreme Court which put
an abrupt
stop to the farmer's production adjustment
programs.
The Republicans will not point with pride
to their vote of 6^ against 19 for in the House of
Representatives and of 11 against and 5 for in the
Senate on the Soil Conservation and Domestic allot
ment Act which represented an attempt to salvage
whatever might be possible after the Supreme Court
had declared the A.A.A. Act to be un-constitutional.
Then he turned to the record of the last Republican
term in office:
They /the farmers/ remember how the Hoover-Wall
Street steamroller flattened out Mr. Lowden and the
farmers at the Republican Convention at Kansas City
in 1928, even although//sic/ after Mr. Lowden and
the farmers had gone home on that occasion, the Con
vention paid its usual sardonic llpservice /slo7 to
agriculture. They recall how after the MoNary-Haugen
plan, which they wanted, had been Junked, the Farm
Board plan, that they hadn't asked for, was enacted;
how the Fordney-McCumber industrial tariffs were
boosted still higher in the Smoot-Hawley Act; and
how agriculture, along with the rest of the oountry,
came to a grand smash in 1 9 3 2 .
The ostensibly expository examples appear in sup
port of three of the four main lines of argument.

In

demonstration of his belief that the Republican platform
would be superficially progressive but basically conser
vative, Ickes enumerated and characterized the men who
■ he said would be key figures in determining the platform.
Through his half-humorous, but usually "slanted," des
criptions, he cited as examples of "progressive windowdressing" Gifford Pinchot and William Allen White, men
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respected by liberal and progressive voters; as the true
powers in the platform determination, he cited Herbert
Hoover and William Randolph Hearst, names which were
politioal anathema to progressives of both parties.
In Ickes’ argument that the Republicans faced too
many conflicting interests to come up with a frank and
definite platform, he cited several examples of people
and groups who would have to be pleased or appeased.
Again in his contention that specific planks presented
difficult dilemmas, Ickes turned to the example to de
velop his idea.

He cited the specific problems, but,

with the exception of that concerning farm policy, he
merely explained the problem, making no forecast and
drawing no conclusions.
While Ickes did little to prove his statements
through logical support, it should be noted that he was
dealing, in many cases, with rather generally accepted
information.

The platform problems of the Republicans

had been aired in newspapers for several days preceding
the speech.

The New York Times had already mentioned

these problems both in news oolumns and editorially.

For

example, Amos Pinchot had been quoted on the gold standard
problem on June 1;

Charles R. Michael discussed platform

•^New York Times, June 1, 1 9 36, p. 2.
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difficulties in general on June
on June 5»

IB

more specifioally

and Arthur Krook pointed up platform con

flicts among the Landon, Borah, Vandenberg and Hoover
forces editorially on the same day that Ickes spoke.^
More than once in Ickes1 speech he asserted that
Landon had no stated views of his own on important ques
tions and that both he and the convention were dominated
by publisher Hearst.

The first of these two statements
20
might have been sustained from other sources;
concern
ing the second, certainly Hearst was vigorously supporting
the Kansas Governor, but the assertion that Hearst con
trolled Landon and the convention required proof.

An

analysis of the validity of this charge will be reserved
for the chapter dealing with the speech “Hearst Over
Topeka," in which Ickes attempted to prove his charge.
On June 7, however, it was not generally asserted or

l?New York

Times,June 4, 1936, p. 2.

•^New York

Times.June 5»

1936, p. 1.

l?New York

Times.June 7,

1936, Sec. 4,

p.

2 ®Krock__stated on June 3 :"Little
ornothing is
known of his /Landon’s/ views on the most acute public
questions." New York Times, June 3> 1936. Senator
Vandenberg was reportedly disturbed also by Landon’s
failure to state his views. New York Times, June 7,
1 9 3 6 , See. 4, p. ty.
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believed,*•and it required proof to be sustained.

21

Logical

proof was, however, something relied upon very little in
the speech hitting the unborn Republican platform.

Ickes

relied primarily upon partisan exposition of generally
aocepted premises and upon repeated and varied assertion
of more controversial conclusions.

After all, he was

more intent upon creating attitudes of suspicion and
distrust toward the forthcoming platform than he was in
logically demonstrating a specific proposition.

For this

reason, demonstrable fact and logical development played
a secondary role to suggestion and innuendo.
One of the three most important means of persua
sion, according to the Arlstolelian division, resides in
the personality and character— the "ethos"—
speaker.22

of the

This personal factor undoubtedly aided Ickes

in his June 7 speech, though he made relatively little
attempt to capitalize consciously upon it.

It has been

pointed out in Chapter II that Ickes had a good reputation
as an honest and efficient public official and as a
private citizen.

He brought to the platform with him the

prestige of an important man in the Administration and

2^Ickes himself later expressed dissatisfaction
with the public reaction to the Hearst charge, especially
with the almost unanimous newspaper rejections of it.
lokes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 671.
22Cooper, ojo. clt. . pp. 8-9.
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the respect accorded an honest and efficient one.

The

major concern at present Is with his own efforts as a
speaker— in this particular speeoh— to enhance his
ethical appeal.
Any attempts Ickes made to lend weight to his
words by the revelation of his own character were in
direct ones.

The speech was approached from the third-

person point of view; at no time did the speaker refer
directly to himself.

Instead he referred to "this

Administration," "the Roosevelt Administration," and
"President Roosevelt."

Ickes spoke as a representative

of the New Deal, for it was the ethos of the Adminis
tration that he sought to build.

For example, Ickes

said of the future Republican farm plank:
The farmers know what the Roosevelt Administration
has done and is continuing to do to improve their
economic and social lot. They know that while this
Administration has made few promises it has tried in
good faith to keep its pledges, despite constant
Republican opposition and notwithstanding the bitter
antagonism of Wall Street and those interests closely
allied with the Republican party. . . .
A few paragraphs further on, the same type of appeal
appeared again:
This Administration has made an honest and deter
mined effort to strengthen our banking system so as
to prevent a recurrence of what happened during the
preceding Administration, when thousands of banks
toppled over, carrying with them the savings of
millions of American citizens. We have also enacted
legislation to protect those who buy securities.
These reforms have been effected in spite of the
bitter opposition of men and interests influential
in the councils of the Republican party.

These typical examples show how Ickes emphasized
the “intelligence, character, and good w l l l " ^ of the
Roosevelt Administration.

It is worth noting that with

the build-up for the Administration went a contrasting
application of negative ethos to the Republican party.
This prooess of stripping from the Republicans those at
tributes which win confidence was especially in evidence
in those places where I c k e B described, ridiculed, and
derided individual Republican leaders.

The insinuation

of insincerity and the sardonic commentary upon past
performance were well-calculated to undermine Republican
prestige.
As he lauded the Democratic Administration and
attacked the Republicans, Ickes remained simply an Ad
ministration spokesman.

The closest approach to a

personal referenoe came at a point where his personal
pride In PWA expressed itself:
They /the public/ know that useful, valuable, and
sooially-desirable public works that have added great
ly to the assets of the oountry have been built with
a resultant uplift of business and Industry.
In the main, Ickes stuck to building up Adminis
tration ethos and destroying that of the opposition.

The

23These are the attributes, according to Aristotle,
whioh gain belief through the person of the speaker.
Ibid., p. 92.

emphasis w.ae predominantly upon the latter.
The strongest appeals In the speech were directed
to the emotions of the audience:
to the desire for security.

to fear, to prejudice,

In his efforts to create an

air of uncertainty and suspicion, Iokes associated the
Republicans with the dark days of the depression.
Following the same line adopted by most Democratic
speakers in 1936> be cast the blame for the severity of
that depression on the Republicans, especially upon the
Hoover Administration:
The people remember all too well the vacillation,
the ineptitude, the division of counsel and the actual
cowardice that controlled the Republican party when
the depression broke over the land in the fall of
1929.
At other points In the speech, he referred to the "plunge
toward the economic abyss that this Administration halted
when it came into power in Maroh of 1 9 3 3 »"‘fco “the pre
cipitous road that we were following toward national
ruin," and to "what happened during the preceding Adminis
tration, when thousands of banks toppled over, carrying
with them the savings of millions of American citizens."
Iokes alBo aroused the fear of "boss oontrol,"
both directly and by Innuendo.

He charged that the plat

form had been "drafted by a few men and approved in
advance by the same interests that have controlled the
Republican party since the days of Theodore Roosevelt,"
and that the convention would be controlled by an
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"absentee boss," William Randolph Hearst.

He managed,

too, several occasions for injecting into his speech
passing references to former Republican "Bosses" Tom
Platt, Murray Crane, Mark Hanna, Matt Quay, and Boise
Penrose.

Nor did he neglect the naming of Warren Hard

ing in a "meeting at midnight in a smoke-filled hotel
room.!*
A third element of doubt and uncertainty was
drawn from the likely Republican candidate.

The absence

of public information concerning Governor Landon's views
on important issues was the weapon selected by Ickes.

On

three separate occasions, the speaker referred to Landon's
unknown views.

He asserted that Landon had "no clear-cut,

forthright views," and labeled the Kansas Governor "a
new political Messiah, than whom no Delphic oracle has
been more abstemious or cryptic in his utterances."
Ickes d o s e d with a statement epitomizing the elements
of doubt and uncertainty with which he had been stirring
the fears of the voters:

"Of a truth, it does appear

that the Republican party is about to fare forth on a
blind date, the location of which is unknown."
Coupled with the stirring of apprehension concern
ing the Republican platform and candidate were positive
appeals to the desire for security.

He referred to the

Roosevelt Administration's record of economic recovery

in glowing terms.

He cited the Democratic efforts to

revive the Amerioan economy, to relieve the deprivation
which depression had entailed, and to provide future
security for the people individually and collectively.
Special appeals were directed toward workers, farmers,
s'

and small investors.

The running contrast of the Hoover

Administration as a "do-nothing administration" with the
Roosevelt Administration as a "do-somethlng administra
tion" wac calculated to stir up vague fears on one hand
and a feeling of confidence on the other.
A type of supporting device used by Ickes which
can be included under the general heading of emotional
proof was humor.

While humor is probably used more often

as a device for holding attention or for creating good
will toward the speaker, it can also be used as subtle
but effective persuasion.
this way.

Ickes used it primarily in

His description of the personnel assisting

in the birth of "baby platform" was, for example,
satire gentle in degree but sharp in purpose.

It was

clever enough in wording and resembled reality enough
in its implications to make the Republican convention a
subject of ridicule.

This paragraph helps to illustrate

the method employed:
This expected progeny, the result of a mesalliance
between the Republican party and the Liberal League,
is awaited with hope-filled hearts, not only by the
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parents, "but by all the surviving members of a once
numerous family. Nothing has been spared In the way
of pre-natal oare. . . . Famous medicine men, skill
ed in their several specialties, already have fore
gathered in Cleveland, and are hurrying there, to
chant their Incantations while introducing to the
world a product which, if it lives up to advance
notices, will constitute a new world prodigy.
Having thus set the slyly humorous tone of the satire,
the speaker proceeded to specific party leaders who would
be present.

The following paragraph is typical:

Properly to clothe the infant, a layette has been
carefully collected. After all, it would be an af
front to good taste to expose the Infant in all its
nakedness. William E. Borah, of Idaho, if still
present, will be granted the privilege of supplying
an anti-monopoly bib, as well as a tucker to protect
against the chilling blasts of foreign alliances.
Frank 0. Lowden, of Illinois, will present a suit of
overalls and a toy pitchfork so that the child oan
play at being a farmer. Gifford Pinchot, of Pennsyl
vania, will supply a conservation romper done in his
best style.
The close blending of fact and fancy enabled Ickes to
suggest effectively by innuendo what might have been less
graphic and more difficult to establish if attempted
through more obvious forms of argument.

His satirical

approach struck Rt Republican ethos through gentle
ridicule and, at the same time, argued against Republican
sincerity and good faith.

The same purposeful humor was

also used in figurative references to Landon's discovery
by "William Randolph Hearst and his fellow wise men from
the East,” and to the monetary assistance expected by
Republicans from Jouett Shouse, President of the Liberty
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League', as "wet nurse" and the duPonts as "pulmotor
operators. "
Ickes told no funny stories and Introduced no
humor simply for humor’s sake.
and broad satire.

He specialized In irony

His was humor designed to persuade,

not Just to amuse.
Although Ickes’ use of language Is dlsoussed
later under another chapter sub-heading, it should be
mentioned here that his use of word-symbols possessing
emotive value2** contributed substantially to the emotion
al proof of the speech.

By the suggestion involved in

carefully chosen language symbols, Ickes pictured the
Republican party as the party of special interests, of
political corruption, and of arch-conservatism.

Ickes’

references to "the Liberty League," "the liberty-loving
duPonts," "Andrew Mellon," "Wall Street," and "vested
interests" were primarily emotive rather than referential,
constantly associating the Republican party with special
financial interests.

By the same token, references to

"Ballinger, Fall, and Sinclair," to the "Ohio gang," and
to "a smoke-filled hotel room" were de a r l y intended

^According to Thonssen and Baird, words have both
"referential" and "emotive" value, the former value being
strictly denotative and the latter arising out of the
emotional reaction the word calls forth from the reader
or hearer. Thonssen and Baird, 0£. cit., pp. 3 6 8 -6 9 .

to picture the Republican party as a party of graft and
corruption.

Such terms as “Old Dealers," "rugged in

dividualists," and "Republican reactionaries," taken in
context, were intended to leave no doubt that the Repub
licans were a party of political arch-conservatism.
Ickes' attack on the Republican platform placed
heavy emphasis upon emotional proofs, and the use of
"loaded" language stereotypes was one of the strongest
manifestations of that emphasis.
USE OF LANGUAGE
Ordinarily, one of the most important criteria
for rhetorical analysis of a speaker's language is
whether the style is more characteristically oral than
written.

William Norwood Brlgance has emphasized the

difference between these two styles:
There are sharp and important differences between
the use of written words and the use of spoken words
These differences grow out of the fact that one
style is intended for the eye and the other for the
ear. The reader may absorb at leisure; the hearer
must take it on the wing. . . .
In short, the difference between written and
spoken style is this: written style must be ulti
mately intelligible to the reader. Spoken style
must be instantly intelligible to the hearer.25

25willlara Norwood Brlgance, Speech Composition
(second edition, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc
1953)* P. 200.
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In Ickes* case, the finished manuscript needed both to
read well and deliver well.

As noted in Chapter II,

Democratic campaign leaders were Interested in getting
Ickes* attacks widely printed as well as widely heard.
This particular speech revealed primarily characteristics
of oral style, but, in one or two respects, it leaned
toward a style more effeotive for readers than for
hearers.
The "instant intelligibility" of which Brlgance
speaks may be gained in several ways.

Among these ways

are the using of language which is both vivid and simple
and of employing sentences and clauses which are rela
tively short and uncomplicated in structure.
language was certainly vivid enough.

Ickes'

His speech was

dotted with illustrations, comparisons and contrasts,
figurative language, and rhetorloal questions.

His

illustrations and comparisons have been previously
noted in the discussion of forms of support.

Of his

extensive use of figurative language there can be no
question.

Indeed, almost the first ten minutes of the

thirty-minute address was built around figurative ex
position.

The first paragraph treated the Republican

party as "a political mouse" trying to create a

^Brlgance lists these as the main objective
elements of vividness in language.
Ibid., pp. 200-01.

"mountain,11 an imposing platform.

Ickes then pictured

the entire convention as a birth and post-natal occasion,
with the platform as the baby and leading Republicans
as attending personnel.

Even after becoming more literal,

Ickes Indulged in countless figurative and vividly des
criptive words and phrases.

He referred to the platform

writers as "phrase mongers" and as "verbal tightrope
walkers"; he called the depression an "economic abyss";
he accused the Republicans of "shadow-boxing" and of
"spreading weasel-words"; he denounced "the Hoover-Wall
Street steamroller" of the 1928 Republican convention;
he likened the Republican overtures to farmers to the
grandmother guise of Red Riding Hood’s big bad wolf; he
sarcastically characterized Governor Landon as a "new
political Messiah" and likened him to an alraost-silent
"Delphic Oracle"; he likened the Republican convention
to a "marionette show"; and he pictured the Republican
selection of Landon to run on an indefinite platform as
"a blind date, the location of which is unknown."

Such

striking and pictorial language helped Ickes to maintain
the attention of his hearers and to make his thoughts
"Instantly intelligible" to them.

The language employed

also read well enough to elicit chuckles from President
Roosevelt as he read the manuscript of the speeoh.2?

2?Ickes, Seoret Diary, Vol. I, p. 615.
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Ickes also made fairly extensive use of the
question, another language form which adds rhetorical
clarity and directness.

Some of the questions employed

were purely rhetorical.

The opening sentence was of this

type:

"You have all heard about the mountain that con

ceived and brought forth a mouse, but have you ever heard
of the mouse that conceived and brought forth a mountain?1*
Another rhetorical question was used after Frank 0. Lowden
was referred to as a "show window" display for farmers:
"He is all dressed up but has he In fact any place to
go

?

"

Many of the questions used by Ickes were put
directly as challenging dilemmas to the Republican con
vention, and they usually occurred in a series.

In

regard to social security, the Secretary posed these
questions:
What will be the pronouncement of the platform
on this subjeot? Will it be a vague, indefinite
and meaningless generalization? Will the Repub
licans declare for a national system of social
insuranoe or will they say that it is a matter for
the states? And If the states are to handle all
questions of social insurance will the Republicans
propose a plan that will work and which the states
will adopt?
Both of these types of questions, those rhetorical and
those directly challenging, added directness to the
speaker's oral style.
In respect to sentenoe length and simplicity,
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Ickes1 style was occasionally more suitable to literary
than to oral presentation.

Some of his sentences were

extremely long and somewhat involved.

According to

standards predicated by Brlgance in Speech Composition,
about half of Ickes' sentences were longer than desirable
for maximum hearer comprehension.

Brlgance put it this

way:
When any sentence gets over 20 words it starts
to be 'fairly difficult', when it gets over 25
words it becomes 'difficult', and when it goes be
yond 30 words it becomes 'very difficult1.28
Brlgance adds, of course, that this general observation
does not rule out occasional long sentences.
Ickes' manuscript for "What Shall the Republican
Platform Be?" contained a total of 133 sentences.
shortest used 8 words, the longest 12^.

The

Forty-eight of

his sentences were 20 words or less; 1^ sentences were
between 20 and 26 words in length— "fairly difficult";
15 sentences were between 25 and 30 words in length—
"difficult"; and 56 sentences were over 30 words in
length— "very difficult."
was 2 9 .8

w o r d s .

The average sentence length

vJhile many of Ickes' long sentences

were the result of parallel structure, utilizing

28Brigance, op. olt. , p. 2 3 9 .
^ T h i a compares with Sir Winston Churchill's
average of 26 words per sentence and Franklin D. Roosevelt's
1? to 27, depending on the type of audience. Ibid., p.
239.
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several semi-colons, it is also true that a few were
simply too long and involved for immediate hearer com
prehension.

With these few exceptions, the sentences

were appropriate for oral presentation.
One definite weakness showed up in Ickes1 choice
of language in this, as in later, speeches.

In his

desire to he vivid and colorful, he occasionally neg
lected to follow the dictates of simplicity in word
selection.

He sometimes used words and allusions which

were beyond the immediate, and perhaps ultimate, com
prehension of a large part of his audience.
words were these:

Among such

mesalliance, quadrennium, accouch-

ment, emanations, inditing, effrontery, abstemious,
progeny, and cryptic.

Obviously, words or phrases less

impressive but more immediately comprehensible could have
been selected.

Perhaps the best example of Ickes1

occasional vocabulary parade was in this sentence refer
ring to Governor Landon's candidacy:
The railroad sidings at Topeka, Kansas, no longer
support the ostentatious display of the private cars
of those humble American citizens who dutifully
Joined in the pilgrimage thither of William Randolph
Hearst in order to do homage to a new political
Messiah, than whom no Delphic oracle has been more
abstemious or cryptio in his utterances.
Ickes was extremely interested in words.

He had

been a student of Latin in his school days,^0 and in

3°Harold L. Ickes, Autobiography of a Curmudgeon
(New York: Reynal and Hltchoock, 1943), p.
i Z " ,
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later life he showed an obsession for vocabulary, keep
ing always near and consulting constantly a large dic
tionary.^ 1

His interest sometimes betrayed him into a

violation of the simplicity of word choice necessary for
audience understanding.
It may be said, in general, that Ickes showed a
tendency in this speech to employ words Infrequently
used and not widely understood, and that his structur
ing of language was sometimes involved.

These defects,

however, were more than compensated by his use of vivid,
expressive, and emotive language.

His use of language

was vivid and colorful enough to command the hearers’
attention, to be humorously and suggestively persuasive,
and to make good newspaper copy.
REACTION TO THE SPEECH
Ickes1 first major attack upon the Republicans
and their candidate was somewhat milder than that of
subsequent speeches.

Outside the New Deal, the reaction

to it was also calmer than it was for later speeches.32

31This was stated by Michael Straus in a personal
interview on January 2 3 , 1955. and confirmed by Mrs. Ickes
in an interview of January 3 1 , 1955.
32in analyzing reaction to all of -Ickes’ speeches,
the writer has consulted the Washington Star, the St_. Louis
Post-Dispatch, the Chicago News, the Chicago Tribune, the
New' Vork' Times , and numerous weekly publications. The
sources used most, however, were the Ickes sorapbooks in
the Iokes Papers. These contain clippings from magazines
and newspapers from all parts of the country.

Coming as it did when the Republicans gathering in Cleve
land held the public eye and the air was full of pronounce
ments from prominent political figures, Ickes1 speech
received less newspaper publicity than did later radio
addresses.

None of the leading dailies carried the speech

in full, though several carried reports of its arguments
and quoted at some length from the speech.

Both the New

York Times and the Washington Post of June 8 carried a
full-column report on page four.

The St_. Louis Post-

Dispatch gave a partial report of the speech but relegat
ed it to page 7C.
at all.

The Chicago Tribune carried no report

Many smaller newspapers gave their readers

partial reports and alBo mentioned the speech editor
ially.^

The reactions of the Hearst press and other

Republican papers were, of course, hostile.

Those which

mentioned the speech carried with it the following
Hearst-authorized comment:

"Mr. Ickes* whole broadcast

is rather absurd, but his remarks about Mr. HearBt are
particularly vapid."3^

Most of the unfavorable newspaper

comment about the speech centered around the Hearst issue,

^^Typical of smaller newspapers from which clip
pings found their way into Ickes* scrapbooks were the
Winston-Salem (North Carolina) Sentinel, the Springfield
(Missouri) Events, the Houghton (Michigan) Gazette, and
the Santa Fe New Mexican.
^^Baltlmore Sun, June 8 , 1936.

ignoring other issues in the speech.

The Pueblo Star

Journal labeled the Hearst charge "ludicrous" and said
Ickes was "raudslinging."33

Even the Democratic Paducah

Sun questioned the validity of the charge of Hearst
domination, saying that Landon realized Hearst backing
was "the kiss of death."3^

The Democratic Winston-Salem

Sentinel, however, said that Landon might like to shake
off Hearst but probably could not do so. 3?

The Hearst-

controlled San Diego Tribune denied that Hearst even
started the Landon build-up, giving credit instead to the
Kansas City Star.-^

The general consensus was that the

Hearst charge had not been sustained.

The rest of the

speech, as might be expected, received generally favor
able comment from the minority Democratic press and
generally unfavorable reaction from the majority Repub
lican press.

Most of the letters, cards, and telegrams

received by Ickes in the wake of the speech were similarly
divided along obviously partisan lines.39
From the Administration point of view, the speeoh
was apparently a successful effort.

Partisan Democrats

35pueblo Star Journalt June 8 , 1936.
3^Paducah Sun, June 9, 1936.
37winston-Salem Sentinel, June 11, 1936.
3^San Diego Tribune, June 9, 1936.
39lokes Papers, Container 2k6.

106

were enthusiastic, and many requested copies of the
speech to he used as campaign m a t e r i a l . T h e newspaper
coverage was undoubtedly sufficient to focus some
attention on the manner in which the Republican platformframers met their problems, which was another purpose of
the speech.

Stanley High, who originated the idea of

the speech, enthusiastically approved of it and, accord
ing to Ickes, tried to claim credit for writing most of
it.^1

That the President was enthusiastic about the

speech has been previously noted.

It might be added, as

further evidence of his approval of Ickes' first major
attack, that it was on July 1— three weeks after the
initial Ickes speech— that the President indicated defi
nitely to Ickes that his Job in the campaign was "to
attack."

The President had, by this time, had ample

opportunity to assess the reaction to Ickes' first major
performance in his role of 'hatohet-man.-

He apparently

considered it favorable enough to continue Ickes'
rhetorical efforts along the same line.

^°Ibld.
^Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 619.
^2Ibid., p. 627.
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SUMMARY EVALUATION

The Idea behind the attack upon the Republican
platform efforts was strategloally good, and Ickes*
analysis of the problems faced by the Republican con
vention was sound.

In presenting those problems and

attempting to create a public attitude of suspicion
and uncertainty about the convention's efforts, Ickes
did little to establish his conclusions through logical
demonstration.

He relied primarily upon emotional ap

peals, especially those built around effective use of
humor and emotive language.

He concentrated, too, upon

undermining Republican ethos while strengthening that of
the Roosevelt Administration.

The speech was broadcast

nationally and given relatively good newspaper coverage.
Though press reaction to the first Ickes* assault was
understandably divided, President Roosevelt and his ad
visers considered the effort successful enough to warrant
repetition.

It had oheered partisans, had supplied many

Democrats with campaign material, had secured publicity
for attacks on Landon and his leading supporters, and had
put the Republicans partially on the defensive on the eve
of their convention.

To consider whether it won any votes

would merely be idle speculation.

The speech appears to

have been fairly successful at doing what the Administra
tion, in the belief that it would affect the ultimate
outcome of the oampaign, wanted it to do.

CHAPTER V

“GOVERNOR LANDON— PRACTICAL PROGRESSIVE“
On August 3 , Seoretary Ickes delivered his second
major radio address of the 1936 campaign.

This speech,

entitled “Governor Landon— Practical Progressive," was
broadcast by a C.B.S. network from 10:4-5 P.M. to 11:15
P.M.

Delivered as a reply to Landon’s July 23 acceptance

address, it was the first direct attack upon the Repub
lican presidential candidate by a member of the Adminis
tration. 1
BACKGROUND AND SETTING OF THE SPEECH
In the period of almost two months between Ickes’
first and second major radio addresses, organized Demo
cratic campaign activity was negligible.

Democratic

strategy originally called for only one month of full-time
campaigning, and the President did not make his first
avowed campaign speech until September 29.

Meanwhile,

the Landon boom appeared to make progress.

On July 20,

the farm poll conducted in thirty-two states by the Farm

^The President had ordered that no member of the
Administration was to mention Landon by name in any speeoh
given before the Kansas Governor’s speech of acceptance.
Ickes, 3ecret Diary. Vol. I, p. 64-2.
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Journal showed Landon leading by a ratio of five to four. 2
After other minor polls showed similar results, Democratic
statistician Emil Hurja took sample polls of his own.

The

results indicated that Roosevelt support had dropped to
barely over fifty per cent and that he was trailing on
electoral votes.

Hurja and Ickes both regarded the situ

ation as serious.3
Ickes made six speeches during the interval between
his first two major broadcasts, but only one of theBe
speeches was frankly political in nature.

On June 29, he

was the prlnolpal speaker at a meeting of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People in
Baltimore, Maryland.^

During the month of July, he made

speeches in his capacities as Seoretary of the Interior
and Administrator of PWA at four formal dedications.-*
On July 17, he addressed the University of Virginia's
Institute of Public Affairs as the Administration's
representative in a political debate.

Republicans were

represented by former Senator Hiram Bingham of Connecti
cut.

Each speaker had an advanoe copy of his opponent's

% e w York Times. July 20, 1 9 3 6 , p. 1.
3ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 6^1.
^This speech, in part emphasizing the value of the
New Deal to colored people, was broadcast by N.B.C. and
was reported in the New York Times, June 3 0 , 1 9 3 6 , p. 10.
5Text of these speeches, delivered on July
l^f, and 22, are in the jokes Papers.
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speech and each used the title "Representative Govern
ment versus Dictatorship."

Bingham, speaking first,

argued that Roosevelt was directing a trend toward
dictatorship; Ickes contended that Republicans stood for
economic dictatorship while the New Deal worked toward
greater freedom for the common people.
Although this debate was broadcast only by local
radio facilities, it received good newspaper coverage.^
Reaction, in general, followed party lines.

However,

some opposing papers, although not agreeing with all of
Ickes1 arguments, oommented favorably upon his effort.?
The President apparently did not express his reaction
after the speech at Charlottesville, but William D.
Hassett, assistant to Stephen Early, had conveyed en
thusiastic White House approval of the manuscript prior
O
to delivery of the speech.
Ickes was active politically between his first

^The New York Times of July 20, gave a fairly
complete report of the arguments on page 13; the Washing
ton Star, also July 20, reported them on page 1; and the
Ickes scrapbooks contain reports from newspapers all
over the country.
?The Lincoln State Journal (Nebraska) of July 27,
disagreed with Ickes'but said he “showed all the skill
of the experienced lawyer,“ and the Washington Post of
July 20, conceded hlB argument that koosevelt had no
desire to establish dictatorial power.
^lokes Papers, Container 2*1-7 .
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two major speeches In one other way.

At a June 18 press

conference he attacked the Republican platform, terming
it "ambiguous and w e a s e l - w o r d e d . T h i s post-convention
comment, coupled with similar remarks in his Charlottes
ville speech, served as follow-up to the charges made in
his June 7 attack on the Republican party.
Ickes’ insistence that the Administration ought to
level early and frequent attack upon Landon, and his own
availability for the task, were noted in Chapter II.
For a time it appeared that he was to be denied the open
ing assault.

On July 2 0 , Charles Mlchelson Informed the

Secretary that he was to reply to Landon's July 23 ac
ceptance address on the following evening.

On July 21,

the President changed the plans, seemingly reluctant to
allow a Cabinet officer to initiate the attack.

On July

30, after Ickes had been urged upon him by Mlchelson,
Farley, and High, and after he had seen the draft of the
proposed speech, Roosevelt approved Mlchelson’ original
plan. 10
Ickes' initial eagerness to make the reply to

9New York Times, June 19, I9 3 6 , p. 7. The same
edition, on the’ same page, oarried almost identical oorament by Norman Thomas, Socialist candidate for president.
diary.

10These developments are all related in the lokes
Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, pp. 6^2-53*
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Landon was whetted by the Kansan* s speech of acceptance.
On July 24, after listening to that speeoh, Iokes wrote
in his diary:
Landon, in my Judgment, has laid himself wide
open to a devastating attack and I am eager to make
it. Particularly in what he said about the Oil Ad
ministration he played right into ray hands. We have
in our files in this Department quotations from
Landon's letters, telegrams, as well as a speech he
made as ohairman of the oil conference here in 1933 >
with which we could rake him fore and aft. . . .
I
feel very keenly that Landon has let down his guard
and that this is the time for a smashing blow. 11
The speech previously prepared was altered to meet the
Landon address, radio time was seoured for the evening
of August 3, and advanoe publicity was arranged.

On

August 1, the New York Times reported that the Seoretary
of the Interior would "contrast the remedies which Gover
nor Landon urged upon the Roosevelt Administration three
years ago with the policies he is now urging as a candi
date for President."-*-2

On August 3, the pro-Roosevelt

New York Dally News carried what looked almost like a
commercial advertisement, urging listeners to tune in
on "one of the country's best radio talkers. ""*-3

The

stage was set for what Ickes termed "a highly concentrat
ed attack on Landon.

H lbld.. p. 649.
-*-2New York Times. August 1, 1 9 3 6 , p. 4.
13New York Dally News, August 3 , I9 3 6 .
^-^Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 653.
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PURPOSE AND THESIS OF THE SPEECH
The primary purpose of the August 3 speeoh was to
discredit Landon; this was to he the “smashing blow"
mentioned in the Ickes quotation previously cited.

The

thesis, alluded to in the title of the speech and de
veloped in the first few paragraphs of the text, was that
Landon was a “practical”— not a “true"— progressive.
Ickes oited the Landon record In several particulars and
concluded after each that the Republican candidate was
“practical" (the Webster definition “oapable of being
turned to use or aocount" was cited), but that he was
not a progressive.

This was a double-barrelled thesis,

serving two purposes.

On one hand, the speaker denied

the olaims of many Republicans that their candidate was
truly progressive; this half of the thesis was directed
toward progressive Republicans and liberal independents.
On the other hand, the exposition of the Kansan’s former
views and statements favorable to the New Deal was not
likely to increase the confidence of conservative Repub
licans in their candidate.

This dual aspect of the

speeoh was noted by the Detroit News:
There will be no question of Ickes' intent to
keep the progressive vote in line for Mr. Roosevelt,
but the Democratic Idea in putting him on the radio
couldn't have failed to consider an effect in weaken
ing Landon among the Eastern conservatives. The
latter don't like Landon’s radical streak. That's
as true as that most of the westerners won to his
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support because of his liberalism don’t like his
association with the Old Guard GOP-ers.15
Both of theBe ideas were potentially harmful to Landon’s
candidacy.

The fact should be added, too, that the ex

posure of the candidate’s apparent inconsistencies and
vacillation was likely to decrease his standing with all
groups.
The Miami News thought it saw still another pur
pose in the “exposure" of the Kansas Governor's change
of views between 1933

1936:

Bear in mind that one of the anti-Roosevelt is
sues of this campaign was to be President Roosevelt's
departure from the platform of 1 9 3 2 , hi8 change of
mind since 1932. Thanks to Ickes, we now have the
opponents of President Roosevelt, in defending their
candidate for his change of mind, defending Secretary
Ickes’ candidate for his change of mind. The changeof-mind issue— the 1 9 3 2 platform issue— is now out of
the campaign, which might well have been exactly what
the acute Ickes hoped and planned to accomplish by
his speech.1 °
That the Landon change of views influenced the effective
ness of Republican charges of Roosevelt platform violation
can be demonstrated.

No evidence has been uncovered,

however, to indicate that this was a planned purpose of
the speech.
The speech’s primary purpose was to damage Landon
prestige, especially with progressive and liberal voters.

■^Detroit News, August 5> 1936.
loMlaml News, August 9, 1936.
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The thesis was that he was a political opportunist tied
to a conservative campaign and was not, in 1 9 3 6 , & pro
gressive candidate.
LINES OF ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION
The lines of argument in this speech were more
clearly organized and developed than in the speech on
the Republican platform.

The thesis, while not ex

pressed in a single sentence, emerged clearly in the
first two minutes of the thirty-minute address.

The

opening paragraph went right to the subject:
Governor Alfred M. Landon has decided that he is
a ’practical1 progressive. That this is the desig
nation that he would apply to himself is clear from
his speeoh of acceptance in Topeka the night of
June 23.1"
After referring to how "practical" was defined by
dictionaries and commenting to the effect that Landon
like the Republican platform, represented an impossible
attempt at compromise, the speaker returned directly to
his thesis:
Now, whether Governor Landon is fifty per cent
’practical’ and fifty per cent 'progressive' or
whether he leans more to the progressive West than
to reactionary Wall Street might be a d o s e question

•^■7xn that address Landon had said:
"Practical
progressives have suffered the disheartening experience
of Beeing many liberal objectives discredited during the
past three years by careless thinking, unworkable laws,
and Incompetent administration." New York Times, July
1936, p. 11.
2

k

,
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If in his Bpeeoh he had not himself thrown some
light upon the subject.
At that point, introduction ended and the first argument
began.
These arguments, unlike those of his June 7
address, could be sharply defined; they were Beven in
number:
(1) Landon has swung from Theodore Roosevelt’s
type of progressivism to a "States’- rights"
philosophy.
(2) He is not a progressive in regard to civil
service.
(3) He is obsoure, but not progressive, regarding
labor unions.
( M His present views on executive powers represent
a "practical" shift

of conviction.

(5) He

of William Randolph Hearst,

is a product

who is not a progressive.
(6) He

is supported by reactionary elements.

(7) He

is running on a reaction&ry platfora.

These premises, if properly supported, constituted
an effective indictment of Landon and adequate argument
for Ickes1 thesis.

If Landon held a "States’ rights"

point of view, opposed extensive exercise of executive
functions, paid only lip-service to a merit system, and
disapproved of strong labor organization, he was not in

line with historic principles of the progressive move
ment.

The last three premises were more circumstantial

types of indictment, since a candidate for political
office cannot always he fairly Judged by the views or
the merit of his supporters, or even entirely by his
party*s platform.

If Ickes proved that Landon was sup

ported by Hearst and by leading reactionary groups and
that he had accepted a reactionary platform, claims that
he was a progressive would oertalnly be open to sus
picion.

To give the indictments fullest significance,

however, the Secretary would need to show strong
presumption that Hearst and other "non-progressive”
Landon supporters were really going to exercise strong
influence on the candidate in the event of his election.
Ickes did conjecture upon that point, but devoted no real
effort to establishing any commitments.

In the oase of

the Republican platform, such a commitment had been made.
Ickes' premises, if adequately supported, were probably
conclusive enough for the progressive Republicans and
liberal Independents for whom they were primarily intended.
After a partial summary of his main arguments,
Ickes launched into an emotional philippic against "the

•^For a statement of Progressive party principles
in 1912, see Louis M. Haoker and Benjamin B. Kendrick,
The United States Since I865 (fourth edition; New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1 9 ^9 ), pp. 385-8 8 .
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money power of America," which was purportedly hacking
Landon, and asserted that the election’s real issue lay
between this foroe and the President.

His oonoluBion

proper was brief:
Governor Landon cannot at the same time be the
candidate of the exploiting and of the exploited.
Not even a ’practical1 progressive ought to be
able to run with the hares and hunt with the
hounds.
FORMS OF SUPPORT
In the speech on the Republican platform Iokes
had concentrated on emotional appeals while subordinat
ing logical and ethical proofs.

In his August 3 address,

logical and emotional proofs were more nearly balanced,
with ethical proofs almost ignored.
Most of the speaker’s premises had some element
of logical support, with testimony and example being
used most frequently.

To support his conclusion that

Landon "began as a strong nationalist but ended as an
advocate of States' rights," Ickes used one quotation
as sole evidence.

That quotation was from Landon's

acceptance address:
As a young man I was attracted to the idea of
centralizing in the Federal Government full power
to correct the abuses growing out of a more complex
social order. When the people rejected this al
ternative I was as disappointed as any one. But in
spite of this rejection I have lived to see many of
those views substantially corrected by the forty-eight
State Legislatures in their fields and by the Federal
Government in its field of interstate commerce.
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The Secretary concluded from this statement that "the
Governor, In effect, is apologizing for having followed
Theodore Roosevelt as a Progressive in 1912."

He added

that "the language itself is obscure, but the clear
meaning is there to quiet the fears of the reaction
aries."

Quoting Landon himself on his altered point of

view was an exoellent idea.
out of context.

Nor was the quotation taken

Error lay, however, in the over-extension

of the conclusion drawn by Ickes from the quotation.

It

obviously did not say, without subjective interpreta
tion, all that the speaker concluded from it.

Perhaps

it was even intended to quiet conservative fears, but
that the speaker did not prove.

The quotation was

Buffiolent to arouse doubt about Landon1s views, but it
alone was not sufficient proof that the Kansan had com
pletely abandoned all previous progressive ideas.

The

premise that Landon was not truly progressive on civil
service was supported both by example and by comparison
and contrast.

Ickes, noting that the Governor had even

gone beyond his party's platform in deolaring for a merit
system, used the failure of Kansas to Implement a merit
syetem as an example of Landon1s real inclination.
facts involved in the example had been confirmed by

The
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Harry Wooaring, Landon'8 predecessor as Governor of
Kansas.^

The speaker then contrasted this failure with

the aotlon of the President in regard to civil service.
The President had requested civil service legislation,
which Congress had defeated.

He then issued an executive

order placing postmasters in three categories under civil
service.

Republicans charged that the President's move

was purely political,^® but, disregarding motive, the con
trast was valid on the basis of actual performance.
Ickes' argument that Landon did not take a progres
sive view regarding labor organization was brief enough
to be quoted:
He /Eandon believes that employees have the right
to organize by plant, by craft or by Industry. He is
for the closed shop and he also believes in the open
shop. If there were any other forms of association
in which employees could Indulge, it is a fair guess
that Governor Landon would favor that also.
Certainly those great industries which, by fair
means or foul, have prevented their employees from
organizing aooording to their own wishes have nothing
to fear from Governor Landon's attitude on this
question.
J

The speaker used no actual evidence, but he was referring

-19^his information is contained in a memorandum
from R. B. Armstrong, an Ickes assistant, to the Secre
tary. Ickes Papers. Container 315.
^ Jo s e p h Martin, Republican congressman from
Massachusetts, aired this charge as part of his reply to
Ickes speech. New York Times. August 5, 1936, p. 12.
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Indirectly to Landon1a statements about labor In his
speech of acceptance.

The Interpretation made by Ickes

corresponded closely with that of most labor leaders.
The Republican candidate's position was denounced the
day after It was presented by John L. Lewis, President
of the United Mine Workers, George L. Berry, Chairman of
Labor's Non-Partisan League, Sidney Hillman, President
of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, Arthur
0. Wharton, President of the International Association
of Machinists, and Francis J. Gorman, Vice-President of
21
the United Textile Workers of America.
Ickes' charge that Landon's expressed fears of
Roosevelt's use of federal authority were politically
motivated, and not sincere, was supported by 1 9 3 3 and
193^ quotations from the Kansas Governor.

The use of

testimony was, perhaps, strongest in support of this
premise.

Eight different Landon quotations were used

to demonstrate his earlier support of Roosevelt1s use
of federal authority:

four from speeches, three from

telegrams, and one from a letter.

Most of the state

ments were specific and difficult to misconstrue.

One

1 9 3 3 quotation was general. but gave definite approval
of Roosevelt's actions:

21New York Times. July 2k, 1936, p. 1.
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I desire to acknowledge, in a tangible way, the
appreciation of the people of my State of the courage
with which President Roosevelt has attacked the de
pression. If there is any way in which a member of
that species, thought by many to be extinct, a Repub
lican Governor of a Middle Western State can aid him
in the fight, I now enlist for the duration of the
war.
More speolfic statements put Landon on record as favoring
the Oil Code, price-fixing, and the National Industrial
Recovery Act.
to support.

This part of the argument was rather easy
Arthur Krock, who appeared neutral, if not

sympathetic, to the Landon candidacy at this stage of the
campaign, made this concession:

"The other night, review

ing some of Mr. Landon’s less recent activities, Secre
tary Ickes made against him, and easily proved, charges
pp
of inconsistency." **
A New York Times editorial of
August 5, while reacting unfavorably to the speech as a
whole, drew the same conclusion:
Secretary Ickes had no difficulty on Monday night
in proving that Governor Landon said things and took
positions in 1933 and 1 9 3 ^ very different from what
he is now saying and advocating.23
This premise was one generally accepted and one which
Landon’s early New Deal utterances made easy to support.
The premise that Landon had been nominated largely
through the support of William Randolph Hearst, if not

22New York Times. August 6 , 1936, p. 18.

23New York Times, August 5i 1936, p. 18.
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extended to Imply too much beyond that, was also relative
ly easy to support.

As proof for it, Ickes offered

statements from two of the Kansan's leading supporters.
The first was from the Topeka State Journal, the news
paper of Henry J. Allen:
With all due respect to the work of Governor
Landon'b supporters and his personality and ability
and*to his natural appeal to the nation, it was
William Randolph Hearst who placed his name on the
lips of the American people.
The second was from a William Allen White article entitled
"How Landon Won— The True Story of the Birth, the Boom
and the Climax of the Kansan's Nomination":
When the two private cars (carrying Mr. HearBt
and his party) were parked in the Topeka switchyards,
all Kansas knew that her Governor was beginning to
be somebody.
These quotations, ooming from Landon partisans, consti
tuted a type of authority about which Bryant and Wallace
say:

"Finally, does the opinion run counter to the

author's natural Interest and bias?
given great weight."2^

If so, It can be

That Hearst was influential in

the Landon boom was then a matter of general knowledge
and Is today generally accepted.

Basil Rauch writes:

Early in the 1936 political season, Hearst made
a visit of inspection to Governor Alfred Mossman
Landon of Kansas, and presently his chain of

^Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace, Fundamen
tals of Public Speaking (New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts, Lno., I9V/)1, p7 38I.
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for the Republican nomination. . . . This was the
first notice given the country as a whole of the
availability of Governor Landon.
The two quotations used by Ickes, considering the lack of
serious controversy on the point directly Involved, con
stituted sufficient proof.

They did not necessarily

point to the further implication that Hearst would con
trol Landon.

This was implied when the speaker said of

Governor Landon and Colonel Knox:
doubt that they are Hearstlan."

"There is not any
That implied premise

was suggested, but it was not proved.
The elements which New Dealers would classify as
"reactionary," banking and big business interests, un
doubtedly supported the Republican candidate.

If the

listener or reader agreed that these interests were of
the nature Ickes assumed them to be, proving that Landon
had "reactionary" support was not only easy, but almost
unnecessary.

That they were reactionary and their

support reprehensible was put merely as emotionallycolored assertion;
Since when did the liberty-loving duPonts, Andrew
W. Mellon, Ogden L. Mills, Winthrop W. Aldrioh, J.
Henry Roraback, Henry P. Fletcher, Senator Jesse H.
Metcalf or John D. M. Hamilton, the latter an off
shoot of the machine of the late Dave Mulvane and,

York:

^-’Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal (New
Creative Age Press, Inc., 194-4)7 P* 237.
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until recently, the bitter antagonist of that pro
gressive group in Kansas which now fawns upon him,
show any except a malevolent interest in a real
progressive principle?
Can it be that Wall Street, The New York Herald
Tribune, The Chicago Daily Tribune, the San Fran
cisco Chronicle and the Los Angeles Times, to say
nothing of the Liberty League and the papers of
William Randolph Hearst and other wealthy re
actionaries, out of a tender regard for the welfare
of the plain people of America have suddenly de
serted the special interests and have gone progres
sive?
While the paragraphs Just quoted gave valid examples of
conservative men and groups who openly supported Landon,
Ickes' assumption that they were "reactionary” and
"malevolent" was not supported by logical proof.

Fur

ther, while this line of argument did illustrate that
Landon was supported by some men and groups certainly
not considered progressive, it did not prove that the
Kansan would necessarily reject all progressive ideas
upon their insistence.

The argument relied more upon

emotional than upon logical proof for its appeal.
Ickes' last major premise was that Governor Lan
don had approved a reactionary platform.

To establish

that the platform was reactionary, the speaker cited
testimony from only one source:

Dr. Nicholas Murray

Butler, President of Columbia University.

Dr. Butler

had called the Republican convention "the most react
ionary in the party's entire history."

The Secretary

made the most of a good authority, noting Butler's
i
-

—

/

.
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long servioe as a leader In the Republican party, his
nomination for Vice-President in 1912, and his prominent
mention as a presidential prospect In 1920.

The quota

tion was not out of context; Indeed, more Butler state
ments could have been used, since the Columbia President
had bitterly denounced the work, of the entire Republican
c o n v e n t i o n . T h e statement used by Ickes did not
specifically mention the platform, but Dr. Butler had
clearly included It in his denunciation in the press.
The quotation was a good one.

Some question must be

raised, however, as to whether a single piece of
testimony was sufficient to prove the opponent’s plat
form “reactionary."

This 1 b especially questionable

since Ickes' previous reaction had been that the plat
form "looked both ways" and that it was "ambiguous and
weasel-worded,"2? not that it was plainly reactionary.
Ickes1 logical Bupport for some of his premises
was not sufficient to constitute conclusive evidence,
and some of his conclusions went beyond both his
original premise and his evidence.

His rational proofs

were, however, probably sufficient for the Republican
progressives and Independent liberals in whom the speaker

2^New York Times. July 16, 1936, p. 9.
2?New York Times, June 19, 1936, p. 7.
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was espeolally Interested.

Coupled effectively with

emotional appeals, they were likely to prove adequate for
creating doubts about Landon In the minds of other voting
groups as well.
In this attack upon Landon, as in that on the
Republican platform, Ickes1 emotional appeals were de
signed primarily to create attitudes of fear, suspicion,
and distrust.

The arguments built around the thesis that

Landon pretended to be a progressive, but was not, were
certain, if given credence, to create fear of Landon’s
policies among voters progressively inclined.

The

simple fact that the Kansan pretended to be something
he was not, if true, would create suspicion and lack of
confidence among voters who were not especially concerned
about whether the Governor was progressive or not.

The

revelation of the Republican candidate’s reversal of
opinion about the New Deal, coupled with Ickes' insinua
tion that the change was politically motivated, was
likely to create distrust and lack of confidence in some
voters of all polltloal points of view.

The basic pre

mises of the speeoh were designed to create attitudes
based partly upon emotional responses.
The Secretary also made use of emotional appeals
which depended more upon selection of language than upon
the ideas themselves.

This language was directed, for
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the most part, toward creating, or recreating, the fear
and distrust many Americans were prone to feel toward
big business, organized finance, and wealth in general.
Emotionally "loaded" stereotypes, many of which had also
been used in the first radio address, dotted the speech.
Here are but a few of them:

"reactionaries," "economic

royalists," "malefactors of great wealth," "concentrated
wealth," "the money power of America," and "predatory
interests."

By the transfer device, the emotional con

notations of these terms were applied to the Republican
party and to Governor Landon.
Names of people and organizations were also used
as a type of "loaded" language.

Names associated with

the Republican Administration during the crash of 1929
seem to have been used almost solely to get "symbol"
responses,

such names as Herbert Hoover, Andrew W.

Mellon, Wlnthrop W. Aldrich, and Ogden L. Mills.
Symbols of great wealth, such as the duPonts, Wall
Street, and the Liberty League were also used for their
psychological value.
Another psychological form of persuasion UBed in
this speech was that of repetition.

Brembeck and Howell

say of this device:

The strength of a suggestion varies with the
frequency with which it is met. Repetition serves
to clarify and to hold attention to an idea until
it becomes a part of us. It may appear in two forms:
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(1) The repetition may use the same words (exact
repetition)., or (2) the same idea may be stated
in different words (restatement).28
Many of Ickes1 ideas were repeated as restatement, but
the use of repetition which stood out in this speech was
the recurring reference to Governor Landon a3 a "practi
cal progressive."

Contained in the title, this- irony-

tinged reference also appeared thirteen times in the text
of the speech.

It was most pointed at the conclusion of

individual arguments.
Ickes closed with:

After supporting his first premise

"As Governor Landon1s friends insist,

he is a 'practical1 progressive."
closed with:
progressive."

The next argument

"Governor Landon is indeed a 'practical1
Another argument concluded:

"Indubitably

Governor Landon is a 'practical' progressive."

These

references to Landon's "practical" type of progresslvism
appear in the title, in the first sentence, in the con
clusion of most of the arguments, and in the final
sentence.

They represent the most obvious examples of

Ickes* frequent use of persuasion through repetition.
Psychological appeals merely accompanied logical
arguments during most of the speeoh.

At the conclusion

of those arguments, however, Ickes launched into a

^®Wlnston Lamont Bremleck and William Smiley
Howell, Persuasion, A Means of Social Control (New York:
Prentlce-Hall, Inc. ,“1952)', p. 17?.
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peroration dealing almost exclusively in the types of
appeal Just discussed.

The following passage is illus

trative:
Concentrated wealth, the power of money, still
dominates the Republican party. If you doubt this
statement, count noses and see in whloh political
camp the great bankers, the monopolistic industrial
ists and the vested interests that have been built
up by Republican favor and which flourish on special
privilege have pitched their tents. . . .
It ought not to be necessary to point out that
that man is to be avoided who openly or secretly,
is being supported by the man who ruthlessly wield
the money power of America. These men know what
they want and it is seldom that they do not know how
to get what they want. Their allegiance in this cam
paign is known and there has been no denial of that
allegiance.
Thus, the appeals to prejudice against wealth and big
business and the insinuations of "guilt,

by association,"

whloh had been subordinated to more logical forms of
argument throughout most of the Bpeech, were given free
rein in the concluding appeal.
The use of humor, which had been one of the strong
est appeals in the June 7 address, was also in evidence
in this speeoh.

Less gentle and more sardonic than before,

it was again used more for argument than for entertain
ment.

In every instance, it rldlouled Landon or his

party.
In one Instance, Ickes called attention to the
fact that Kansas had passed a civil service law. but that
Governor Landon had never pushed through an appropriation
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to effectuate It.

Then he concluded:

It has been another Instance of 'Mother, mother
may I go out to swim? Oh, yes, my darling daughter.
Hang your clothes on a hickory limb, but don't go
near the water.'
A few moments later, when he discussed Landon's fearB of
dictatorship, he engaged in irony at the Kansan's expense:
I do not think that this 'common sense' candidate
believes for a moment in this claptrap. But we must
make allowances for him. There is a campaign on.
Even if he cannot point with pride, we must allow
him to view with alarm.
A short time later, when discussing Hearst's printed
claims that the Republican platform and candidates were
progressive, Ickes again engaged in irony and invective:
Of course, Mr. Hearst has every right to expect
his most trifling dictum to be accepted by abject
Republicans as a pontifical utterance. And if he
says it is progressive, who would be so bold as to
question that fact?
In the same editorial he laid down the law to
the effect that the candidates for both President
and Vice-President are also progressive. Well, who
in the whole country, I may aBk, has a better right
to name the children than their father?
As in the speech analyzed in Chapter IV, Ickes
again gave little conscious attention to using or build
ing his own ethos as persuasion in the speech.

His

emphasis was on reducing the reputation and prestige of
Landon and his party, with some effort being made to
enhance the standing of the President and the Administra
tion.

The entire argument was calculated to undermine

confidence in Governor Landon.

Both his independence
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and his sincerity were questioned, and he was subjected
to ridicule.

His party was accorded similar treatment.

Three references to the President were made In a
way likely to Increase the ethos of the Secretary's
candidate.

The comparison of Landon's record on civil

service with that of Roosevelt has already been noted.
In addition, Iokes attempted to capitalize upon the
denunciation of Landon's "reactionary" supporters in a
way which would raise the President's standing.

After

associating Landon with suoh men as the dePonts, Hearst,
and the membership of the Liberty League, the speaker
said:
To my mind It is a real tribute to President
Roosevelt that he should have won the bitter en
mity of such men as I have referred to. He must
have struck some mighty blows In behalf of the
people to have oalled forth the hymns of hate
which have been chanted against him by the econ
omic royalists and the malefactors of great wealth,
if we may borrow a striking phrase of the late
Theodore Roosevelt.
Near the end of the speech, these men were again refer
red to, this time as "the same crowd through which there
was circulated some months ago the slogan:
up on Roosevelt.'"

'Let's- gang

This was but a brief repetition of

the same technique used before.
Ickes' use of ethical appeals was directed chiefly
toward reducing the reputation and prestige of Governor
Landon and enhancing that of President Roosevelt.

The
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subject matter of this speech gave Ickes unusual oppor
tunity to capitalize upon his personal position.

His

recognized background as a leading progressive and his
position as Administrator of the Oil Code, which figured
prominently in the proof of the speech, gave him oppor
tunity to inject himself into the speech.

He spoke,

instead, as an impersonal representative of the New Deal.
USE OF LANGUAGE
The language of the speech has already been disoussed from the point of view of emotional persuasive
ness.

It should be studied, too, from the point of view

of style, especially regarding the requirements of ef
fective oral presentation.
Ickes* choice of language again showed his
awareness of the value of figurative expressions.

His

words and phrases often helped to give a striking and
vivid mental image of the idea being presented.

For

example, when noting the Landon shift between 1933 an<l
1936, Iokes pictured him as "A.W.O.L. from the war
against poverty."

He also referred to the "reallstio

shudder" which Landon simulated when thinking about
Roosevelt's dictatorial aspirations.

Later he pictured

the Kansas Governor driving "a four-in-hand made up of
William Randolph Hearst, William Allen White, Gifford
Plnchot and a duPont selected at random."

He also

13^
depleted Landon going "down on his knees at the mourners1
bench to ask forgiveness for his temporary aberration
In 1912," adding that In 1912 the Republican candidate
did not dream that "Wall Street and the Liberty League
would one day take him to the top of a high mountain and
promise him all the kingdoms of the world."

In the con

cluding sentence, Ickes used one last figure of speech
on Landon, declaring that "not even a 'practical' pro
gressive ought to be able to run with the hares and
hunt with the hounds."
Ickes also used some vivid language when attack
ing Hearst.

Ickes referred to the publisher's "Bhrill

editorials" pronouncing "dictum" which Republicans would
accept as "pontifical utterance."

In speaking of Hearst's

recent ascension as a Republican boss, the Seoretary said
that "he has not yet warmed the ohair that he has usurped"
and that "the members of his adopted family are still a
little nervous about his table manners"since he"may want
more than his fair share of the good things of the board."
Ickes desorlbed the compromise platform of the
conservative East and more liberal West as a "platform
that faces both ways," a description he used often during
the campaign.

Perhaps his most descriptive language was

used In analyzing the change in the Republican party in
1936:
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The most that can be said for the Republican
party la that it has been to a beauty parlor to
have its face lifted. But a face-lifting does
not make a new personality:
it merely gives
temporarily a more pleasing appearance to an old
face. There has been no character lifting in the
Republican party.
It still suffers from soul
erosion.
Ickes interspersed his arguments with rhetorical
questions which helped to give directness to his style.
For example, after disclosing a shift between Landon's
1 9 3 3 views and those he submitted as a candidate in
1 9 3 6 , Ickes asked:

"What caused this change?"

When

he noted that the Kansan's supporters were mostly con
servatives, he asked:
progressive?"

"Does this prove him to be a

Then he pointed to Landon's endorsement

of an "ambiguous, tricky platform" written largely by
"reactionaries" and again asked:
a progressive?"

"Was this the act of

After listing some of the Republican

candidate's leading supporters from business and finance,
the speaker asked if these had "suddenly deserted the
special interests and gone progressive?"

There were

ten questions of this sort in the thirty-minute
address.
Ickes used fewer unnecessarily long or infrequent
ly-used words in this speech than he had employed in his
first major radio addreBS.

One such word did appear and

received half-facetious, half-serious comment from the
hostile Chicago Dally Tribune.

The Tribune wondered how
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James A. Farley, who reportedly thought already that
Ickes used too many big words in his speeohes, would
react to his expression "the verisimilitude of progresslvisra."29
The Secretary’s sentences were also better-adapted
to effective oral style in this address.

They were, by

actual count, shorter in this speech, averaging about
twenty-two words per sentence.

Approximately half of

them were less than twenty words In length, which, ac
cording to the Brlgance standards outlined in Chapter IV,
would make them easily comprehensible in oral discourse.
The use of shorter sentences and less dlffloult vocabu
lary simplified the oral style of Iokes’ second major
campaign speech, but robbed it of none of its vividness.
REACTION TO THE SPEECH
Ickes was obviously pleased with the response to
the speech.

Three days after delivering It he wrote:

I am having a good many letters commenting on my
radio speech last Monday night, and very few indeed
are oritloal. I note that the approving ones are
more enthusiastic and complimentary than I have ever
received on a speeoh. There are many requests for
copies for personal use and for distribution, and I
am writing today to Charley Michelson to ask him
whether it is the purpose of the Democratic National

29chloago Dally Tribune. August 5, 1936.
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Committee to print this speech.3°
Among the enthusiastic wires, letters, and personal notes
were very congratulatory messages from Attorney General
Homer Cummings, Ambassador Josephus Daniels, Senator
Joseph Guffey, Governor Herbert Lehman, and publisher J.
David S t e r n . S t i l l more important was a wire from the
President which read:
night."32

’’That was a great philippic last

The President spoke to Ickes by telephone

three days later to tell him the speech was "grand."
He congratulated his Secretary of the Interior again
two days later when he oonferred with him at the White
House.33
Ickes also found the reaction of Republican
leaders gratifying.

Of their comments he said:

Republican politicians and headquarters attaches
have met the speech in a complaining tone of voice.
. . . they do not meet me on the Issues. All of
which means to me that my speech really hurt.3^

3°lckes, Secret Diary. Vol. I, p. 65^. The speeoh
was reprinted by the Demooratio National Committee.
August 7, 1936 letter from Michelson to Iokes. Iokes
Papers.
3lNotes from Cummings and Daniels, letters from
Lehman and Stern, and a wire from Guffey are in the
Ickes Papers, Container 2*16.
32ickee, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 65^.
33ibid., p. 6593^Ibid., p. 665.
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That there was much truth In the Secretary's analysis of
opponents' reaction Is Illustrated by some of their
oomments.

Congressman Joseph Martin, Republican cam

paign manager In the East, appeared to have evaded and
misconstrued the Issues raised:
From a Republican stand point the speech was
most encouraging. It indicates how desperate the
Democrats are. Like Chairman Farley, Mr. Iokes,
pseudo-Republican, is whistling as he approaches
the political cemetery where the New Deal is to
be interred. Mr. Iokes, with ill grace for a man
who was himself a so-called progressive, has
attacked Governor Landon because of what he con
siders to be progressive tendencies.35
This statement missed the point, of course, since Ickes
was charging that the Governor had taken political
departure from his former progresslvisra, not that he
had retained it.

Another reaotion o&me from Harrison

E. Spangler, speaking for the Republican National Com
mittee; he simply dismissed the speech as an attempt to
"smear Landon."
retort:

The same news column carried Ickes'

"Mayn't we say anything about their man?

. . . I thought they invited careful scrutiny of his
record. "3^

The Secretary's belief that Republican

spokesmen failed to reply on the issues of his speech
appears to have been Justified.

35New York Times, August 5, 1936, p. 12.
^ Washington Post, August 5, 1936, p. 2.
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The speech was given good newspaper publicity.
The neutral New York Times and the hostile Washington
Post carried both news reports and complete texts on
August

The St_. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Chicago

Dally Tribune, and the New York Herald Tribune reprint
ed portions of the text, and most of the country’s other
dally newspapers appear to have given the speech some
kind of news or editorial notice.37
Editorial reaotlon was, of course, largely
divided along partisan lines.

However, those publica

tions which supported the President were unusually
enthusiastic, and many of those In the hostile group
mixed disagreement with praise or made only complaining
retorts.
Among the favorable editorial reactions was that
of the Philadelphia Record, which said, regarding whether
or not Landon was a progressive:

“No man Is better fit

ted to answer that question than Iokes.
it brilliantly Monday night. . . ."38

And he answered
The Beaumont

Enterprise labeled the speech “one of the most effective
since the campaign started" and said Iokes showed "a

3?Container 239 of the Iokes Papers has several
pages of clippings from newspapers representing all
sections of the country.
38phlladelphla Record, August 5, 1936.
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oaustio tongue, a sense of humor, and plenty of ammuni
tion."^

The Sedalla (Missouri) Times. said he "made a

case that will be difficult

to a n s w e r . H e y w o o d

Broun, In his "It Seems to Me" column, said that "Ickes
scored strongly" and then added:

"The reaction of Repub

lican spokesmen to the address gives strong support to
the charges which Mr. Ickes made."^-1- These are typical
of the many favorable editorial reactions included in
the Ickes scrapbooks.
Many of the papers supporting Landon roundly de
nounced the speeoh.

The Boston Transcript called Ickes1

charges "so vicious as to be utterly unworthy of a
Cabinet officer";^ the Indianapolis Star said it was "a
radio tirade of 3,700 words" in which there was "no room
for logic"; ^

the Yakima Herald called Ickes a "popgun"

39seaumont Enterprise, August 17, 1936.
^°Sedalla Times, August 7» 1936.
^ Washington News, August 24, 1936.
^2The Nation of August 8 , 1936 called the speech
“shrewd, acid, and devastating." Still others whioh ex
pressed praise were the Newark Ledger, the Brooklyn
Citizen, the Miami News, the Louisville Courier-Journal,
the Decatur Dally, the Wichita Publicity, the Camden Post,
the Las Vegas' k'evlew Journal, the Pittsburgh Pilot, and
the Mobile Register. Iokes Papers, Container 339.
^Boston Transcript, August 5, 1936.
^Indianapolis Star, August 4, 1936.
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who had fired ‘'only BB shots'1; ^ and the New London Day,
the Washington Herald, and the Kansas City Times, all of
August 4, said that the speaker "tried to smear" Governor
Landon.

'
None of the opposition papers mentioned so far,

however, made a serious attempt to reply to the charges
made by their New Deal opponent.

The San Diego Tribune

and the Portland Oregonian, both of August 5, did reply.
Their answer was to cite the changeB in President Roose
velt's ideas and program sinoe 1933.

Oklahoma City

Dally Oklahoman of August 5 replied that no one had
changed his mind In his political career more than
Secretary Ickes.
Several smaller newspapers supporting Landon dis
agreed with the speech Itself but had grudging words of
praise for the speaker.

An upstate New York editorial

accused him of over-stating his oase but labeled him "a
forceful speaker and campaigner";^ a hostile New England
paper said that he brought into effective play "the full
force of personalities which he, as an Inveterate re
former, p o s s e s s e s " a n d a paper in Landon's home state

^ Yakima Herald, August 5» 1936.
^ Watertown Times, August 5, 1936.
^Providence Bulletin, August 6 , 1936.
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denounced Ickes but called his speech "one of the most
effective speeches against Governor Landon yet made by
the quaking Democrats," adding that the speaker "de
serves and will get credit from the Roosevelt Adminis
tration.
The New York Times remained uncommitted in the
presidential contest at this time, and the opinions
of Arthur Krock, one of its leading political comment
ators, were still non-partisan.
speech was a mixed one.

Krock's reaction to the

He said that "reviewing some of

Mr. Landon1s less recent activities, Secretary Ickes
made against him, and easily proved, charges of incon
sistency"; but he added that the speech "probably did
not have any great effect on those groups of voters who
are still undetermined."

Krock believed Ickes had not

gone far enough in proving that Landon had changed his
views purely for political opportunism.
however, that "the burden of proof

He concluded,

is on

Mr. Landon that

he did not do the latter."^
In general, the enthusiastic reception of it by
partisans and the evasive or mixed response to it by
opponents gave Ickes reason to be pleased with reactions
to his speech.

^ Hutchinson Herald. August

5»

1936.

^ New York Times, August 6 ,

1936, p. 18.
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SUMMARY EVALUATION

Judged both by Internal conformity to rhetorical
standards and by the test of public reaction, the initial
attack on Landon was a more effective speech than the one
directed against the Republican platform.

The August 3

speech went into the very essence of Ickes' special task
in the campaign, that of reducing the stature of Landon
aB a candidate.

The Administration's hatchet-man was

under way in his efforts to weaken the Republican candi
date In the eyes of progressives and liberals in both
parties and to undermine public confidence in that
candidate's sincerity.

His chief weapons were the words

of Governor Landon himself and of his supporters.
The strength of the speech lay primarily in its
effective blending of logical and emotional appeals.
Examples and testimony were used as rational supports,
but they were clothed in highly psychological language.
Vivid Imagery and sardonic humor were effectively inter
mingled with logical supports.

Some stylistic weaknesses

present in the first radio address were not noted in this
speeoh.
The reactions to the speeoh pleased both Ickes
and Roosevelt.

Democrats were highly enthusiastic about

it; it was well publicized; and the replies of Republican
leaders and publications were relatively ineffectual.

Democratic strategists had reason to feel that Ickes'
attack had damaged the prestige and standing of Roose
velt's opponent and, at the same time, had weakened
Republican charges of platform violations against the
President.

CHAPTER VI

"HEARST OVER TOPEKA"
On August 27, at 9:45 P.M. (E.S.T.), Secretary
Ickes made his third major radio address of the cam
paign.

This thirty-minute speech, sponsored by the

Democratic National Committee, was broadcast over a
Columbia Broadcasting System network.

It was en

titled "Hearst Over Topeka."
BACKGROUND AND SETTING OF THE SPEECH
Between August 3 and August 27, Ickes made no
speeches.

He was not, however, entirely out of the news

during that time.

On August 18, several newspapers

carried reports of the Secretary's verbal blast against
the Winchester, Massachusetts policeman who had arrest
ed Robert Ickes, the Secretary's foster son, on a charge
of driving while under the influence of liquor.

The ar

resting officer was accused of playing politics "through
a young lad who is an innocent bystander."

The New York

Times carried Iokes' charge and also the denial by
Police Sergeant Charles J. Harrold.'1' Of potentially more
serious consequence to Iokes politically was the published

^ e w York Times. August 18, 1936, p. 13 .
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charge that hia book Baok to Work:

The Story of PWA was

prepared In large part by government personnel and at
government expense.

This charge appeared In Hearst pub

lications on August 24, and was made a front-page story
by many of them.

Ickes' press-conferenoe reply was that

he had simply availed himself of the research services
which were supplied, upon request, to any taxpayer,
Including Hearst correspondents. 2

After this brief ex

change, the matter was apparently allowed to drop.-^
During this period between Ickes' addresses,
Governor Landon began his expected Eastern tour.

On

August 21, at West Middlesex, Pennsylvania, he called
4
for a return to "the American way of life"; on August
24, at Ghautaqua Lake, New York, he discussed education,
declaring against the Hearst-supported teacher loyalty
oaths and favoring keeping education "free of all con
trol by the Federal Government";^ and on August 26, at
Buffalo, he hit "reckless spending" and promised repeal

2 Ickes, Seoret Diary. Vol. I, pp. 668-69; and
New York Times, August 28, 1936, p. 8 .
3This conclusion is based on the absence of edit
orial or further news comment in the New York Times, the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Chicago Tribune, the Washing
ton Post, and the newspaper clippings (usually very
thoroughly collected) in the Iokes Papers.
**New York Times, August 2 3 , 193b, p. 1.
^New York Times, August 25 , 1936, p. 1.

w
of the Surplus Tax Bill.^

A statement released by the

Democratic National Committee Indicated that Secretary
Ickes1 August 27 address would ’'discuss some of the
questions raised in Governor Landon’s talks at Chau
tauqua Lake and in Buffalo."^

Although the Ickes'

speeoh dealt with those questions very briefly and only
indirectly, this announcement probably served to stimu
late the desired interest.
Much closer to the actual oontent of the speeoh
was a later announcement by the Democratic National
Committee.

It promised that the Ickes speech would dis

close "hitherto secret documents revealing how orders
Q
went from William Randolph Hearst to Alfred Landon."
This was a speeoh Ickes had been eager to make for a
long time.

He had urged upon Michelson, Farley, High,

and the President the delivery of an attack linking
Hearst and Landon before Landon*s aooeptance speech.
Aooordlng to Ickes, everybody approved the Idea except
the President, who preferred waiting until after the
Kansan's speech of acceptance.^

The President expressed

the fear that Landon might then disavow the politically

6New York Times,August 27,

1936, P* !•

?New York Times,August 24,

1936, p. 6 .

®New York Times, August 27,

1936, p. 11.

^ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, pp. 639-40.
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risky Hearst, a fear which his Secretary of the Interior
regarded as "downright silly.
Ickes did win approval for making minor attacks
on Hearst In his June 7 and August 3 speeches.

After

the latter attack, according to Ickes, Roosevelt seemed
more enthusiastic about "going after" Hearst:
He /Roosevelt/ said he had heard that Hearst
didn’t like the attacks that were being made upon
him and that there were indications of a willing
ness on his part to compromise. He added that it
might be neoessary to go after him once more to
bring him to time. 11
On August 1 9 , Charles Michelson called the Secre
tary to tell him that the President had decided to
schedule the speech on Hearst and Landon for the evening
of August 27.

Ickes polished up the partially-prepared

speeoh that week end while a guest of his friend, and
Hearst’s publisher of the Washington Herald. Mrs.
12
Eleanor Patterson.
At an August 24 private luncheon
with the President, final approval of the speech was
reoeived:
He /Itoosevelt/ told me that Charley Michelson
had said to him that ray speech for Thursday night
was fine. I handed a oopy of It to him and he
read It. He liked It and did not suggest a single

10Ibld., p. 639.
1 1 Ibld., p. 657.
12
Ickes diary relates this interesting event with
obvious pleasure. Ibid., p. 6 6 5 .

1^
correction. He did suggest one or two things that
might be added, and these I put in later in the day,
to the improvement of the speech.^3
PURPOSE AND THESIS OF THE SPEECH
An original purpose of the attack on Hearst, that
of embarrassing Landon Just prior to his acceptance
speech by linking him closely with Hearst, was gone;
others, however, remained.
Hearst publications were in vigorous opposition to
the Roosevelt Administration; therefore, any attack which
undermined the Influence of the publisher, or his news
paper? ,periodicals, and other news outlets, was sound
political strategy.

Governor Landon, however, and not

Hearst, was the chief target of the assault.
Johnson was to point out after the speech:
is not the candidate.

As Hugh
"Mr. Hearst

Landon is the narae."'1'^

Ickes

and the President undoubtedly realized this, but they
further realized that a candidate must often carry the
weight of those supporters with whom he is closely
associated in the public mind.
Landon through Hearst.

Ickes was attacking

This is about what Landon-sup-

porter William Hard said in a rather subjective way

1 3lbld., p. 6 6 6 .
^Newsweek, VIII (September 5, 1936), 12.
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when he aooused the Secretary of trying "to blacken the
character of Governor Landon by blackening the character
of Mr. Hearst.
Some evidence undeniably pointed to the conclusion
that Hearst was not regarded favorably by the voters
whose favor Landon sought- to capture.

In the election

year of 1936 he was placed under especially persistent
attack.

In that year, two new Hearst biographies, both

unsympathetic to their subject, appeared.

16

In an

editorial entitled "The King is Dead," New Republic
said that these books threw Hearst under "a lurid
spotlight" and then quoted in part from Charles A.
Beard’s introduction to one of them:
Hearst, despite all the uproar he has made and
all the power he wields, is a colossal failure. . , .
He will depart loved by few and respected by none
whose respeot is worthy of respect.17
Just a few months prior to publication to these two
biographies, Hearst had figured prominently in Raymond
Gram Swing’s Forerunners of American Fascism.

In his

chapter on Hearst, Swing wrote:

^-5New York Times, August 28, 1 9 3 6 , p. 8 .
•^Oliver Carlson and Ernest Sutherland Bates,
Lord of San Simeon (New York: Viking Press, 1 9 3 6 ); and
Ferdinand Lundberg, Imperial Hearst: A Social Biography
(New York: Equinox Cooperative Frees,”"1936).
^ New Republic, L X X X V H (September 5. 1936), 35.
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Waging war on professors, contemptous of aca
demic freedom and of the rights of free speech,
hostile to the 'alien' ideas of labor (particular
ly to the Newspaper Guild in his own offices),
apologetic for big business, admiring of the
fascists of Europe for having suppressed communism,
and sensing in his very bones the decadence of the
democracy he once served, that is Hearst today.18
In July of 1936, the Fortune poll took up the
subject of Hearst.

Their results showed widespread

apathy or lndeoision but also revealed that many con
sidered Hearst publications a bad influence on American
politics.

When asked the question "Do you think the

influence of the Hearst papers upon national politics
is good or bad?" over 10 per cent replied "good,"
almost 28 per cent thought it "bad," and the majority
had no opinion.

In the areas where Hearst papers were

published, 10 per cent thought their Influence good
and those considering it bad rose to over 43 per cent.
On August 21, a resolution by the American Federation
of Teachers, convened in Philadelphia, labeled Hearst an
"enemy of academic freedom," the "chief proponent of
fascism" and the "outstanding Jlngoist" of the country.
They also quoted Senator Norris' statement that Hearst
publications were "the Bewer system of American

ISRaymond Gram Swing, Forerunners of American
Fascism (New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1935), P* 151*
^ Fortune, XIV (July, 1936), p. 148.
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Journalism," and their resolution to boycott these publioatlons passed unanimously.

20

Much of the American public quite obviously did
not approve of Hearst or his publications.

If Ickes

succeeded in associating Landon closely with Hearst, this
might seriously hamper the Governor’s bid for public
favor.

This purpose was accompanied by the further aim

of striking at one of the most persistent and bitter
critics of the Administration.
The thesis of the speech went beyond the simple
association of candidate Landon with supporter Hearst.
It developed the theme of a "boss-candldate" relation
ship.

The subject was the Landon-Hearst relationship;

the proposition which eventually emerged was that pub
lisher Hearst strongly influenced or even controlled
Governor Landon.

The subjeotwhs announced in the

opening sentence of the speech:

"What of Governor Lan

don and William Randolph Hearst?"; the proposition Was
plainly implied in the d o s i n g sentences:
Hearst over Topeka J Do the American people want
it to be Hearst over the White House?
This is one of the most important issues, if not
in fact the transcendent issue of this campaign.

20New York Times, August 22, I 936 , p. 5*
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LINES OF ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION
The broad organization of thiB speeoh was clear.
The speaker posed a question in the introduction, gave
his answer to it in the body of the speeoh, and drew his
conclusions in the closing sentences.

The internal

organization in the body of the speech conformed less
to any logical pattern.

The arguments, in order, were

these:
(1) Landon owes his nomination to the support and
direction of Hearst.
(2) Landon does not Intend to discard Hearst
after the election.
(3 ) Landon's present relationship with Hearst is
a very close one.
(4-) The "Old Guard" has not been removed from
power in the Republican party.
(5) Hearst dominates most of the American press.
(6 ) Landon is conducting an evasive campaign.
It will be seen that these last three arguments do not
directly support the main thesis of the speech, nor is
there any obvious pattern to their arrangement.

The

tendency already noted in Iokes' speeches to Btrlke out
on all fronts to discredit candidate, supporters, or
party is much in evidence in this speech.

The speeoh
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maintains a semblance of unity, but only by the constant
injection of references to the Hearst-Landon relation
ship and by the persistent attitude of attach.
FOBMSOF SUPPORT
As in previous speeches, some of Ickes1 premises
were supported primarily by assertion and psychological
appeals, almost not at all by logical proof.

His first

premise-, for example, was supported by no logical proof
at all.

In contending that Landon owed his nomination

to Hearst'8 support and direction, the speaker used as
sumption, assertion, and slanted narrative, but no
logical proof.

He began by saying:

Everyone knows that it was the result of a care
fully planned Hearst build-up that made it possible
for the pleasant gentleman who is Governor of Kansas
to appear upon the national stage in the character
of a Presidential candidate.
If boiled down to its purely factual content,
this assertion was perhaps Justified.

As noted in

Chapter V, the belief that Hearst support was very
Instrumental in securing the necessary publicity and
backing for Landon1s nomination was rather generally
held.

The narrative which followed next, however, went

beyond the bounds of general agreement.

Throughout his

exposition, Ickes wove in assertions and implications of
a highly controversial nature.

His narrative, stripped

of all slanted description and Implication, told of
Hearst's break with the Administration, his decision
to support the Kansas Governor, the publicity campaign
which followed, and the eventual nomination of Landon
and approval of a platform.

While delivering this

narrative, however, Ickes worked in unsupported as
sertions or implications (1) that Hearst's break with
Roosevelt was solely because the Administration “denied
certain special privileges" to him in regard to tax
procedures; (2) that Landon balanced the budget so he
would not "render himself liable to impeachment," and
that he did so by cutting expenses "at the cost of the
schools and other public welfare institutions";

(3 )

that Landon, at the direction of Hearst, "gradually dis
carded every conviction that would link him with the
Progressive movement of the country or the New Deal of
President Roosevelt"; and (^) that the Republican plat
form was "weasel-worded."
The paragraph describing the results of the
Republican convention illustrates the nature of the
lakes’ narrative:
In due course the Republicans assembled in a
national convention at Cleveland, where they
adopted a weasel-worded platform that was en
thusiastically approved by Mr. Hearst and formally
ratified candidates for President and Vice Presi
dent who had been selected by him. The greatest
build-up in the politioal history of America thus
far had been successful. A well-meaning, pleasant
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but inexperienced Governor In the make-up of a man
of transcendent abilities and of truly heroic mold
had been nominated for President by the major
minority party.
The easy assertions and clever but unsupported implica
tions in this paragraph are typical of those found in
the first third of the Secretary's speech, the portion
devoted to what "every one knows" about the nomination
of Landon.
The second argument rejected the idea that Landon
might, after election, drop Hearst.

It did so by psycho

logical suggestion tinged with a trace of irony.

The

argument was brief:
People of generous minds are loath to believe
that these gentlemen /Tandon and Knox^ are willing
to accept the support of Mr. Hearst and at the same
time, by their silence, refuse to acknowledge their
obligation to him. Least of all do they wish to
credit the story that is going the rounds to the
effect that Governor Landon will accept the support
of Mr. Hearst until after the election and then
repudiate him, win or lose. No one wants to have
such an opinion as that of the Republican candidate.
Embodied here also was the suggestion of a dilemma:
either Landon welcomed and would show appreciation for
Hearst's aid, or he would prove ungrateful and treacher
ous.

Ickes rejected the latter alternative in favor of

the more "generous" one which, of course, supported the
thesis of his speeoh.
The third argument dealt with the most advertised
portion of the speech:

the charge that sworn testimony
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before an Illinois court furnished documentary proof of
the Hearst Influence on Landon.

The testimony occurred

in a case involving George P. Harding, Republican National
Committeeman from Illinois.

Harding had wanted, for

reasons upon which Ickes speculated, to see Hearst.
Through Frank Knox, he secured an appointment with Hearst
and flew to California during the last week in June, 1936.
After that conference, Hearst sent to Harding a memorandum,
from which the speaker quoted in part:
Memorandum for Mr. Harding from Mr. Hearst: I was
very much impressed by what you had to say about
Governor Landon not making too many speeches. If you
will write me to that effect, expressing your views
as frankly as you did when we were talking, I will,
with your permission, send the letter to Governor
Landon. It cooperates with and supports what I have
already told the Governor, and I feel that suoh
views coming from an important man as yourself would
have a great and valuable Influence. I think the
Governor naturally feels this himself, but the average
politician around him is continually urging him to
get out and talk. Talk is the method of the average
politician, but as you very truly said this is a
oampalgn in whloh speech-making might do more harm
than good. At present the Democrats have nothing to
orltiolze Governor Landon about. You can see that
in their attempts to criticize him. Too many speeches
might give the Democrats their eagerly wanted oppor
tunity. Others try to combat or at least try to off
set the influence of those politicians who are
continually demanding more speeohes.
This was the documentary evidence upon which the speaker
based his premise that Hearst was exeroislng powerful
influence over Landon.

A simple reading of the memorandum

does not offer convincing proof that it documents the
charge.

It seemed almost as though Hearst needed help in
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putting across a suggestion to the Republican candidate.
It expressed some Hearst points of view which were not
likely to endear him to the public, and It did not re
flect favorably upon his supporters* private views of
Landon as a candidate; the memorandum did not, however,
prove that Landon was under the domination of Hearst.
It was good campaign material, but It does not appear to
have proved the speaker's premise.
Ickes made the most of his document and of the
circumstances leading to its writing.

He Inferred that

Harding went to see Hearst because he was "practical"
and therefore "wished to go to the highest source of
power and authority In the Republican party," that he
visited Hearst instead of Landon because "he wanted to
get to the man at the top," and that if you want to get
to Landon “the surest way is through Mr. Hearst."

Suoh

Inferences appear to have been the result of partisan
speculation; they were not warranted by the evidence.
The Secretary also quoted from the memorandum to
prove that Hearst had silenced Landon on the issues of
the campaign.

Regarding Harding's suggesting that Lan

don say very little, Hearst had said "It cooperates with
and supports what I have already told the Governor."

This

statement proved, according to the speaker, that Hearst
was responsible for silencing Landon:
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Mr. Hearst early In the game had cautioned him
against talking too much, and a word of caution
from that source was all that Governor Landon
needed. . . . Has any aspirant for the high office
of Chief Executive ever said so little that Is
worth listening to?
From the point of view of evidence and reasoning, the
speaker's conclusion simply over-reached his proof.
Tho next argument was that the Republican party,
far from ridding Itself of the "Old Guard," was still a
party of loose ethical standards.

The evidence was

drawn from a statement of Harding In the same case
previously olted.

This statement, as quoted and inter

preted, did not paint a very savory picture of Harding's
concept of political honesty.
dence was hardly adequate.

Again, however, the evi

A questionable, or even

valid, charge of poor political ethics against one Repub
lican, while It may be psychologically telling, is not
logically sufficient to Indict an entire party.
Ickes next argued that Hearst exeroised control
of a large section of the American press.

The argument

is brief enough to be quoted In Its entirety:
Another significant aspect of the campaign, in
addition to the pregnant taciturnity of Governor
Landon and Colonel Knox upon this Important Hearst
Issue, is the almost equally impenetrable silence
of a certain part of the American press with refer
ence to it.
It would almost seem that to some the cherished
right of freedom of the press, about which Mr. Hearst
and Colonel MoCormick can become so exlcted when
there Is no occasion for It, is often merely freedom
to distort news and to supress newB. It might not be
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unreasonable to affirm that a seotion of the Amerloan
press, to the degree to which It wears blinders upon
this and other Issues Involving Mr. Hearst, regards
him not only as Its politioal but as Its Intellectual
and ethical leader.
Be the explanation what It may, it Is noteworthy
that what In other circumstances would be regarded
as Important news cannot break Into the columns of
some newspapers which today, like the Republican party,
have surrendered their Judgment and their conscience
to VJllliam Randolph Hearst.
Little in thiB argument would meet the tests of sound
evidence.

The conclusion was based upon an assertion of

fact— that many newspapers were ignoring the New Deal side
of the news, especially on the Hearst issue— and a causal
inference from that assertion— that they had aocepted
completely the leadership of Hearst.

The opinion that

many pro-Landon newspapers carefully selected and even
distorted political news was widely expressed by Democrats.
Numerous letters in the Ickes1 files expressed such an
opinion, as did President Roosevelt and Charles Michelson.
It Is difficult to say whether undecided voters accepted
it as general knowledge.

If they did not, the entire

argument rested on unsupported assertion of a dubious
"fact.u
That Hearst was the acknowledged leader of the
Republican press was an inference not clearly indloated

2^Ickes Papers. Containers 246-52; Rosenraan, Public
Papers, VoY. V, p. 3; Charles Michelson, The Ghost Talks
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944), pp. 49 and JJ12.
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by the previous assertion and probably not a statement
of generally accepted fact.

Only one printed opinion

which supported that stated by the Secretary has been
found.

Heywood Broun, pro-Roosevelt columnist wrote:

For more than a year Hearst has set the pace and
defined the issues for practically all the attacks
made upon the Roosevelt Administration. Even such
bitter newspaper rivals of Mr. Hearst as the Chicago
Tribune, the Los Angeles Times and the New York
Herald Tribune have taken their tone from San Simeon. 22
Iokes1 final argument was that Landon was a vague
and evasive candidate, one about whom the voters actually
knew little in regard to vital issues.

He said, in part:

The farm question, the labor question, the question
of social security, taxation, relief, peace and many
other burning Issues may be all right in their way,
but the Republican candidate has a more important
matter to discuss.
He wants the country to conform to 'the American
way of life1. Well, who doesn't? He reiterates this
phrase as if he meant something by it, but in his
mouth it is only a catch-phrase, a bit of empty
rhetoric, a tinsel object designed to attract the at
tention of the unthinking.
I haven’t attempted to count the number of times
that the Republican oandidate and his running mate
have used this expression— which also is a favorite
one of the Hearst press— but when Governor Landon,
in particular, reaches a point in a speech where hope
runs high that he is at last going to say something
about the real issues of the campaign he can always
be depended upon to wind up with Borne inanity.
Here, ignoring for the moment the subjective language,
Ickes was upon more solid logical ground.

Landon had

been more general than specific, and he had frequently

22Nation, GXLII (June 17, 1936), 779.
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called for a return to "the American way of life."

This

expression had been especially In evidence In Landon's
addresses at Omaha, Nebraska, on August 20 and at West
Middlesex, Pennsylvania, on August 22.23

Arthur Krook,

who had treated the Landon candidacy rather favorably,
noted Landon’s failure to spell out his stand on the
issues:
We must begin to detail and amplify the vague
promises and professions of the platform and his
own speech of acceptance or run the extreme risk
of being set down as having no amplifications to
Impart.24
On his Eastern tour, Landon began to be somewhat
more specific.

At Chautauqua Lake he announced his op

position to teacher loyalty oaths,and at Buffalo he
promised to repeal the Surplus Tax Bill and to reduoe
federal spending.

However, a New York Tiroes editorial

observed on the day of Iokes' speeoh that Landon
"remains vague regarding Just where he would apply the
knife.The

charges which Ickes made regarding the

Republican candidate's vagueness on many important
issues were well-grounded in fact.

However, in conclud

ing th^ argument, the speaker said:

2^See reports and texts in New York Times of
August 21, and August 23, 1936.
2 ^New York Times, August 2 3 , 1 9 3 6 , Sec. A, p. 3 .
^ New York Times, August 27, 1936, p. 20.
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There isn’t a responsible person in the United
States, unless it be William Randolph Hearst, who,
at this moment, would underwrite what Governor Lan
don, if elected President, would do in any given set
of circumstances.
Ickes simply let his conclusion go somewhat beyond what
his basioally valid proof Justified.
As in the case of the speech on the Republican
platform, Ickes relied much more upon emotional appeals
than upon logical proofs.

This was true despite the

great emphasis placed, especially where publicity was
concerned, upon the documentary aspect of the speech.
The documentary proof actually had limited value as
evidence; the persuasion of the speeoh rested in the
psychological use which the speaker made of the docu
ment presented.

He used inconclusive evidence, from

which he drew questionable inferences, upon which he
built emotional appeals.
Most of the psychological support in the speeoh
was built upon "guilt by association."

For Ickes* pur

pose, it was not really neoessary that he prove Landon
to be under Hearst domination.

It was sufficient that

he get Landon closely associated with Hearst, even though
vaguely, in the votei's* minds.

This strategy would create

an impression upon "the unthinking" to whom Ickes had
said Landon appealed with his "American way of Life."
The antipathy which many felt toward Hearst might then
extend to the Kansan as well.

Too, the charge of Hearst

domination, while never proved, was likely to arouse
some suspicion and distrust simply by suggestion and by
dent of constant repetition.

The speaker did not really

have to prove anything to his listeners to damage the
landon candidacy; he needed only to arouse their sus
picions.

While his evidence was Inadequate as logical

proof, Ickes did cleverly suggest that Landon was domi
nated by Hearst, that he was a political opportunist
without film convictions, and that he was being deliber
ately vague and evasive; he did suggest, further, that
the Republican party was led by corrupt men and that
Hearst dominated an unfair hostile press.

If these

suggestions took firm root, they were, strictly from the
point of getting political results, Just as effective as
the most valid logical proof.

This Ignores, for the

moment, the ethical consideration involved.
The two psychological devices Ickes used most
were emotionally suggestive language and repetition.
Some emotionally suggestive or loaded language from
previous speeches reappeared in this one.

“Reactionary

Wall Street,“ “Old Guard," "weasel-worded,“ and "prac
tical," for example, were back.

A new approach to re

ducing the stature of Governor Landon by the language
applied to him appeared also.

Ickes sought to create a

picture of a mediocre, second-rate man by referring to
Landon as "a well-meaning, pleasant but inexperienced
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Governor" and as "the pleasant gentleman who Is Governor
of Kansas."

In context, the word "pleasant" took on a

suggestion definitely apart from its denotative meaning.
As an example of the speaker's use of repetition to im
plant a suggestion, this word "pleasant" appeared three
separate times to describe the Republican candidate. The
word "boss," In reference to Hearst, was also repeated
several times.

As noted previously, many key words used

in other speeches were repeated in this one.

The main

ideas of the previous two radio addresses were also
repeated in very condensed form.
Less use of humor as a persuasive device appeared
in this speeoh than in previous ones.

The general tone

was more business-like, and a light note was less fre
quently sounded when ridicule was being employed.
humorous references, however, did appear.

Some

The irony of

the following passage, dealing with Hearst‘s "discovery"
of Landon is Illustrative:
Mr. Hearst looked upon Governor Landon and found
him good. Wherupon Mr. Hearst let it be known to
the world that he had discovered a veritable poli
tical prodigy, a nugget of great value, a simple but
rugged soul, whom he proceeded to offer, with his
approval, to the Republican party as its candidate
for President.
The same type of humor appeared in the discussion of
Landon1s discarding all previous progressive ideas:
To some people it might have appeared to be a
large order to dig a hole in the back yard large
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enough for the interment of so many vigorous ideas
on governmental policy, but the 'strong1 and now
silenced man of Topeka, with a Presidential nomina
tion dangling before his eyes, undertook the task.
Another illustration of Ickes* effective use of irony
occurred when he referred to George Harding’s concept of
political morality as expressed through his opinion of
an Illinois politician-named Van Meter.

The Seoretary

epitomized a Harding quotation this way:
Van Meter was appointed because he was honest
and could be depended upon to split the swag
equitably among the politicians. And he was honest
'because he was born on father's farm. 1
Ridicule and saroasm were used a great deal in this
speech, but most of it was more deadly serious than
humorous in aspect.
An extended analysis of the ethical proof in
"Hearst Over Topeka" is hardly necessary.

The discus

sions of lines of argument and of persuasive techniques
illustrate clearly that again in this address, as before,
the Secretary concentrated on a negative approach to the
ethos of the opposition rather than upon a positive one
toward his own.

All of his arguments were directed

toward diminishing the stature of Landon, Hearst, the
opposition press, and the Republican leadership.

No

effort was made to capitalize on his own reputation or
position and apparently very little to win the favor of
listeners by the personal virtues and attitudes reflected
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In the speech.

After this speech, Newsweek noted that

Iokes undoubtedly had been given the Job of "Chief De26
nouncer" and assigned the "pummeling of the opposition."

He stuck close to that task in "Hearst Over Topeka."
Two brief references were made which might have
been Intended to help support Ickes' attack by using the
prestige of the President he represented.

One was a

statement that the Hearst press was "venomously misrep
resenting the hard-working, able and statesmanlike
President of the United States."

This assertion not

only capitalized upon the President's office but also
referred very subtly to Roosevelt's "non-political"
functioning in it while Landon was campaigning.

Later,

in asserting that Landon, not Roosevelt, was the "pig in
a poke," the speaker referred to "President Roosevelt,
whose policies have been frankly disclosed to the country
as they have been developed."

These were half-hearted

attempts to utilize ethical proof as a persuasive factor
when compared with the larger efforts to destroy the
standing of the opposition's candidate and of his leading
supporters.
USE OF LANGUAGE
The language in "Hearst Over Topeka" had the same

^ Newsweek, VIII (September 5> 1936), p. 12.

vivid and striking quality noted in previous speeches.
This has been apparent in sections of the speeoh already
quoted for other purposes, especially those illustrating
the speaker’s use of irony.

The language is noted for

its expressively figurative quality, from the title it
self to the final threat of "Hearst over the White House."
For example, Ickes said that Landon became "uncommunica
tive as the sphinx," that he became a "strong but silenced
man," that making him a presidential candidate was like
"making bricks without straw," and that no one before
had "pussyfooted his way into the White House."

He also

referred to Landon's "oracular utterances" and his "auto
biographical phrase 'pig in a poke'," and he noted
Hearst's "styptic effect upon the vocal organs."

The

Republican party he called "the major minority party."
Such figures were not only slantedly descriptive but
gave life and vigor to the speech.
The speaker's oral style was given foroe by
frequent use of short, blunt sentences and by rhetorical
questions.

Illustrative of the injection of an occasion

al concise, blunt statement was this paragraph:
But notwithstanding his hurry, apparently he did
not think it worth while to stop at Topeka to confer
with Governor Landon as he flew over that city on
his way to San Simeon. No, he wanted to get to the
man at the top. Mr. Harding is a realist.
Several questions, mostly rhetorical, lent added force and
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directness to the speaker's style.
asked:

His opening sentence

“What of Governor Landon and William Randolph

Hearst?"

This question was posed again, rephrased, only

a few seoonds later.

At one point, a series of questions

was used:
While there is no written evidence to prove that
Mr. Hearst also has told Governor Landon that he
should say as little as possible, and then only in
unctious inanities on those occasions when he could
not avoid making speeches, who can doubt that he has
done so?. How otherwise explain the Republican's
elocutionary efforts? Has any aspirant for the high
office of Chief Executive ever said so little that
is worth listening to?
Four other direct questions were posed, culminating in
his final "Do the American people want it to be Hearst
over the White House?"

Ickes employed language that was

vividly descriptive and psychologically persuasive, and
he usually structured it in a direct, forceful manner.
REACTION TO THE SPEECH
Ickes was pleased with the news space given his
speech by the press.

Of this press coverage he wrote:

I got a big newspaper play on my Thursday night
speech. The New York Dally News, which has the
largest circulation in the country, printed it in
full, beginning on the front page, and carried some
seotione of the photostatic copy of the record in
the Harding v. Harding case. It is very unusual for
a tabloid newspaper to print so much of any one story.
The New York Times carried it in full with a frontpage s'i'ory, while even such papers as the Baltimore
Sun and the New York Herald Tribune gave it large
space.
. . . the Hearst papers gave a reasonable
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amount of space to my Thursday night speech. They
all carried the Associated Press story, I am told.2 '
Less pleasing were some of the negative reactions
to the speech.. One reaction occurred, oddly enough, an
hour before the Ickes speech was delivered; at that time
William Hard "replied" on behalf of the Republican
party.2®

The Secretary, though misinformed as to its

time of delivery, frankly admitted the effectiveness of
the reply:
The Republicans did one clever thing last night.
Although I had withheld all copies of my speeoh until
one o ’clock yesterday afternoon, except a few that
were sent by mail that would not reach newspaper
offices until about the same hour, the Republicans
managed to get one for William Hard, who is on the
radio every night. Usually he is on early in the
evening, but last night, although it must have oost
them a lot of money, they put him on following /.sic/
my speech and he replied to it. It was well done
and cleverly done. I must admit that. °
Hard's speeoh ridiculed the charge of Hearst con
trol on three counts:

(1) that Hearst had supported a

willing Roosevelt in 1932 but obviously had not dominated
him thereafter; (2) that Charles Michelson did not ap
parently think Hearst so insidious, having worked for him
for many years; and (3 ) that Elliot Roosevelt was under
Hearst employ at the very moment, managing Texas and

27lckes, Seoret Diary. Vol. I, pp. 670-71.
2®New York Times, August 29 , 1936, p. 12.

29iokes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 670.
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Oklahoma radio stations for him.3°
widely reported in the press.

This speech also waB

The Chicago Tribune, the

Washington Post, the St^. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the
New York Times all carried Hard's speech on the same
page as that of Ickes.
Governor Landon made no reply himself, hut James
Hagerty, newsman traveling with his party during the
campaign, reported the oonsensus in the Republican inner
camp.

It was that Landon's Chautauqua opposition to

teacher loyalty oaths, a stand directly opposing that of
Hearst, had already refuted Ickes before he spoke.^
This was the position taken too, by some nominally in
dependent newspapers.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer and

the New York Times. both of August 29, took suoh a
position editorially.

The latter said, in part:

This address had the appearance of being pre
pared a week or ten days earlier and, although
Intervening events had taken the heart out of it,
Mr. Ickes proceeded grimly to read it to the bitter
end.
. . . the whole attempt to represent Mr. Hearst
as the political creator and controller of Governor
Landon was from the first artificial and now has
become little short of ridiculous.32

3°These arguments were summarized In Time, XXVIII
(September 7, 1936), 9.
33-New York Times, August 29, 1936, p. 1.
32New York Times, August 29, 1936, p. 12.
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Newsweek noted that:

"Even Democratic writers called

the speeoh effective campaign ammunition— had it come a
week

earlier.

"33

it was true that several pro-Roosevelt

newspapers had failed to respond favorably to the charge
of Hearst control.

The Richmond NewB Leader of August 28

said that Hearst was only a political "weather vane";
the Tupelo Journal (Mississippi) of August 29 expressed
disappointment in Landon but put no stock in the Ickes
charge of Hearst domination; the Montgomery Advertiser
of September 1, called the charges “balderdash"; and
Hugh Johnson's column, "One Man's Opinion," while still
supporting Roosevelt, termed the Ickes1 attack "an un
fortunate error."3^
The usual partisan reaction, however, came from
many Democratic papers.

The Brooklyn Citizen of August

28 called the speeoh "devastating"; the Nashville Tennes
sean of August 29 thought it "perfectly timed"; the
Paduoah Sun of August 30 Bald it could not "be laughed
off and ignored"; and further editorial support came
from the Chloago Times of. August 3 0 , the Beaumont
Journal of September 5» and the Glasgow News of Sept
ember 1 0 .

^ N e w s w e e k , VIII (September 7, 1936), p. 12.
3^Washington News, August 28, 1936.
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From several Republican leaders emanated hostile
statements In whloh lay little actual reply.

Melvin C.

Eaton, New York Republican Chairman, called Ickes only
"a ventriloquist’s dummy" and struck out at the President:
Comrade Harold L. Ickes, Overlord of the Interior
and Commissar of PWA, has apparently again heard his
master's voice and, rushing to the radio,has at
tempted to divert to himself the Republican attaoks
on President Roosevelt. This, of course, is an old
New Deal custom: Whenever the going gets too tough
for the celebrity himself, a Cabinet member invar
iably steps into the conflict and takes on the general
aspect of an administration decoy or bell cow.35
In Chioago, George F. Harding said he could not "immediate
ly" recall the conversation with Hearst and then added:
"However, I do not care to dignify the charges with an
answer.

It seems that this is the only way they can

attack Governor L a n d o n . C h a i r m a n John Hamilton
brushed the speeoh aside with the comment "Why answer
the popguns?"

Congressman Joseph Martin replied more

extensively:
Secretary Ickes apparently has been glad to come
to the front as the chief mudslinger in the present
campaign. . . . But when a fighter hits below the
belt he generally pays the penalty. Mr. Ickes has
not helped Mr. Roosevelt by his unfair and unjust
attack.37
Had the Secretary's attack "helped Mr. Roosevelt"?

35n b w York

Times,August 29, 1936, p. 5*

3^New York

Times,August 28, 1936, p. 8.

37n6W- York

Times,August 2 9 , 1936. P» 5»

1 7k
Ickes h'imself was not sure.

Three days after the speech,

he wrote:
The editorials on this last speech that I have
seen generally take the position that the Hearst
issue is an old one that fills the editorial writers
with ennui.
This leads me to the conclusion either that the
Hearst issue is not as important as I had thought it
would he or that the newspapers are unwilling to
cheer on an attack against the greatest publisher,
in point of newspapers, in the country. Both may be
true. However, I believe that there is more wide
spread anti-Hearst feeling among the people than
there has been for a great many years, if ever. . . .
On the other hand, there is a good deal to what the
newspapers say, but not to the extent to which they
would like to have it appear.3°
While much of the editorial comment of the press
could be discounted, the composite reaction was not very
favorable.

Landon*s break with Hearst on the issue of

loyalty oaths and the effect of Hard’s reminder that.
Hearst had once supported Roosevelt were both factors
which dulled the sharpness of the Secretary's attaok.
The reaction of independent newspapers and writers, and
also of some Democratic organs, Indicated that "Hearst
Over Topeka" would probably produce less influence upon
undecided voters than Ickes' two previous attacks.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
This speech had two primary purposes:

(1) to

attaok William Bandolph Hearst and the Hearst press and

38lckes, Secret Diary. Vol. I, p. 671.
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(2 ) to -weaken the Landon candidacy by closely associat
ing the Kansas Governor with Hearst.

The Hearst-Landon

association was the more important of the two.

The

speech was based upon the well-founded belief that pub
lisher Hearst was an unpopular and distrusted public
figure.
From a logical point of view,the speech was rela
tively weak.

The proposition that Landon was controlled

by Hearst was not amply demonstrated by the evidence
presented.

It was this proposition that most of the

press refused to credit and upon which those Republi
cans who replied at all based their answers.

From a

psychological point of view, a more successful effort
resulted.

Through techniques of suggestion, the speaker

enforced the association of Hearst with Landon and brought
the Hearst issue into full public view.

The association

not only waB not denied, but the very act of refuting
Ickes’ claims of actual Hearst control publicized the
undented elements of that relationship.

Republicans

were able to refute the speaker’s rather weak logical
proofs, but it was more difficult to reply to the sus
picions and prejudices Implanted by suggestionand
ported by emotional appeals.

sup

In these lay the

effectiveness of the speech.
The press coverage of the speech was good;the

press reaction was somewhat disappointing.

The proposi

tion of the speech was unproved; its purpose was at
least pai’tlally fulfilled.

The speech probably proved

less effective than the attaok on Landon’s progressivism; but it was by no means a complete failure.
While the Democrats had yet to establish that Landon
was dominated by Hearst, there was definitely now a
HearBt issue.

From that issue, the Republicans could

not possibly gain.

The Democrats might.

CHAPTER VII

"LANDON, COUGHLIN, 'ET AL'"
The tempo of the campaign gradually increased
during the month of September.

Then, after the Presi

dent made his first frankly political speeoh at Syra
cuse on September 2 9 , the final drive of both parties
really began in earnest.

The President’s Syracuse

address to the New York State Democratic Convention
replied to the charge of communist support with which
the Hearst press had attacked him on September 20.

On

October 1, the President spoke at Pittsburgh, this time
on the deficit and federal spending.

On the same night,

Frank Knox also spoke in Pittsburgh and Alfred E. Smith
endorsed Landon in New York City.'*'

On October 8 , Smith

attacked Roosevelt again, this time from Philadelphia.
On the same day, while Monseigneur John A. Ryan, in
Washington, was defending the President from previous
attaoks by Father Charles E. Coughlin, the Detroit
priest lambasted the President again in Pittsburgh.

On

Ootober 9, ’the air waves were really filled with campaign
oratory, as Roosevelt spoke in St. Paul, Minnesota,

^Secretary Ickes listened to all three by radio
in Washington. Ickes, Seoret Diary, Vol. I, p. 6 8 8 .
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Landon In Chicago, the 1920 Democratic ^presidential
nominee, James M. Cox, in Dayton, Ohio, and Harold Ickes
in Columbus, Ohio.

The Secretary's address, entitled

"Landon, Coughlin, 'et Al'," was delivered at a rally of
the Good Neighbor League in the Columbus Municipal
Auditorium and was broadcast from 8 : 3 0 to 9**0° P.M. by
N.B.C.
BACKGROUND AND SETTING OF THE SPEECH
The October 9 speeoh was Ickes' first major
political address since August 2 7 .
made three non-political addresses:

He had, however,
a welcoming speech

at the World Power Conference in Washington, a dedica
tion speeoh at the University of Syracuse, and another
speeoh at the dedication of the New York City Mid-Town
Tunnel.

He reluctantly declined to speak to a large

Negro rally at Madison Square Garden on September 21
because of the very recent death of his step-son,
Wilraarth Ickes.

This invitation came through Stanley

High, who said he found that Ickes had the highest stand
ing in the Administration with Negro leaders.2
The Secretary of the Interior also appeared to
hold high standing as a speaker with Democratic

2Ibld. . p. 680.
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campaign strategists.

On September 18, Thomas G-. Cor

coran reported to the Secretary that a campaign tour was
being planned for him.

According to Corcoran, Sam Ray

burn, Democratic Congressman from Texas, said that there
were more requests for Ickes as a speaker than for anyone
else; Corcoran further reported that Farley thought
Ickes’ speeches "went over big."3

Although most of the

press had expressed boredom or distaste for the August
27 attack on Landon and Hearst, Democratic leaders ap
parently had not shared such a response.
In early October, the entire Democratic outlook
was brighter than it had been at the start of the cam
paign.

On October 8 , Krock noted that the only encour

aging sign Republicans had was the Literary Digest poll.
Other polls showed Roosevelt leading, and Landon's lead
was gradually being cut in the Literary Digest sampling.^
With Roosevelt finally taking the political stump, Demo
cratic prospects were almost certain to Improve.

Perhaps

that was one reason why New York bettors, in the face of
extravagant vlotory claims from Chairman Hamilton and
publisher Hearst, were making the October odds on the
President's re-election 2-1 .^

3lbid., p. 682.
^New York Times, October 8 , 1936, P* 22.
5New York Times, October 6 , 1936, p. 22.
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As pointed out In Chapter I, some of the obstacles
to the re-election of Roosevelt were not Republican
obstacles.

An opposition third party, Father Coughlin’s

Union Party, and a dissident Democratic conservative
wing, led by Alfred E. Smith, both threatened to capture
votes normally Democratic.

The Union Party's candidate

was William Lemke of North Dakota, while bolting con
servative Democrats supported Governor Landon.

Having

previously concentrated on Landon and Hearst, Ickes
turned In "Landon, Coughlin,'et Al'" to two new targets,
Coughlin and Smith.
observers.

Both appeared formidable to some

Father Coughlin estimated the Union Party's

vote at no less than ten million, and of this estimate
Basil Rauch later wrote:
Father Coughlin promised to give up his radio
speeches If Lemke polled less than ten million
votes. The size of the membership of the Union
Party's constituent organizations seemed to make
this a fair gamble.
Some observers saw the pos
sibility that the Union Party would take away enough
votes from the Democratic candidates to ensure a Rep
ublican victory.®
While Coughlin forces were capturing some of the New
Deal's more radical support, Alfred E. Smith and other
conservative bolters wooed Democratic voters of the
right wing.

York:

According to Joseph W. Martin, Eastern

^Basll Rauoh, The History of the New Deal (New
Creative Age Press, Ino., 194577 P. 253^
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manager for Landon, the bolt of Smith alone would take
7
away over three million Democratic votes.
For his new
rhetorical targets, Ickes had at Columbus not only an
N.B.C. microphone but also a partisan Good Neighbor
League audienoe.

Thirty thousand invitations were sent

to Columbus citizens and the eventual audience was
estimated at eight to ten thousand people.®
For this speech, Ickes worked on three different
drafts.

He was assisted by Straus, Taylor, Fairman,

Slattery, and Armstrong; Presidential Secretary Early
also made at least two suggestions which were reflected
in the final draft.9

On October 7, Ickes showed the

final draft to the President.

He said that the Presi

dent "liked it and asked me to send him a copy. 1,10
After six weeks on the sidelines, the New Deal’s "Chief
Denouncer" was ready to return to the attack.
PURPOSE AND THESIS OF THE SPEECH
Neither in any of Ickes’ papers nor in his diary

?New York Times, Ootober 3, 1936, p. 1.
®Estiraate of W. T. Dickerson, chairman of the
Columbus chapter of the Good Neighbor League. Ickes
Papers, Container 225.
9lbid.
lOickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 692.

is there a statement revealing the specific goal or
goals of this speech.

The advance publicity given the

speech, as well as press reports following its delivery,
indicated that its objective was to show an informal
union between Republicans and Father Coughlin.

The

press release printed by the Baltimore Sun said that
the speaker would offer "documentary proof" of such a
connection.^

A later section of this chapter will

show that this part of the speech was all that most of
the press reported.

If establishing a Coughlln-Landon

connection had been the speech's only goal, it would
have been a valid one.

The ten million left-of-center

votes which Father Coughlin promised Lemke would draw
would almost oertainly have oome at the expense of the
Democrats.

If the speaker could convince the voters

concerned that a vote for Lemke was actually a vote for
Landon, he was likely to weaken the Union Party's poten
tial support.
Another purpose may have been to weaken several
Roosevelt foes, especially Coughlin.

The Detroit cleric

was probably the most vehement of Roosevelt's critics,
having called him in various speeches:

"betrayer,"

"soab," "anti-God," "communist," and " l i a r . O t h e r s

•^Baltimore Sun, October 6, 1936.
•^Rauch, o£. olt. , pp. 261-62.
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strongly attacked by Ickes were Landon, Smith, Knox,
Hard, Hoover, and Hearst.

One of the Secretary's goals

was but a smaller version of his larger campaign goal:
to strengthen Roosevelt by weakening public respect for
his foes and detractors.
This speeoh apparently had also a more positive
purpose.

Almost half of the twenty-seven minutes of

delivery time went into a defense of the New Deal, an
identification of it with the Interests of the common
people.

At the same time, Ickes pictured all special

interests as "ganging up" on Roosevelt.

The speech

attempted to represent the real issue of the campaign
as one of oppressor and privileged against oppressed
and underprivileged.

The champion of the latter group

was, of course, the President.

This idea came closer

to being the one thesis of the speech than any other,
and its establishment in the listener's mind was prob
ably one goal of the speech.
Discovering one paramount goal and a single
thesis for "Landon, Coughlin,'et Al'" is extremely dif
ficult.

The speeoh was roughly divided into two parts.

The first twelve and one-half minutes were devoted to
the Coughlin-Republican connection and to added attaoks
on Hard, Landon, Knox, and Smith; most of the remainder
of the time was spent in developing the "Roosevelt for
the common man" theme, with, attacks on Republican
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lalssez falre philosophy injeoted occasionally.
Moat of the ideas developed by the speech appear
to have been directed toward two principal goals:

(1 )

undermining the Union Party by linking Coughlin to Landon,
and (2) associating the cause of Roosevelt with that of
the common man.

The thesis with which Ickes sought to

unify a wide variety of ideas was that the issue of the
campaign was Roosevelt and the common man against the
ganged-up forces of special interest.

Perhaps the best,

though somewhat diffuse, statement of this thesis oc
curred as Ickes concluded:
Let Landon and Father Coughlin and Lemke and the
Smith Brothers— Alfred E. and Reverend Gerald K . ~
and their ill-assorted following 'gang up 1 on Presi
dent Roosevelt. He has nothing to fear, for back of
him are arrayed those who hate war, the idealistic
youth of the land, independent business men and the
great mass of the people— farmers, workingmen and
white collar folks in whose bodies he had kept alive
the spark of life during the terrible years of the
depression and, more important still, in whose souls
he has restored morale and revived faith in the
future of America.
LINES OF ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION
The introduction and conclusion of this speech were
clearly discernible as functional units.

They both ad

hered to the general thesis Just desoribed, thus giving
an appearance of unity to the entire effort.

Between

introduction and conclusion, however, the pattern of
organization was much less clear or unified.

The listen

er who tried to organize IckeB1 speech by the sequence of
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ideas presented would have discovered, with some effort,
lines of argument something like this:
(1) Many forces of special privilege are combined
in opposition to President Roosevelt.
(2) A "common understanding" exists between Repub
lican leaders and Father Coughlin’s party.
(3) The real campaign issue is between "Hooverisra"
and the New Deal.
(4) The "massed wealth of America" is lined up
behind Landon.
(5) Economio security for all should be the object
of the American Government.
(6 ) Even in 1929

,

"Hoover prosperity" did not

provide this security.
( ? )

Citing these facts is not to "array class

against class," but to get something done.
(8 ) The Roosevelt Administration seeks a real
"American standard of living."
It is not entirely clear whether Ickes organized
his speeches around a sequence of Ideas, or whether he
built the speeoh organization around the various targets
for attaok.

This speech, for example, could almost be

outlined like this:
(1) Attaok on the whole opposition "team"— two
minutes.
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(2)

Attack on Father Coughlin— six minutes.

(3)

Attaok on William Hard— thirty seconds.

(ty) Attaok on Father Coughlin again— thirty seconds.
(5) Attack on Governor Landon— one minute.
(6 ) Attaok on Frank Knox— one minute.
(7) Attaoks on the Liberty League and Alfred E.
Smith— one minute.
(8 )

Attaok on "Hoover prosperity"— two minutes.

(9)

Attaok on William Randolph Hearst— two min

utes.
(10) Concluding attack on the whole group again—
thirty seconds.
Except for the omission of the constructive support of
New Deal aims, a ten-minute appeal broken only by a brief
diversion toward Hearst, this topical organization would
accurately describe the developmental pattern of the
speech.
The most effective feature of the arrangement of
Ideas and subjects In this speech was that Ickes placed
his attacks on the opposition first and arranged his more
constructive appeals last.

The final appeal was devoid

of humor and had a ring of earnestness and sincerity not
always so apparent in earlier portions of the speeoh.
Unity and clarity of thought organization were
partially sacrificed In this speech, as they had been In

187

others, to assure that all desired targets for attack
were included.

The lack of real unity was somewhat

camouflaged by a consistency of introduction and con
clusion.

The broad psychological pattern of the speeoh

was good.
FORMS OF SUPPORT
Although the emphasis was again heaviest upon
emotional appeals, Ickes achieved in this speech a fair
balance of emotional, ethical, and logical proofs.

The

logical appeals were more varied in nature than in most
of the Secretary's previous addresses, and the forms of
inference which he employed were more readily evident
than usual.
The first argument, that special interests had
teamed up against Roosevelt, actually appeared in the
guise of introductory exposition.

Since it was support

ed psychologically, and not by evidence or reasoning, it
will be discussed later in more detail.
Ickes* second argument, that "there is a common
understanding between the Republican high command on the
one hand and Father Ooughlln and Lemke on the other,"
was supported by testimony, example, and varied forms
of inference.

His first of four supporting arguments

was that Father Coughlin and Lemke often echoed the
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criticisms of Roosevelt made by the Republican high
command.

Though this was only asserted, it would have

been easy to prove.

It is certainly not uncommon for

different opponents to voice like criticisms.

The crux

of the argument lay in the premise upon which the infer
ence of collusion was drawn.

Did like criticisms

necessarily imply a “common understanding11?

If so,

Republicans could well have charged that Thomas and
Browder were in collusion with the President.

These

candidates of the Socialist and Communist parties
respectively had echoed or preceded many Democratic
attacks on Landon.^

By the same token, Father Cough

lin could have been considered in oollusion with
Roosevelt forces.

He had charged, as had Ickes, that

Landon was a Hearst product.

1/j,

The speaker's inference

was unsound because his major premise was Invalid.
Ickes' second supporting argument for his LandonCoughlin tie was supported by assertion of a generally
accepted premise and by testimony.

He said first that

“The Detroit cleric is too astute a politician not to

x^For example, on September 8 , Thomas had oalled
Lemke “a stooge for Landon and Hearst." New York Times,
September 9, 1936, p. 19. On September 20, !Browder had
restated previous charges that Hearst exercised oontrol
over Landon. New York Times. September 21, 1936, p. 2.
•^-^New York Times, August 2, 1936, p. 12.

know that the next President will be either Roosevelt
or Landon. . . ," a statement which Father Coughlin would
not have challenged in the face of his own claim for
only about ten million Lemke votes.

The speaker then

quoted an October 6 Coughlin statement, made in an
Associated Press interview, that "he would rather be
with the Republicans."

Though this statement was in

complete as quoted, it did express Father Coughlin’s
sentiments.

His attacks on the President were muoh more

vehement throughout the campaign than those on Landon.
For example, Father Coughlin, in a July 16 address to
the Union party convention, had called Roosevelt "the
great betrayer and liar," asserted that he was communisticly inclined, and called for the defeat of any
oandidate supporting him; of Landon he said only that he
was "forced to repudiate him" for his adherence to the
gold s t a n d a r d . T h e statement that the Detroit priest
favored Landon over Roosevelt was expected to bring, and
brought, no denial.
The heart of the evidence of Landon-Coughlin col
lusion was in the letter from William Hard, paid Repub
lican broadcaster, to Gardner Jackson, Washington
correspondent.

This letter, relied upon so heavily in

the speeoh, is quoted here as Ickes read it over the air;

1 5New York Times, July 17, 1936, p. 6 .
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Dear Gardner:
Are you free to take on a little more Journalistic
work? It would be quite left-wing. Will you let me
hear from you?
On second thought, I might as well let you know
straight off who the publisher Is. It Is Father
Coughlin. He wants some Washington correspondents
for his new magazine. Would you be available?
There Is not any too much money In it because the
magazine goes gratis to the members of the National
Union for Social Justice. Still there will be some
compensation. And a good deal of activity.
The fact is that Father Coughlin wants three or
four Washington correspondents. I am writing to you
first. If you are not available, could you suggest
some writers in Washington that would be? The number
of words that they would have to write each week
would be small. The magazine is to be a tabloid of
sixteen pages. The articles would not run more than
five hundred or seven hundred and fifty words. The
writers could use pseudonyms but Father Coughlin
insists that they be first-class men. He wants no
second-class duds.
In short, will you write me straight off and let
me know what you can do about it? The magazine
begins coming out in March. It may have a lot of
influence on the politics of this year.
A photostatic copy of this letter, together with a letter
from Jackson confirming the circumstances involved, is
still in the Ickes Papers in the Library of Congress.

It

certainly was the most striking piece of evidence in this
particular speeoh, but how valid was it as support for
the speaker's premise?

While not conclusive, it did

constitute oircumstantial evidence of a common bond be
tween Roosevelt's foes; and It was bound to prove slightly
embarrassing to Father Coughlin and to Hard, especially
to the latter.
Hard's position as a paid political commentator
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for the Republican party was an unconcealed one.1^

His

quoted letter made It clear that he was also on familiar
political terms with Father Coughlin.

To identify that

relationship further, Ickes quoted that Hard had further
written to Jackson:

"I am one of his (Father Coughlin's)

closest friends and advisers and, while I am not on his
staff officially, he asks me for counsel and advice."
Ickes1 evidence showed that Hard, a paid speaker of the
Republican party, was also an unofficial agent of Father
Coughlin; and It strongly implied that he believed
serving one cause also served the other.

It did not

definitely prove the speaker's contention beyond its
application to Hard.

It only suggested that others in

the Republican camp shared Hard's views.

Ickes, however,

was more careful than upon some occasions not to extend
his premise too far.

He made this clear in his argument

about Coughlin:
I have not charged him with 1selling out to the
Republican party'.
I do charge that there is a
community of interest, a common objective, between
him and the Republican party.
This evldenoe presented by Ickes did show that Hard and
Father Coughlin believed such a community of interest
existed.
The fourth piece of evidence used to support the

3-^New York Times. July 1*J>, 1936, p. 9.
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alleged Republioan-Coughlin connection was very brief:
Further on the friendly cooperation between the
Republicans and Father Coughlin, information has
come to me that the Republican National Committee
spent about a thousand dollars in decorating the
Coliseum in Des Moines, Iowa, in which Father
Coughlin spoke on the afternoon of September 19.
This information was accurate; it vras documented by a
notarized statement which is still retained in the Ickes
Papers.

However, that same information revealed that the

Republican National Committee had spent the money in
question because of confusion about speaking dates, not
through any original intent to finance Father Coughlin’s
rally.^

The facts were not distorted, but the speaker's

implication constituted a distortion of them.
After brief but very derisive references to both
Landon and Knox, Ickes advanced his next line of argument:
that the real issue of the campaign was "Hooverlsm
versus the New Deal."

The issue was declared, after ac

cusation that Republicans sought to avoid it, in a single
paragraph:
The real issue in this campaign is whether we are
going back to the laissez faire, Hoover policy of
rugged individualism or forward to the establishment
of suoh a social order as the Founding Fathers en
visaged when they enunciated the political philosophy
of equality of opportunity under the law for every
American citizen, regardless of race or creed or
color. Two philosophies of Government are at death
grips with eaoh other in America today.

^7lckes Papers, Container 250.
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The speaker next asserted that "the massed wealth
of America, almost without exception, is lined up today
behind Governor Landon."

The only proof offered was the

example of the Liberty League.
would not have been questioned.

A less extreme statement
Leaders of industry and

finance and many wealthy people, like the duPonts, were
openly supporting Landon.
pointed out, however:

As a New York Times editorial

"There are, in spite of Secretary

Ickes,a few rich Democrats left in the land. . . .
That most of the nation's wealthy supported Landon was
generally accepted.

The Secretary's tendency to over

state his case, sometimes unnecessarily, was in evidence
again.
The speaker diverted briefly to imply that Alfred
E. Smith, according to Ickes the Liberty League's "fore
most spokesman," opposed Roosevelt primarily because of
Jealousy and envy.

Then he advanced his next premise:

that assuring economic freedom and security for all was
a legitimate function of government.

This argument was

developed partially by amplification and partially by
comparison and contrast:

l^This editorial asserted, without naming him,
that the campaign's largest single contribution was made
by a wealthy Democrat. It agreed, nevertheless, that
most of the wealth lay with Landon supporters. New York
Times, Ootober 13, 1936, P* 26.

194What is government for if it is not to secure
the greatest degree of happiness for the greatest
number of its people? We talk about our political
freedom and this hardly-won boon is indeed precious
to us. But of what avail is political freedom un
less we have economic freedom? How many citizens
were there during those last terrible yearB of deep
est depression that came upon us after twelve years
of Republican misrule who would not have been willing
to surrender their right to vote if, by so doing,
they had been able to achieve economic security for
themselves and their families? It is small comfort
to a man whose ohildren are crying for bread and
whose wife lacks proper clothing to reflect that in
a few months it will be his privilege to help decide
who shall be the mayor in his town.
Mbst of the appeal in this excerpt from the argument was
directed toward the emotions, and the speaker’s language
in such expressions as "Republican misrule" assumed a
great deal.

Ickes1 use of example, however, in which he

used the depression years for his comparison of political
and economic freedoms, was well-chosen; and the premises
in his enthymeme were generally accepted by the groups to
whom he wished most to appeal.
More controversial was his next argument:

that

the so-called "American standard of living" of the Hoover
era was a fraud.
comfort

The speaker noted Republican olaims of

and luxury during that period and then launched

into one of the most forecful passages in the address:
Misrepresentations ! Frauds I Misstatements of
factJ The truth is, and those Republicans who
promise us a Utopia if we will only retrace our
steps to Hooverlsm know it full well, that the
picture Intended to be conjured up by the expression
'American standard of living' constitutes a cruel
hoa.x so far as the majority of our people is concerned.
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In this great and rich land of ours there is a small
peroentage of the people who own or control the over
whelming mass of the wealth of the country. From
this limited but very rich group there is a sharp
graduation down until we come to the actual majority
of the people. According to that non-partisan and
conservative fact-finding organization, the Brookings
Institution, more than 60 of the people of the United
States in that most prosperous of years, 1929, were
living at or below the margin of a decent existence.
According to this same reliable authority, 1/10 of
of the families, at the top of the economic scale
receive approximately as much Income as
of the
families at the bottom.
%

1

This was valid evidence.

%

The authority was indeed re

putable and the statistics were taken from a year which,
while hardly typical, was certainly a fair one.

While

the speaker oould not deny that general living standards
were higher during the century's second decade than they
were in 1 9 3 6 , he could and did illustrate that a large
number of Americans had not shared much of the "American
standard of living" during that era.
Ickes next took oocasion to reply to the common
charge that Democrats in 1936 were stirring up class
hatreds:^
I realize that the mere statement of these facts
will lay me open to the accusation by Republican
orators and the Republican press of trying to appeal
to class prejudice. But is it statesmanlike to close
one's eyes to a condition that must be remedied if
we are to save our institutions? Does a calm state
ment of sobering fact make one a rabble rouser? Was

^Thls frequent Republican charge had been strongly
stressed by Alfred E. Smith in his October 1 speech at
Carnegie Hall. For text, see New York Times, October 2,
1936, P. *h
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the Brookings Institution trying to array class
against class when it ascertained these facts and
published them? Does one bring on a storm by point
ing out that lightning is flashing from dark clouds?
Do we meet an epidemic of typhoid fever by refusing
to admit that our water supply is being polluted?
Is the way to put out a fire to refuse to sound the
alarm?
The inferential proof in this series of six rhetorical
questions was vividly presented.

The first three ques

tions dealt in causal reasoning, clearly Implying that
Democrats were motivated toward contributing to solu
tions to class problems, not toward inflaming them.
The last three questions were concisely-put analogies,
designed to reduce the Republican charge to an absurdity.
They were effectively presented, and, if Ickes' previous
analysis of motives was the correct one, the reasoning
was valid.
The last main argument of the speech was that the
New Deal sought a true "American standard of living,"
one in which all could share.

As support for this con

tention, the Secretary discussed New Deal policies which,
according to him, were examples of the Administration's
efforts to produce economio freedom.

For the most part,

exposition was employed as the means of development.
Among policies so presented were those concerning equal
opportunities, adequate wages, and social security of
various types.

In discussing education and principles

of taxation, the speaker contrasted New Deal policy .
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with views of two of its opponents, Landon and Hearst.
The reference to Landon and the frequent charge that
education lagged in Kansas was thinly veiled:
The New Deal, which has to its credit the finan
cing of some 1 0 , 0 0 0 sohool construction projects in
all parts of the country, including the state of
Kansas, during the past three and a half years,
Indignantly rejects the theory that future genera
tions of American citizens should pay in the coin of
an inadequate education for the immediate balancing
of a set of books.
When postulating the theory that "the cost of
government should be assessed on the ability to pay,"
Ickes contrasted this New Deal viewpoint with his own
construction of the view of Hearst.

He asserted that

"the principal reason" for Hearst opposition to Roose
velt waB that the latter had denied him special privileg
es in filing tax returns.

This exercise in effect-to-

cause reasoning was given no support beyond assertion.
As a matter of fact, Rauch's The History of the New Deal
inclines toward the view that the President's foreign
policy was a more likely cause for Hearst opposition.

20

Although weak in spots, Ickes* logical support
in the October

^

speech was, generally speaking, better

than that in "What Shall the Republican Platform Be?"
and "Hearst Over Topeka," and on a par with "Governor
Landon— Practical Progressive."

The strongest appeals,

20Rauch, oj>. olt. , p. 2 3 7 .
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however, were again more psychological than logical.
Most of the speech*s attacks were supported by
appeals directed toward feelings of class prejudice and
of fear and insecurity.

The constructive arguments were

most often based on appeal to security, patriotism, and
the desire for freedom.

The appeals to economio class

prejudice ran throughout the speeoh.

The association of

the Republican party with the wealthy interests of the
nation, strong in power, but a distinct and often re
sented minority in numbers, pervaded the speeoh.

One

of the lines of argument previously cited was that
"massed wealth" was lined up behind Governor Landon.
But the appeals to class prejudice were embedded most
effectively in the connotatlve, loaded, and often questionbegging language employed.

Making repeated appearanoe

were such expressions as "special privilege," "massed
wealth of America," "ruthless, rugged individualists,"
"this array of pomp and power," and "men and women out
of whose labor the wealth that again seeks to exploit
them has been built up."
The appeals to fear recalled vividly the condi
tions prevalent when Roosevelt took office in 1933.

The

speaker referred to "these last terrible years of deepest
depression," to children "crying for bread," and to "the
gnawing pangs of hunger, the bite of cold and the loss of
morale."

And he kept the suggestion that Republicans
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wanted "to return to the Hoover era" constantly before
his audience.

He also raised the specter of fascism by

referring to Father Coughlin as "the Detroit Fascist"
and to his ideas as "the Fascist Ideals of that gentle
man. "
On the positive side, Ickes visualized for his
listeners the coupling of real freedom with security
guaranteed by a continuation of the New Deal program.
One passage, built largely upon this theme of freedom
and security for all, is illustrative:
As I understand the purpose of the New Deal, it
is to bring about a condition that will at least
approximate what we have been boasting of as the
‘American standard of living*.
The New Deal be
lieves in equality of opportunity under the law for
every man, woman and child, regardless of race or
creed or color. It has as an objective the employ
ment of every man or woman ready and willing to work,
at a task commensurate with his ability, for a wage
that will sustain life in comfort. The New Deal
believes that labor has a right to organize acoording
to its own free choice. It stands for the principle
of security— security for the workman during periods
of Involuntary unemployment, security against the
casualties of our industrial system, security for
mothers during periods of childbirth, security for
men and women after they have readied the age when
they can no longer hope to be employed gainfully.
Another positive appeal was to patriotism and,
as a corollary to it, the prejudice toward our own
democratic institutions.

Such expressions appear as

"every Araerioan who loves liberty and Justice," "our
Democratic institutions," "the Founding Fathers,"
"equality of opportunity," "regardless of race or color
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or creed," and "faith In the future of America."

This

patriotic type of appeal had not appeared in previous
Ickes* attacks hut was very evident in the more con
structive portion of this one.
To the four basic appeals Just enumerated should
be added certain question-begging appeals which asserted
through language what was not necessarily proved by the
argument Itself.

Such terms Included reference to Lemke

as a "Father Coughlln-Landon stooge," to "twelve years
of Republican misrule," and to "discredited Hooverism."
Humor was also used as Indirect persuasion.

The

opening minute of this speech resembled the attack on
the Republican platfonn in its use of a figurative but
pointed introduction.

Where previously Ickes had used

the "birth of a baby" theme, this time he pictured a
football team:
An Interesting game of political football is in
progress. Trying to stop the victorious march of
the team that is lined up under the captaincy of
President Roosevelt Is an Incongruous and ill-as
sorted a combination as could well be imagined. In
the backfield we see Governor Landon, light and in
experienced, but withal a clever dodger, who is hard
to pin down; Herbert Hoover, back on the gridiron
after an enforced stay on the bench for four years;
Father Coughlin, the great triple threat, who does
the kicking for the team; and A1 Smith, one time
•All American', now turned professional. The ends
are Frank Knox and John Hamilton. From tackle to
tackle crouch the well-known duPont brothers— Pierce,
Lamraot, A. Felix, Irenes, and Henry. William Ran
dolph Hearst, as coach, through a megaphone, calls
signals from the sidelines. The string of substi
tutes contains some notable names— Mellon, Mills,
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Rockefeller, Aldrich, G-rundy, Dr. Townsend, Plnchot,
Lemke, as well as an assortment of Liberty Leaguers
of high and low degree. The Republican voice of the
air, William Hard, occupies the dual role of water
boy and Jeer leader.
Here was Ickes at his best, combining a flair for
language with a biting sense of humor.

Beneath the humor

lay ridicule of men who wished to be taken very seriously
and a suggestion of a combination whioh had vague but
unwholesome intentions.
The same acid humor was later turned on Governor
Landon when the speaker accused him of evading the real
campaign issues:
He /Landon/ would much prefer to tell where he
buys his maple syrup, to talk about what he calls
the 'American way of life', to confide the marvelous
news that wherever he goes in America he finds Ameri
cans, to disclose the hitherto unknown fact that
elderberry pie is his favorite, to announce impres
sively that the way to destroy monopoly is to destroy
monopoly. But it simply will not work. Governor
Landon will not be able to nibble around the edges of
the issue Indefinitely. Sooner or later he will have
to bite
into it, bitter as the tastemay be.
Two humorous sallies in the

direction of Alfred E. Smith

subjected that Roosevelt foe to ridicule.

After assert

ing that Smith's desertion was caused by envy and
Jealousy, Ickes quoted two lines of poetry in reference
to him:
"Just for a handful of silver he left us,
JuBt
for a riband to stick in his coat."

These lines

from Browning's "The Lost Leader" were

sug

gested to the Secretary by Stephen Early especially for
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Smith. ^

Near the end of the speech, reference was made

to "the Smith Brothers— Alfred E. and the Reverend Gerald
K . a

reference which probably did not amuse the former

Governor of New York.
Through humor, loaded language, and appeals to
basio motives, Ickes blended strong psychological appeals
with his more rational forms of argumentative support.
Ethical appeals, too, were given close attention in this
speech.

In addition to the reduction of opposition by

the varied attacks which had keynoted all previously re
ported speeohes, the New Deal’s hatchet-man built upon a
more constructive type of ethical proof.

He associated

the aims and record of the President and the New Deal
with almost every humanitarian motive; he contrasted the
New Deal's social consciousness with the selfishness and
callousness he attributed to the Hoover Administration;
and he pictured the New Deal as hated by selfish and un
scrupulous economic groups, but beloved by the oommon
people of America.

Contrary to his usual habit, Ickes

even Inserted a personal note which attributed praise
worthy motives to himself:
To say that it is the aspiration of the New Deal
to make possible for the average Amerloan a richer
and fuller life is to subject oneself to the Jests

^ Ickes Papers, Container 250.
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and sneers of many of the supporters of Governor
Landon. For one, I willingly proclaim that I am
Interested in the New Deal for the precise reason
that its ambition is to improve the lot of the
common man.
The ethical appeal in this speech was more balanced
between its destructive and constructive parts and was,
for that reason, probably more effective than usual.
USE OF LANGUAGE
In addition to being selected for its persuasive
value, the language employed by Ickes was clear enough
to be easily comprehensible and vivid and direct enough
to hold listener attention.

Both of these qualities of

the speaker's style have, perhaps, been amply demon
strated by the liberal quotations from the speech text.
The sentences were not unusually long or difficult, and
only two words which might not be familiar to most of
his listeners were drawn from Ickes' extensive vocab
ulary.

These infrequently-used words occurred when the

speaker referred to William Hard as "the friend, the
associate and the political coadjutor of the man who,
in the habiliments of the National Union for Social
Justice. . . . "

The relatlvely-unfarailiar words were,

of course, "coadjutor" and "habiliments."
Most of the time, Ickes' language was strikingly
expressive without indulging in infrequently-used words.
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For example, he labeled Hard his party's "Jeer leader,"
oalled Lemke a Father Coughlln-Landon "stooge," and
referred to Smith's "Intellectual nakedness."

He played

upon a familiar phrase In striking manner when he accused
Republicans of believing In "a government of the dollar,
by the dollar, and for the dollar."

This expressive,

and often figurative, language showed itself,not Just
in single phrases, but in the vivid expression of a whole
idea.

For example, the speaker epitomized his version

of the "Joint" but "undercover" efforts of the Presi
dent's opponents this way:
Thus when Landon, with Hard cheering him on,
tries, on a delayed pass to Hoover, to get around
the right end, Father Coughlin, in a different
uniform and with a ball hidden under his sweater,
attempts to skirt the left end of the Democratic
team.
Even upon those who missed the subtler connotations of
some of the wording, the broad meaning could not have
been lost.
One of Ickes1 most commonly-used stylistic de
vices for achieving directness with his audience, the
rhetorical question, has been noted in the three pre
ceding chapters.
in the October

^

Thirteen such questions were posed
speech.

Two of them occurred Immediate

ly at the conclusion of the two-minutes required to read
William Hard's letter.
asking:

Ickes ended the quotation by

"Could language be plainer?

Could Intent have
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a clearer meaning?"
and the meaning.

Then he Interpreted the language

Another question was used to Intro

duce his denunciation of Hard, when he asked:

"Just

who Is William Hard?" and proceeded to Identify him In
most unsympathetic terms.

The other ten questions oc

curred In series of four and six each.

The first series

developed the function the New Deal thought government
should have.

It did so by leading the listeners through

a series of rhetorical questions which embodied the "yes
response" technique.

The last series of six questions,

quoted earlier in this chapter, posed analogies through
rhetorloal questions.

22

The thirteen questions, while

varied in purpose, all appear to have been effective In
producing directness and force in the presentation of
ideas.
Ickes' language was, as usual, one of the most
effective features of his speech.

It was, generally

speaking, simple, vivid, and direct.
REACTION TO THE SPEECH
This speeoh is noteworthy partly because of the
absence of widespread or heated reaction.

Press coverage,

for example, was less than that of previous major ad
dresses.

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch failed to mention

22See pages 195-96.
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the speeoh at all; the Chicago Tribune reported It very
briefly on page five; the Washington Post gave the
speeoh almost a full column, but relegated It to page
six; and the New York Times reported It on page four.
Of the leading newspapers, apparently only the Democratic
Philadelphia Record carried the complete text.

The

Record reported the speech very favorably on October 10
and reprinted the text, together with a photostatic copy
of the Hard letter, on October 11.

If other leading

newspapers gave space to the speech, Ickes did not In
clude their comment In his scrapbooks, which would be
somewhat unusual.^
There was, likewise, little editorial reaction.
Most leading dailies had none; the New York Times had
two rather casual references to the speech.

On October

1 3 , a previously-oited editorial on campaign expenses
took passing Issue with Ickes' assertion that wealth
oh,

was solidly behind Landon.

Previously, on October 11,

a oartoon had appeared on editorial pages which might
have been oonstrued as belittling the Ickes speeoh.

It

showed Chairman Hamilton and Secretary Ickes as little
boys In short pants scribbling on opposite sides of a

23For clippings oovering pertinent dates, see
lokes Papers, Container 341.
2**New York Times, October 1 3 , 1936, p. 26.
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fence.

Hamilton wrote "Roosevelt loves Browder," and

Ickes wrote "Landon loves Coughlin. 11

The two ideas

appeared to be equated and neither taken very serious
ly.
Republicans took little heed of the Ickes address.
The day before the speech was delivered, Congressman
Joseph Martin issued brief denial of the expected theBls,
calling it "absurd."

He said that "the only possible

similarity or connection between us /Republican and
Union party adherents/ is that we are both against the
re-election of President Roosevelt.

Hamilton,

usually quiok to reply, and Landon, who seldom did,
made no comment on the speech.
Coughlin.

Nor, indeed, did Father

Ten days after the attack, the priest’s

weekly publication, Social Justice, mildly depreciated
the implications of the Hard letter.2^

Father Coughlin,

however, made no direct reply.
Administration adherents who expressed views to
Ickes were enthusiastic about the speech, but fewer than
usual did so.

The President expressed approval of the
27
manuscript before the speeoh was delivered.
Later,

2 5New York Times, October 8 , 1936, p. 16.
2^Soolal Justice, October 19, 1936.
Ickes Papers, Container 3*fl.

Copy in

2^Ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 692.
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Daniel C. Roper, Secretary of Commerce, and Josephus
Daniels, Ambassador to Mexico, sent very congratulatory
notes, Daniels calling the speeoh as good as any he had
heard "since 1884-. "2®

Several of the usually numerous

partisan letters were received.
ones said:

One of the favorable

"Your voice came over the air in very clear

and effective fashion."

This was, characteristically

enough, countered by a very hostile letter which accused
the Secretary of "stuttering and mispronouncing."29
Why was there comparatively little reaction to
this Ickes attack?

One answer is undoubtedly that the

President was, by this time, dominating the Democratic
campaign scene.

It was only natural that during Roose

velt's whirlwind final month, after his previous absti
nence from strictly political speaking, other Democratic
speakers would recede into the background.

Too, Iokes1

"Landon, Coughlin, 'et Al'" was delivered on the same day
as addresses by Roosevelt, Landon, and former-Governor
Cox of Ohio.

This served to deorease the press attention

and publlo interest given to his speech.
A significant conclusion may, perhaps, be drawn
about the nature of the news reporting which this speech

2®Ickes Papers, Container 250.
2 9lbld.
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did receive.

Although Ickes did not, as he had pre

viously done, devote full time to attacking the
opposition, this was the only aspect of the address
given real coverage by the press.

The approximately

ten minutes which the Secretary had devoted to con
structive support of New Deal philosophy was almost
completely ignored.

The only report which heeded the

constructive arguments was that of the New York Times.
It quoted only one sentence of such argument while
making a full column report.

It quoted the first two

minutes, the football metaphor, in its entirety; and it
went into detail regarding the attacks on Coughlin and
Smith.

Only in the final sentence did it recognize the

other portion of the address.

It quoted, in closing:

Because President Roosevelt has enlisted on the
side of the people and is determined that, in ad
dition to political freedom, they shall have econ
omic fair play, Is the reason why every American
who loves liberty and Justice should enlist under
his banner.
The implication of this coverage appears clear.
It was the hatohet-man role of Ickes which made news
and which would find its way even into enemy papers.
The bold attacks, the biting irony— these were what put
Ickes into print.

Unless the newspapers were mistaken

about what the public wanted, these were also the factors
which won radio listeners for the New Deal's "Chief
Denouncer. 11

The aspect of his oratory which drew
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criticism and complaint from the opposition was,
apparently, the same aspect which caused the press,
largely Republican, to publicize his speeches.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
This speech attempted to show (l) that there was
a d o s e association between Father Coughlin and the
Union party on one hand and the Republican high command
on the other, and (2) that President Roosevelt repre
sented the common people of America.

The speech combined

the usual denunciation of Republicans and their allies
with constructive support for the New Deal program.
Although several unsupported assertions made
their usual appearance, the logical proofs of this
speech were stronger than in most of Ickes1 previous
attacks.

Ethical appeals were also stronger, for the

speaker devoted more attention than usual to the ethos
of the President, the New Deal, and himself.

Emotional

support, however, continued to be the Secretary's main
source of persuasion.

Persuasive language and purpose

ful humor were his best psychological weapons, and
class prejudice, fear, seourity, and patriotism were the
basic motives to which he most frequently appealed.
Reaction to the speech was, no doubt, disappoint
ing to lokes.

Newspapers gave it less coverage than
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most of his major efforts received; there was little
editorial comment; and Republican leaders almost ignored
the attack.

Ickes had been pushed into the background

by the emergence of the President as an active campaign
er.

There was, however, one very interesting feature

about the newspaper reaction to the Bpeech:

the press

virtually ignored the speaker's more constructive efforts
and reported only his denunciatory arguments.

They were

apparently interested in Ickes only as the New Deal's
hatchet-man, not as Just another speaker.

CHAPTER VIII
"IS LANDON SINCERE?"
The last, and perhaps the sharpest, of Ickes1
five major radio attacks was delivered on October 20.
Entitled "Is Landon Sincere?", it was broadoast from
10:30 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. by a national C.B.S. network.
BACKGROUND AND SETTING OF THE SPEECH
Between Ickes1 October 9 and October 20 radio
addresses, President Roosevelt made an extended speak
ing tour through the West.

He covered over

5

,

0

0

0

miles and delivered over sixty speeches within ten
days. 1

Included among these was the Chicago speech

which he directed primarily toward winning the small
businessman, an address which a New York Times edltoral called "the most effective and vote-winning thus
far. " 2

While this tour was in full swing, the ill-

fated Literary Digest poll published its first returns
based upon samplings in all forty-eight states.

These

returns showed Landon still leading by a 3-2 margin
but registered steady gains for Roosevelt. 3

The day

^New York Times, October 19, 1936, p. 1.
2New York Times. October 16, 1936, p. 20.
3New York Times, Ootober 16, 1936, p. 20.
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before these returns were announced, Washington politioal
newswrlters, by a vote of nineteen to one, had selected
the President as the probable winner.**

The consensus of

their opinion was that the President would achieve a
plurality of over three million votes and would more than
double Landon’s vote in the electoral college.

New York

bettors’ opinions coincided with the newsmen’s ,and Roose
velt was made a 1 2 - 5 favorite.-*
After his Western tour, the President rested and
worked on future speeches for two days before starting
a swing through New England.

During these two days,

his Secretary of the Interior delivered two important
addresses.

One was the October 20 attack with which

this chapter is primarily concerned; the other was a
thirty-minute address at the Academy of Music in Phila
delphia.

This address, entitled "Landon’s Angels," was

broadoast only by local stations.

Its chief targets

were Landon, Hoover, Smith, and the duPonts, the latter
family being put into the title role.

Ickes adapted

this speeoh well to his audience and occasion.

He

satirically set himBelf to "review the opera bouffe"
which he said Republicans were staging, and the

**New York Times, October 15, 1936, p. 23.
5Baltlmore Sun, October 17, 1936.
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"dramatis personae" received the full benefit of biting
/*
humor. 0 In addition to adapting to his immediate physical
surroundings, he acknowledged his presence In Pennsyl
vania

by paying his respects to Democratic Senator Guffy

and by giving attention to quite another sort to Gifford
Pinchot and the Pennsylvania duPonts.

Ickes was well-

pleased with the size of the audience and with its
"enthusiastic" reception of his speech.

7

Michael Straus,

who accompanied the Secretary, was also pleased, although
he thought the audience missed much of the subtle irony
of the attack.®

Only the Philadelphia Record of October

20 carried the full text of the speech, but the New York
Times and Washington Post of the same date reported its
lines of argument.

The letter files and scrapbooks in

the Ickes Papers indicated that this speech received
little editorial comment and aroused little public re
action outside Pennsylvania.^
The Philadelphia address illustrated Ickes1
constant awareness of the value of advertising a speech
in advance.

In it, after a brief reference to Landon1s

^For the text of this speech, see the Philadelphia
Record. October 20, 1936.
^iokes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 695.
Q
Straus interview.
9
Ickes Papers.
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record, he said:

"Tomorrow night from Washington, over

a national radio hookup, I propose to probe further into
Governor Landon’s record.
Sincere?'."

My subject will be ’Is Landon

The speech for whloh the Secretary was pro

viding advance publicity had been prepared even before
a definite date had been set for it.
of the speech to Early on September

Straus sent a copy
3

0

for his sugges

tions; Early sent word of his approval on October 2:
Bill /Haesett7" and I think this is a masterpiece
of ironical and logical analysis of the issues of
the campaign. Let me know when he goes on the air
with this. I don't want to miss it. 10
By October 15, the date for delivery had been set
as October 20, and Ickes released an announcement to the
press. .He said, in part:
Certain pages from Governor Landon’s record that
will make the American Liberty League sorry it con
tributed b o much money to his Presidential campaign
will be presented Tuesday night in a political
speeoh.
A New York Times editorial of October 1? gave the speeoh
further advance notloe.

After observing that ex-Senator

Heed of Missouri and ex-Governor Smith of New York had
"played body-snatchers" with portions of the President’s
1 9 3 2 speeches in order to show inconsistencies, the

l°The September 30 memorandum from Straus to Early
and Early’s October 2 reply are both on file in the Frank
lin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York.
New York Times, October 16, 1936, p. 1*K
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editorial said that Ickes and Hopkins were reportedly
preparing to "exhume" some of Governor Landon1s earlier
utterances.

Landon's record, it was noted, would make

him vulnerable:
. . . the well-known kindness and charity which
Secretary Ickes displays in his political speeches
would find a congenial field in gently arraying
Candidate Landon against Governor Landon.12
PURPOSE AND THESIS OF THE SPEECH
The purpose and thesis of this speech were both
easy for the listener or reader to discover.

While the

purpose may have required some analysis, the thesis was
plainly implied in the title of the speech, in the
Introduction, and in the conclusion.

Ickes indicated

that the title was going to be more than Just a catchphrase when he began:

"The question that I shall

discuss briefly tonight is this— Is Governor Landon
really sincere in his campaign?"

Throughout the body

of the speech, Ickes employed numerous summary and
transitional statements that Landon was not sincere.
Then he concluded:

"Is Landon sincere?

the hands of the Jury.

The case is in

On the face of the record only

one verdict can be brought in:

Not guilty of fcinoerity."

No question could exist in the listener's mind about the

12New York Times, October 17, 1936, p. 17.
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thesis of the address; It was stated early, plainly, and
often. The basic Intent of the speech was also very clear:
the speaker Intended to undermine public confidence In
the Republican candidate.

As a study of lines of argument

will demonstrate more clearly, Ickes struck at Landon
through every element of his potential support.

For the

conservatives, he quoted the Kansan's sympathy for govern
ment operation of oertain utilities; for the liberals, he
clearly aligned him with wealthy and ultra-conservative
supporters; and for the "middle-of-the-roaders," he
pictured a candidate who was opportunistic, insincere,
a "changeling."

Ickes* purpose was to destroy confi

dence In Landon, and, in line with that purpose, he
used tactios which he often accused the Kansas Governor
of using:

he offered at least one appeal for everybody.

LINES OF ARGUMENT AND ORGANIZATION
Unlike some of the Secretary's other political
addresses, this speech was clearly organized.

The intro

duction stated the issue concisely, the conclusion was
a reassertion of that thesis, and the arguments in the
body of the speech were sharply defined.
contained three main lines of argument.

The speech
The first was

that Landon*s reoord as Governor was inconsistent with
his campaign insistence that business should be kept
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relatively free of government regulation and Intervention.
To this argument, half of the time of the speech was de
voted.

It was supported by two illustrations, both a

matter of record.

The first was Landon's recommendation

for State telephone systems, and the second was his plan
for putting Kansas into the natural gas business.
Upon completion of this first argument, Ickes
cited very briefly other areas in which, according to
him, Landon had tried to be on both sides of the Issue.
A passing Jab was also made at "reactionary" Interests,
represented by the Sloans, Rockefellers, Morgans, and
duPonts, who supported financially the Governor's efforts
to "rededlcate" Maine to "good government."
premises were not built Into major arguments.

These two
The

seoond major argument was that the Republican candidate,
while he contended that Roosevelt was likely to lead the
nation into war,*^ was himself supported by those who
had most to gain by armed conflict.

The speaker cited

the duPonts, Interested In munitions and chemicals, the
duPonts and Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., interested in auto
motive sales, the Morgan firm, deeply entrenched in
international banking, and other lesser figures in oil
and chemical production.

Approximately five minutes of

•^■3gee text of Landon's September 12 address at
Portland, Maine. New York Times. September 13, I9 3 6 ,
P- 36.-
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the total of twenty-seven were devoted to this argument.
The speaker’s last major argument was briefer
than the others.

It,too,dealt with the type of backers

behind the Republican candidate.

Ickes quoted a 1933

Landon statement condemning Insull, Morgan, and Van
Sweringen as financial and industrial "racketeers";
then he noted that at least two of these three were, in
1936, avowed Landon supporters.
All three of the major arguments supported the
speaker’s thesis, and all three were well-adapted to
his purpose.

The first was directed primarily toward

conservatives, the last two primarily toward indepen
dent liberals and Republican progressives, and all
three toward the "middle-of-the-roader" who wanted an
honest, sincere candidate.

It is interesting to note

that the strongest and most sensational argument was
placed at the beginning of the speech and the weakest
at the end, a praotlce Ickes often followed.

Since he

was addressing an audience, who could simply change a
dial or turn a switch, not a relatively "captive"
audience, this was probably a sound arrangement.

As

Brlgance puts it:
Remember that your first topic must draw a
strong response. Will your least impelling topic
get that response? If so you can follow the
climaotic order of arrangement. If not, one of
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the.stronger topics must be drawn from the ranks
and sent to the front.i^
Ickes’ arguments were apparently arranged with the idea
of capturing the attention and Interest of the radio
audienoe.
FORMS OF SUPPORT
IckeB* strongest appeals were, again, more
emotional than logical.

Only in the firBt of the three

main arguments were logical proofs dominant.

It was in

support of that argument that Ickes employed evidence
from the PWA files.

Before the speech had consumed

much over a minute, the speaker was reading the 1935
Landon letter concerning State telephone systems.

He

quoted it as follows:
Dear Mr. Ickes:
If you do not have the authority under the Public
Works Administration to make loans to States for
public, State-wide telephone systems, may I suggest
that it would be a sound public policy to obtain
that authority.
With highest personal regards, I am,
Yours sinoerely,
(Signed) Alf. M. Landon,
Governor.
This documentary evldenoe was of a definite nature, but
the Secretary, ostensibly to impresB its authenticity
still further upon his listeners, added with a touch of

l^Wllliam Norwood Brlgance, Speeoh Composition
(second edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.,

1953), P. 6.
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sarcasm:
I suspect that the Governor will find a copy of
this letter In his own files, hut If he wants to
Inspect the original to satisfy himself of its
authenticity, I will he glad to submit it to his
most careful scrutiny.
The letter proved Landon's interest in a public telephone
system, and, to those who kept abreast of the campaign,
its significance in regard to Landon's sincerity was
obvious.

The Republican platform and the candidate's

speeches both called for less government activity in
business and industry.

To be sure that everybody under

stood this connection, Ickes said upon completion of the
reading of the letter:
Within the week the man whose signature is ap
pended to this letter proclaimed himself the
champion of private initiative and attacked the
President as merely 'giving lip service to our
system of free enterprise'. Is Landon sincere?
Before reading the letter, the Secretary had noted
Landon's announoed opposition to "regimentation" and his
insistence that business "be kept free."
was well used.

The evidence

The speaker made clear the point with

which his evidence dealt, gave the evidenoe, and then
pointed up the conclusion from it.
The second piece of documentary evidence was used
in much the same way, though the argument depended less
upon it than upon simple narration.

Ickes told his

listeners about the plan for a State-owned natural gas

system in Kansas as it was expressed to him and his PWA
assistants by the Governor and by William Allen White.
The narrative was detailed enough to be fairly convinc
ing, but the speaker threw in as documentation a direct
quotation from the proposed charter of the State corpo
ration.

After noting that his office had copies of the

charter, Ickes read from it a section on the purpose of
the State corporation:
The full nature and character of the business
in which said corporation proposes to engage is to
purchase, prospect for, obtain and produce natural
gas and to operate and control pipe lines, stations
and plants for the transportation, distribution,
marketing and sale of said natural gas and the by
products and to lease, hold, purchase, sell and
oonvey real estate for the purpose of procuring,
producing, transporting, selling, and distributing
the said natural gas and the by-products thereof.
This quotation left no doubt that Landon was planning to
put his State into the gas business.

For the Implication,

however, that Landon dropped his plan so he would be more
available as a candidate for the Republican nomination,
the speaker offered no proof.

He simply asserted that

the plan was dropped about the same time that Landon
"first began to be talked of as a possible Republican
candidate for President."
The support for the last two main arguments was
not primarily logical.

Both of these arguments rested

on the technique Ickes had often used in previous speeches
of implying that whatever was true of Landon’s supporters
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was true of him.

In the second argument, for example,

he noted that such Republican supporters as Morgan,
Sloan, and the duPonts were engaged In businesses which
stood to profit from war.
true.

This was, no doubt, quite

It required more partisan conjecture than logical

Inference, however, to reach the subsequent conclusion
that these men would, therefore, work to involve their
nation in war.

Ickes made no effort to prove it; he

simply implied it, asserted it, and repeated it.

The

speaker, in closing that argument, did put himself on
somewhat stronger inferential ground when he compared
Landon and Roosevelt on the war issue:
In trying to force the United States into another
war, it goes without saying that war munitions, oil,
and International banking would be much more influ
ential with Governor Landon, whom they are unani
mously supporting, than with President Roosevelt,
whom they are viciously fighting.
If the earlier premise that these interests might en
courage war for profit, a premise assumed in this
statement, were accepted, the comparison would be a
reasonable and effective one.
The final argument, assoolating Landon with busi
ness “racketeers," was not based on sound reasoning or
evidenoe.
idea:

It was the familiar “guilt by association"

that since Insull and Morgan were supporting

Landon, who had once termed them “racketeers," the
Kansas Governor must have changed his mind about
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racketeers.

Whatever may have heen Its psychological

value, this argument was not based on a logical founda
tion.

Both candidates, as Ickes knew, undoubtedly had

some supporters of whom they did not personally approve.
After the first argument, there was little re
liance on evidence and sound reasoning in this speech;
psychological appeals were emphasized much more.

As

Just indicated, the last two arguments rested primarily
upon suggestion and emotional association.

The second

one, identifying Landon with so-called "war lords,"
used scare tactics, and both of the final arguments
played upon the prejudice of many against wealthy and
powerful men in business, finance, and industry.

Names

like duPont, Morgan, and Insull were designed to have
undesirable emotional connotations for many listeners.
Even in the first argument, despite its support
by excellent documentary evidenoe, Ickes used psycho
logical appeals of this type.

In offering to produce

the Landon letter from which he had quoted, the Secre
tary managed to work in the names of a few of his
favorite moneyed targets:
If any of the Rockefellers or the duPonts or the
Sloans or the Colonel McCormicks or the Pews or the
Grundys or the William R. Hearsts or the Andrew W.
Mellons, who are so generously pouring their money
into Candidate Landon’s campaign fund, are curious
about it, I will be glad to furnish them with
copies.
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As usual, Ickes used language, particularly
epithets and loaded descriptions, as psychological
forms of assertion.

For example, he referred to Landon

as a "changeling" candidate and as the "friend of the
common millionaire"; Knox was referred to as "that
windmill-tilting gentleman of grotesque and absurd
statements"; and men like the duPonts and Morgans were
labeled "war lords."
The persuasive element of humor, present in one
or two of the phrases Just noted, was another psycho
logical form of support which Ickes employed.

He

referred, for example, to "the late A1 Smith" and to
"Governor Landon's little pipe line dream."

Of Lan

don's visit to the PWA Administrator regarding a loan,
he said:

"We had long since learned that when Governor

Landon called the United States Treasury needed extra
guards."

When discussing Landon's charge that Roosevelt

might lead the nation to war, he noted that the Kansan's
supporters were the groups which had most to gain from
war; then he concluded:

"The Jam is too apparent on

Governor Landon's apparently innocent face to esoape
detection."

As the tone of these examples would in

dicate, the humor in this speech, while pointed, was
lighter and less bitter than in one or two previous
addresses.
In all four of the radio addresses previously
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analyzed, Ickes bent more effort toward reduoing the
ethos of his opponents than toward building and capital
izing upon his own.

By the very nature of its thesis

and purpose, this speech was also devoted more to
negative than to positive ethical appeals.

However, the

speaker did devote more attention to his personal ethos
in this than in any previous address.

It is significant

that the proof Iokes used of Landon’s inclination toward
State ownership and operation of business was all from
the Secretary’s own files as PWA Administrator.

The

quoted letter and the narration of events surrounding
both it and the proposed natural gas corporation charter
pictured a state official petitioning a superior federal
officer.

Landon was petitioning Ickes.

This subtly

underlined relationship boosted the speaker’s standing,
even as it mitigated Governor Landon’s.
The speaker also utilized an opportunity to at
tribute characteristics of virtue to himself and his New
Deal associates, while implying a deficiency of those
attributes in the Republican candidate.

Discussing the

negotiations concerning the loan for a State corporation
in Kansas, he said:
The public works administration never presumed
to dictate policy to a Sovereign State applying for
money to finance a project. Neither was it our
habit to conduct official business in secrecy. But
at the insistence of the man who now, as a candidate
for President, demands that all public business be
conducted in the open, we agreed in this instanoe to
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secrecy in the preliminary stages of the negotiation.
It was our expectation that in due course a formal
application would be made for a PWA loan and grant,
at which time full publicity would be given to the
proposal and public hearing held if desired. During
these confidential conversations with Governor Landon
and his agent it was suggested that the Governor
secure legislative authority for his plan. This idea
was always met with the plea that Governor Landon did
not want the people of Kansas to Know what he was up
to until it was too late to block his plan.
Ickes knew how to use ethical appeals and could, upon
occasion, blend positive and negative approaches into a
two-edged weapon.

His failure to depend more upon con

structive ethical appeal should probably be attributed,
first, to the nature of his role in the campaign and,
second, to his obvious enjoyment of a more destructive
approach.
USE OF LANGUAGE
Ickes* language in this speech was, as usual,
vivid and imaginative.

It gave full play to his af

fection for figurative expression.

For example, he

spoke of Landon's willingness to "tear his principles
from the shallow soil in which they were rooted," of his
"kaleidoscopic" changes, his "quick-silver policies,"
and his "boxing the compass" on the Issues.

He spoke,

too, of Landon's record which "literally bristles with
question marks respecting his own sincerity."

In

speaking of the change in Landon when he became a possible
candidate, he said that "Candidate Landon was about to
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burst forth from his State-Socialist chrysalis as a
bright and multi-hued conservative butterfly that would
delight the Wall Street individualists of the Hoover
sohool. 11
It has been noted in previous chapters that, with
his flair for the figurative, Ickes sometimes failed to
resist the temptation of very expressive but not very
widely-understood language.

Several examples of this

failure to adapt his vocabulary to many of his listeners
occurred in this attack on Landon.

He accused the Kansas

Governor, for example, of "Lochinvarlng it to Maine;" It
is doubtful that most of his radio audience was familiar
enough with Scott's character in Marmlon to immediately
appreciate the meaningful allusion.

Again, when he

spoke of the "Morganatic marriage between the war lords
and the Republican party," it is doubtful that the term
"Morganatic marriage" was understood by most of his
listeners.

It was perhaps typical of the paradoxical

Secretary of the Interior that he used expressions like
this one in the same speeoh in which the most simple and
down-to-earth expressions also appeared.

In the latter

category would definitely fall the very Informal outburst
which occurred when the speaker said that the Republicans
were "desperately in need of a candidate— Oh Lord, any
candidate !"

In almost the same category was his statement

that he was "tolerable familiar" with Governor Landon's
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signature.

Nor was there anything very ornate or un

usual about the reference to "Jam on Governor Landon's
face" or his "biting the hand that fed him."

Ickes'

language, always colorful, was usually strikingly
familiar.

Occasionally, however, it over-reached the

comprehension of the audience and failed in its primary
function of clear communication.
To help make his oral style more direct,the
Secretary again, as in previous addresses, turned to the
use of questions.

In several plaoes, Including the intro

duction and the conclusion, he posed the title question:
"Is Landon sincere?"

He also used the interrogative form

to introduce ideas, asking a question and then answering
it.

For example, he Introduced his comment about Insull's

support of Landon simply by asking:
Insull?"

"But what of Samuel

Most effective, however, were his rhetorical

questions Intended as persuasion.

He constructed a series

of such questions when he was punching home his contention
about Landon's reversed policies:
How does it happen that the State Socialist of
1935 Is the Republican candidate for President in
1936 on a platform of uncontrolled private Initia
tive? Is It possible that the Governor of Kansas
was willing to tear his principles from the shallow
soil In whioh they were rooted because of the lure
of the greatest office in the world? And what assuranoe is there that such a man, who apparently
sways easily to every passing political breeze, would
remain the advocate of private Initiative and of rug
ged individualism, if by chance he should become the
President of the United States?
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The interrogative structuring of language for introduc
tion, for repetition, and for argument helped to give
to the speech the directness required for an effective
oral style.
Ickes* frequent use of exceptionally short and
blunt sentences, noted in previous chapters, added a
forcefulness to his structuring of language for oral
presentation.

The first minute of his speech, for ex

ample, consisted of seven sentences, only two of which
had over twenty words in them; three had fewer than ten
words:
The question I shall discuss briefly tonight is
this— Is Governor Landon really sincere
in his cam
paign? The burden of his- speeches so far has been
a demand that we return to what he calls *the
American way of life. ’ He is for the rugged indivi
dualism of Herbert Hoover. He believes in cut-throat
competition. He is for the aggrandizement of the few
at the expense of the many.
Governor Landon Inveighs against what he calls
’regimentation. 1 Business must be made free and kept
free, declares the pleasant gentleman from Kansas in
the very severest tones that he is able to marshal.
Such

short and simple sentences produce a blunt forceful

ness

much less easily achieved with

sentenoes.
short.

longer,

complex

Not all of the sentences, to be sure, were

Many consisted of over thirty words and the

longest sentence contained seventy-eight words.

At

frequent intervals, however, especially when con
clusions to an argument were being stated, the series
of short, simple sentences appeared.

As he concluded
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his final argument, for example, Ickes said:
the record.

"ThiB la

Let Governor Landon explain it if he can.

Let him deny it if he dare.

Let him ignore it if he

must."
The language of this attaok upon Landon was color
ful, usually direct, and often very forcefully phrased.
Despite an occasional use of relatively unfamiliar
vocabulary, Ickes' choice of language made a definite
contribution toward the effectiveness of the speech.
REACTION TO THE SPEECH
Considering the fact that Governor Landon, Gover
nor Lehman, Senator Vandenberg, and John ¥. Davis,
former Democratic nominee for President, all delivered
campaign addresses on the same day, and that the Presi
dent commenced his New England tour on that day, news
coverage of Ickes' October 20 address should have been
gratifying to him.

His speech shared the page one head

line of the October 21 Washington Star with Landon's
Los Angeles address; the Chicago Tribune, which often
Ignored Ickes' speeohes, reported this one briefly and
impartially on page nine of its October 21 edition; the
New York Times of the same date devoted more than a
column on page thirteen to a fairly complete report; and
the St.. Louis Post-Dispatch made it the subject of an
editorial on page one, section C.
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Only three leading city dallies commented editori
ally on the speeoh.

The Post-Dispatch, In the Landon

oamp politically, noted that Ickes1 evidence regarding
the Kansas Governor's vlewB on public ownership were
designed to "chill conservatives."

The editorial said

that it might, on the other hand, appeal to liberals who
favored government ownership.^

This was possible, but,

In view of other announced positions of Roosevelt and
Landon on business regulation, hardly likely.

A very

favorable commentary was written by Robert S. Allen and
appeared in the pro-Roosevelt Philadelphia Record.

Allen

called the speech "the most scorching address of the cam
paign," and said, In part:
Ickes, famed as the New Deal's most acid-tongued
and hardest hitting fighter, reached new heights in
both tonight. He belabored Landon with devastating
irony, sarcasm, direct haymakers and solar plexuB
blows. J-o
The Republican Washington Post. commenting only briefly,
said that Ickes was reading so many letters over the air
as evidence that future correspondence to him ought to
be addressed:

"Dear Mr. Secretary and my friends of the

radio audience."'1'^

^ S t . Louis Post-Dispatch. October 2 1 , 1936.
Section C T p . T : ----------- ----•^Philadelphia Record, October 21, 1936.
■^Washington Post, October 22, 1936.
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Probably the most Important reaction oame from
the Republican candidate himself.

Although Landon later

said In Tulsa, Oklahoma, that "During this campaign I
have made no effort to answer personal attacks that have
lO
been made upon me,"
he replied at some length to this
attack by Ickes.

This reply, quoted in most oases along

with the report of the Secretary's speech, said in part:
Up to date, the administration's spokesmen have
been attacking me on the ground I was a puppet of
big business. Now they attack me on the ground that
I am a Socialist and the enemy of big business.
This Is typical of the confusion and contradictory
policies that have characterized this administration
from its beginning.
This attack is like the losing
team throwing the ball around wildly attempting to
score. . . .
I am glad the administration has seen fit to make
these negotiations public. They show I was determin
ed to bring lower gas rates to Kansas, even to the
extent of resorting to public ownership on a State
basis.
I have always been In favor of public ownership
of a gun behind the door in the adjustment of proper
and fair utility rates. . . .
Naturally I asked Mr. Roosevelt's Secretary of the
Interior to keep our discussion secret. If it had
been given publicity the private gas interests would
have pre-empted all the available gas reserves and
we would have been out of luck.
But we were finally able to obtain the lower
rates, with a large saving to the gas consumers of
Kansas, without resorting to the last weapon that
should be resorted to— public ownership.
Landon went on to say that "very much the same situation"
was true of his letter regarding a State telephone system.

18n ©w York Times, October 24, 1936, p. 1.
19New York Times, October 21, 1936, p. 13.
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Then he launched an attack on the New Deal for "getting
into ‘business" on a national scale.
This reply was clever, although It missed the
point In some respects.

Ickes had never really charged

Landon with being presently in favor of public owner
ship; he had, In faot, contrasted Landon’s views aB
Governor with his views as a candidate.

Landon accepted

his detractor'8 facts but rejected his Implication of
motive.

He put himself back on record as a friend of

business, while picturing himself also as a champion of
the consumer.

It was not a complete answer, but it prob

ably sufficed for his supporters.

From Ickes’ point of

view, a significant fact was that he had forced Landon
into a reply.
No other Republicans replied directly, but an in
direct response came from Republican National Committee
headquarters.

They attacked Ickes' PWA on the ground

that its funds from September 8 to October 10 had gone
mostly to "so-called doubtful States."

The Administrator

replied by press conference that "not much" of the avail
able fund had even been allocated and that "if we were
playing politics we would be spending it all over the lot
like the duPonts are doing in the Republican campaign. 1,20
The Republican statistics on actual expenditures were not

20New York Times, October 21, 1936, p. 1A.
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denied.

Stripped to Its essentials, the Secretary’s

reply proved only that PWA was not playing politics as
muoh as it could he doing.

This exchange probably had

little Influence on a public already saturated with
charges and denials of politics in WPA.
The only unusual feature about the reaction to
this speeoh was that Ickes had finally forced a reply
from his principal target.

In view of his previous

policy of ignoring attacks, Landon’s reply would seem to
indicate that he feared the effects of this Ickes' ad
dress and decided that it could not safely be ignored.
SUMMARY EVALUATION
On August 3 , Ickes had ostensibly used candidate
Landon's platform and campaign statements to refute the
claim, made on the basis of his record in Kansas, that
he was a progressive.

On Ootober 20, he ostensibly used

the Kansan's record as Governor to question the sincerity
of some of his 1936 views as a candidate.

In reality, he

hoped to do the same thing in both addresses:

to demon

strate that Landon was opportunistic and insincere.

His

October 20 speech supported this thesis by three argu
ments:

(1) that Landon, who now urged free enterprise,

had favored State ownership of utilities before he was a
candidate;

(2 ) that Landon, who charged that Roosevelt

might lead the nation to war, was actually supported by
those who would gain most from war; and (3) that Landon,
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who as Governor had labeled certain financiers "rack
eteers,” was being supported by those very men.
For the first of these arguments, evidence of a
documentary nature was the chief form of proof.

The

second and third were supported almost entirely by psy
chological appeals to fear and prejudice.

In the speeoh

as a whole, Ickes used more constructive ethical appeal
than in any previous effort.
The language of the speech was vivid and forceful.
It suffered in a few places from use of vocabulary
probably unfamiliar to many listeners, but it was, in
general, very effective.

The use of rhetorical questions

and short, simple sentences contributed to the directness
and force desirable for oral presentation.
News coverage of the speech was good, and even op
position editorials were only mildly critical.

With this

speech Ickes managed, for the first time, to goad Landon
into a reply.

Since that reply was in explanation, and

not denial, of some of the facts alleged by Ickes, it can
be inferred that the Republican candidate feared the ef
fect which the speech, if ignored, might produce.

The

speaker assigned the role of keeping the pressure on
Landon had succeeded in putting him on the defensive.
The retort even helped to publicize the attack.

From

the Democratic point of view, this speech must be re
garded as an effective effort.

CHAPTER IX
CHARACTERISTICS OF ICKES' PERSUASION
The special function of Ickes in the 1936 campaign,
as described In Chapter II, was to act as the Administra
tion's hatchet-man, its "chief-denouncer. 11

His Job was

to keep the pressure on the Republican party and to
prevent the rise of Landon to a seriously challenging
position.

Ten speeches designed to fulfill this assigned

task were delivered, five of which have been analyzed in
detail in preceding chapters. 1

It Is the purpose of this

chapter to observe and describe briefly the persuasive
methods and techniques which characterized the speaking
of Ickes in the campaign.
The speaker's methods and techniques can best be
viewed in the light of his basic purpose.

Ickes' purpose

was to prevent Landon from gaining the confidence of most
of the American public.

To fulfill his purpose, it was

not necessary that he definitely prove anything about

10 nly seven of these ten speeches have been dis
cussed in this study. The three which followed the speech
"Is Landon Sincere?" were as follows: On October 21, in
Evanston, Illinois, an attack aimed chiefly at the Chicago
press and entitled "Only Thirteen More Days to Save
America," on October 27, in Altoona, Pennsylvania, an
attack aimed primarily at Gifford PInchot and entitled
"Why Pinchot Ran Out," and on October 28, in New York City's
Carnegie Hall, a ooncerted attack on Landon called "At the
Crossroads." None of these addresses were broadcast
nationally.
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Landon.

He needed only to implant by suggestion atti

tudes of uncertainty, suspicion, and doubt.

In this

task, Ickes became essentially a propagandist, for his
speeches constituted “a systematic attempt . . .

to

control the attitudes of groups of individuals through
the use of suggestion.

. . .

The tendency toward merely suggesting, rather than
proving, is reflected in several facets of Ickes' per
suasion.

It may be seen, first, in the vagueness of many

of the speaker's theses.

Discovering in some of Ickes'

speeches a definitely stated or clearly implied thesis
or proposition is an almost impossible task.

This ab

sence of clear thesis has been noted particularly in the
speech attacking the Republican platform and in the one
devoted partially to Father Coughlin.

In the case of

other attacks, It has been noted that the stated thesis
did not necessarily embody the real Intent of the speech.
In his attack on Landon's progressivism, for example,
lokes' real purpose was not as much to deny that Landon
was progressive as It was to imply that no one could be
sure where Landon stood from one moment to the next.
When the propagandist aims at creating attitudes, it is

2See definition of "propaganda" by Leonard W.
Doob. Propaganda (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1935), PP_. 75-76.
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not neoessary— it may, in fact, be disadvantageous— to
present a real and definite thesis.

Ickes' true purpose

was not always embodied in a definite or stated thesis.
The nature of the Secretary's purpose apparently
Influenced his organization in much the same way.

As

it has been noted in the study of individual speeches,
this organization was seldom ordered from a logical
point of view.

Quite often little or no logical con

nection existed between the ideas which were developed
in sequence.

Suoh loose organization was especially ap

parent in the speeches devoted to the Republican platform,
to the Hearst-Landon connection, and to Father Coughlin's
relationship to the Republican party.

Since Ickes* pri

mary purpose was neither clear exposition nor logical
demonstration, a logical arrangement of ideas was less
neoessary than it would otherwise have been.

Further,

well-organized attacks upon Landon would have been easier
for Republicans to answer than was the Secretary's looselystructured campaign of suggestion and innuendo.
The nature of Ickes' proofs showed a greater em
phasis upon persuasive techniques embodying suggestion
than upon those built upon reasoning and evidence.

Ickes

used evidenoe, sometimes excellent evidenoe, in every
speeoh analyzed in previous chapters.

It is significant,

however, that his evidence was usually selected for its
psychological effect or its sensation or expose value.
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His evidence by testimony, for example, was almost
always from Landon's own words or from those of a Landon
supporter.

His documentary evidenoe was usually from

private correspondence or from previously unpublished
documents.

His examples were selected more for their

emotional connotation than for their logical value.
Even Ickes1 logical proofs were selected and construct
ed, at least in part, to command attention and to per
suade by suggestion.
The real essence of the persuasion in Ickes'
speeches, however, lay in his skillful use of those
psychological techniques commonly associated with the
propagandist.

Some of the most common of these tech

niques have been enumerated and described by the
Institute for Propaganda Analysis, a non-partisan
organization created in 19 37 to study propaganda and
public opinion.

Those listed are "name calling, 11

"glittering generality," "transfer," "testimonial,"
"plain folks," "card stacking," and "band wagon."3 These
devices, several of which are discussed by speech text
books under other titles, are applicable in characteriz
ing the persuasive appeals of Ickes.

Moreover, they

combine other elements of emotional appeal with those

3Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee (ed.),
The Fine Art of Propaganda (New York: Hareourt, Brace
and Company, 1939), pp. 23-24.
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dependent primarily upon language selection, and no
analysis of Ickes would be complete which did not con
sider his persuasive use of language.
"Name calling" and "glittering generalities" are
essentially negative and positive descriptions of the
language technique which Brembeok and Howell call
"positive loading" and "negative loading."^

Since he

was occupied primarily with the attack upon the Presldent’s opponents, it was "name calling," the technique
of "giving an idea a bad label. . . to make us reject
and condemn the idea without examining the evidence,"
which Ickes used most.^

When he labeled Landon a

"practical progressive" and a "strong but silenced man";
when he called the Republican platform "weasel-worded";
when he referred to "Boss Hearst" and to the "libertyloving duPonts"; and when he labeled Landon supporters
as "Old Guard," "massed wealth," "vested interests,"
"predatory interests," "warlords," "reactionaries,"
and "Old Dealers"; when he did these things, Ickes was
"name-calling."

These, of course, represent only a few

of the many illustrations of this practloe which have
been noted in the analysis of Individual speeches.

K inston Lamont Brerabeck and William Smiley Howell,
Persuasion: A Means of Social Control (New York:
Prentloe-Kall, Inc., 195277 P* 153*
5Lee and Lee, ojo. olt. , P. 23.
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The New Deal’s most persistent attacker of Landon
£
also made use of the "transfer" device in persuasion. 0
Again it was the negative aspect of the technique which
he used most.

As subjects, he employed Landon adher

ents whom he thought to be low in public favor, denounc
ing them and rhetorically tying them around the neck of
the Republican candidate.

Thus the opprobrium they bore,

enhanced by Ickes1 own invective, was to be transferred
to Landon.

Foremost among those whose presumed lack of

public favor he attempted to transfer to the Kansan were
the duPonts, Hearst, Hoover, and the Liberty League.
The negative use of the "testimonial" was also a
characteristic of Ickes’ persuasion.?

His attacks in

dicated the apparent belief that the candidate's virtue,
his principles, and his program, could be no better than
the people who supported him.
"guilt by association."

This was the principle of

By calling attention to the fact

that Hearst, Hoover, Insull, Morgan, and the Liberty
League had subscribed to the Landon candidacy, Ickes

^"'Transfer' carries the authority, sanction, and
prestige of something respected and revered over to some
thing else in order to make the latter acceptable; or it
oarries authority, sanction, and disapproval to cause us
to reject or disapprove something the propagandist would
have us reject and disapprove." Lee and Lee, op. cit.,
p.
Z

k

.

?"'Testimonial' consists In having some respeoted
or hated person say that a given idea or program or pro
duct or person is good or bad." Ibid., p. 24.
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intended to discredit the Kansas Governor in the eyes of
laborers, farmers, liberals, progressives, and most of
the so-called "common" people.
The "plain folks" technique appeared in almost
O
all of' Ickes' speeches.
Throughout the campaign, he
worked to convince his radio audience that the election
issue was between wealth and vested interests, on the
Republican side, and the common people, who supported
the President.

Roosevelt and the New Deal would, ac

cording to Ickes, benefit the worker, the farmer, the
small businessman; Landon would represent wealth and
big business.

In this way, Ickes used the "plain folks"

approach as a double-edged weapon.
The device called "card stacking" by the Institute
for Propaganda Analysis is probably used by all campaign
speakers in some degree, but Ickes’ speeches typified it
as a propaganda device.9

His reasoning, his selection of

evidence, and his language all reflected what Brembeck
and Howell refer to as "two-valued orientation.

®"'Plain folks’ is the method by which a speaker
attempts to oonvlnce his audience that his Ideas are
good because they are ’of the people’, the 'plain
folks'." Ibid., p. 24*.
9"»Card stacking' Involves the selection and use
of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distractions,
and logical or illogical statements in order to give the
best or worst possible case for an idea, program, person,
or product." Ibid., p. 24.
l0Brerabeck and Howell,

ojd .

clt. . pp. 157-58.
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Ickes recognized no middle ground; there were only hlack
and white.

No action of Landon and his party was not

suspect, and the worst possible Interpretation was
placed upon their motives.

The President, on the other

hand, had done and could do no wrong.

This extermely

Intentional reasoning ran through the speaker's argu
ments, and his language and evidence followed the same
pattern.
Ickes made only limited use of the "band wagon"
technique of persuasion.'*'■*' It would have been difficult
to make extensive use of this device In company' With his
sharp drawing of battle lines In the campaign.

He did

frequently remind his audience of Roosevelt's smashing
victory in 1 9 3 2 , and he indicated that the "common’
people" all supported Roosevelt and the New Deal.

Only

in the concluding appeal in his attack on Father Coughlin,
however, did he make obvious use of the "get on the band
wagon" Idea.

His role In the campaign was more concerned

with preventing Landon support than In making positive
appeals for the President.

H"'Band wagon1 has as its theme: Everybody— at
least all of 'us'— is doing it. With it, the propagandist
attempts to convince us that all members of a group to
which we belong are accepting his program and that we must
therefore follow our crown and 'Jump on the band wagon.'"
Lee and Lee, loc. clt.

Another technique of persuasion which character
ized the speaking efforts of the New Deal's “chief de
nouncer" was the use of humor.

This aspect of Ickes1

speaking has been noted in connection with each of his
speeches, and its importance to the successful perform
ance of his campaign task is difficult to over-eraphasize.

The audience might soon weary of attacks on the

opposition which were harsh but unimaginative, and
criticism and accusation, if unrelieved, could eventually
have created sympathy.

Ickes* caustic humor refined, re

lieved, and camouflaged— without softening— the blows he
struck at Landon and his leading supporters.

The acid

humor which had won him the reputation as "the Cabinet
witnl2 Wa8 U sed, not merely to hold attention, but to
implement persuasion as well.
One other form of suggestion which Ickes used
extensively as a means of persuasion was repetition.
The use of repetition in individual speeches has been
noted in the analysis in previous chapters.

The Secre

tary also repeated the main ideas of former speeches as
supporting ideas in later ones.

The reourring references

to Landon as a "practical progressive" and to Hearst as
the Kansan's "boss" are cases in point.

York:

•^Ernest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution (New
The Viking Press, 1933")', P* 2 9 0 .

In brief summary, Ickes1 persuasion was based
primarily upon psychological appeals and techniques.
Ethical and logical proofs were subordinated to and
colored by psychological forms of persuasion.

He made

frequent use of the techniques of the propagandist; chief
among them were "name-calling, 11 "transfer," "testimonial,"
"plain folks," and "card stacking."

He also made exten

sive use of repetition and humor as psychological forms
of persuasion.

Most of these techniques depended upon

or were greatly enhanced by the speaker's use of vivid
and persuasive language.
Harold L. Ickes was the New Deal's hatchet-man.
H1 b primary assignment was to reduce the public stature
of the President's Republican foe.

His appeal to his

mass audience was characterized by the psychological
techniques of the propagandist, and it was influenced
by the reputation, the wit, and the colorfulness of the
man himself.

CHAPTER X
APPRAISAL
In the light of his I936 campaign efforts, how
should Ickes be evaluated as a speaker?

The criteria

for appraising a speaker are numerous and varied, but
Thonssen and Baird list and describe the following
tests as "most common in contemporary evaluation": (1 )
the immediate response to the speeches, (2 ) the reada
bility of the texts, (3 ) the technical perfection of the
speeohes, according to accepted rhetorical principles,
(^) the historical test of the speaker’s ideas, (5 ) the
delayed response to the speeohes, and (6 ) the ultimate
effeot of the speeohes upon society. 1
Since Ickes is being evaluated as a political
orator in a special campaign role, some of these cri
teria are much less applicable than others.

To begin

with, the technical perfection of his speeches is less
important than those tests dealing with the actual re
sponse reoeived.

It has already been noted, for example,

that the organization of his speeohes was often weak
from a logical point of view.

Since his particular ob

ject did not depend to any large degree upon ordered

^Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech
Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 19^8),
pp.
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proof, this technical weakness, while perhaps signifi
cant, was not necessarily a limiting factor.

The ap

plication of the historical test of ideas would also
yield little.

Most of Ickes* subject matter was based

on what could or could not be expected of Landon in the
event of his election.

Since Landon was not elected,

then or later, the Secretary's ideas could not be
weighed on the scale of actual performance.

Nor would

the gain be great from an attempt to evaluate the ul
timate effect of Ickes* ideas upon society.

His subject

matter was of an immediate and temporary nature, and his
ideas were particular rather than universal.

Unless one

were rash enough to ascribe Roosevelt's re-election to
Ickes* efforts and then to attempt to evaluate the
election's influence upon society, the social Impact
test could not be used.
The test of readability of speech texts, on the
other hand, is especially pertinent to the present study.
As Thonssen and Baird have pointed out, opinion is
divided on the question of whether or not a good speech
reads well in print. 2

The idea that an effective speech

will also read well is popularly held, but many rhetori
cal critics hold that good oral style is so different

2Ibld. . p. 456.

from literary style that a good speech should not read
well as printed matter.

Ickes* speeches, to satisfy

his particular goals, needed to blend oral and literary
styles effectively enough that they would sound good
over the air and yet read well in the newspapers.

For,

as noted in Chapter II, the Administration used its
Secretary of the Interior at least partially for his news
value, and Iokes himself devoted great effort toward secur
ing the widest possible news coverage for his speeches.
That his style was, for the most part, well-adapted to
oral presentation has been noted in the study of indivi
dual speeches.

At the same time, Ickes possessed a very

creditable literary style.

His language was not only

colorful; it was almost always meticulously correct.3
The speeches not only read well in print, but, even more
important in this particular case, they made interesting
reading.

Newspapers, even some hostile ones, were will

ing to'devote space to reprinting Ickes* major speeches
entirely, or to quoting liberally from them.

This ac

complished one of the basic aims of the New Deal’s
hatchet-man:

It gave wide publicity to his attacks on

Landon and his party.

^Straus, Wolfsohn, and Cohen have indicated that
Ickes possessed a good literary style, with a slight
tendency toward the classical. Interviews.
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The Immediate reeponae to his speeches cannot
be Ignored as a oriterlon for evaluating the speaker.
Thonssen and Baird say of this criterion:
The effectiveness of a speech may be Judged by
the character of the immediate, surface response.
If a speaker succeeds in holding the audience's
unbroken attention; if he receives a favorable
response in the form of applause or cheering; if he
does these or other things which relate straightway
to the response of the moment, he is presumed to
have carried through his communicative attempt
competently. This is a superficial, though some
times accurate, indicator of rhetorical merit.^
Since Ickes* campaign speeohes were beamed primarily to
the radio audience, several of them being studio broad
casts, this type of analysis is difficult to make.

In

two speeches previously reported in which delivery was
before a live audience, eyewitness and newspaper
accounts have indicated that response to Ickes was
enthusiastic .-5

Joel David Wolfsohn, who heard the

Secretary often in 1936» has indicated that the audi£

ences were favorably responsive in each case.
For reactions to Ickes' network radio addresses,
however, the crltio must depend upon newspaper and other
printed reports.

Since newspapers and political oom-

mentators cannot be considered as entirely unbiased
observers, this type of reaction is also difficult to

^Thonssen and Baird, o£. clt. , p. 4-55.
^These were the speeches delivered at Columbus on
October 9, and at Philadelphia on October 19.
^Interview.

evaluate.

Some suggestions as to Ickes' effectiveness

can, however, be gleaned from a review of the reactions
of newspapers and of political observers of both parties.
For example, the August 3 attack on Landon's progresslvlsm brought forth reluctant admissions of the effect
iveness of the speech from several Republican papers,
and it received only complaints from Republican leaders.
It also received exceptionally favorable and unanimous
support from Democratic leaders and newspapers.
speech could be adjudged effective.

That

The August 2?

attack on Hearst was much less effective.

It received

a strong reply from William Hard and from the Republican
press.

Its charge, on the other hand, failed to receive

support from many Democratic editorials.

Using this

type of appraisal, a study of reaction to the five major
radio addresses would Indicate that all except the speech
charging Hearst control.of Landon were largely effeotive.
The most effective were the speeches questioning Landon's
progresslvlsm and his sinoerity.

The latter even drew

reply from the Republican candidate, but the reply,
though cleverly done', only partially met the issues
raised.

Though he was enthusiastic about the other four

speeches, even the Secretary was dubious, as noted in
Chapter VI, about the public reaction to his attack on
Hearst.
According to observers, Ickes received a favorable
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immediate reaction from his audiences when an audience
was present.

No definitive conclusion can be reached

about the reaction of his radio audience.

Some evi

dence does, however, suggest that at least four of the
five major addresses received a favorable response.
Of greater Importance than the test of immediate
audience reaction is the criteria of the ultimate re
sponse of that audience.

Comparing these two criterion,

Thonssen and Baird say:
Much more significant is the test which measures
effectiveness by the substantial responses deriving
from possible changes in belief or attitude. . . .
Thus, in an extended debate in the House of Commons
or in the American Congress, a vote may not be taken
for days after the delivery of certain significant
speeches. But the fundamental test will be: Did
these speeohes.have an effect upon the subsequent
disposition of the question? -Did they help to
produce the delayed response?'
In the 1936 campaign, an evaluation would, then, be
based on whether Ickes* speeches had any effect on the
November vote.

How is this to be determined?

It would

be foolish to conclude that since Roosevelt won reelection, Ickes had necessarily been effective in his
eampalgn efforts.

Nor is it possible to say that since

Landon was prevented from attaining any great measure
of public confidence, that having been Ickes' special
assignment, this result proved the hatchet-man a

^Thonssen and Baird, 0£. clt. , p. 457.

successful speaker.

The cause is too small for the

effect, and other factors were operative.

Indeed, the

Secretary's diary indicates the belief that Landon cost
Q

himself many votes by his own unimpressive speeches. 0
An attempt to survey the results in Columbus, Philadel
phia, Chicago, and other cities where Ickes spoke would
also prove little or nothing.

The analysis of the

Secretary's effectiveness must be based upon the opinion
of observers.
Editorial comment, some of it from unfriendly
sources, suggested that Ickes had been effective in his
campaign role.

The Louisville Hearld Post said, as the

campaign neared its end, that he had "worn better than
all other radio speakers" and mentioned his "unfailing
c h a r m . T h i s comment appeared in an article which also
praised Herbert Hoover.

The Washington Star of November

1 9 , speculating upon cabinet changes, was sure that the
Secretary of the Interior, under fire before the cam
paign began, would be reappointed because "He did some
heavy line-plunging for Roosevelt in the campaign. . . . 11
Probably the most satisfying comment to Ickes, however,
came from Hearst»s Chlcago-Amerlcan.

It said:

"In

8ickes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. ?02.
^Louisville Herald Post. October 26, 1 9 3 6 .
10Washlngton Star, November 19, I9 3 6 .
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fairness It should be recorded that Harold Ickes proved
an Ace among the New Dealers."

11

This comment probably

was even more rewarding for that New Deal speaker than
the post^-electlon oredlt given him for his part in the
vlotory by Frank Kent in his column in the Baltimore
12

Sun.

Kent had been one of Ickes' persistent critics

during the oampalgn.

Still another indication of ef

fectiveness came from John Hamilton, Republican Chair
man.

He told Ickes on December 21 that he, Ickes, had

"hit him harder than anyone elBe during the campaign.
Perhaps the best way to measure Iokes' effective
ness is to discover the estimate placed on his services
by the party and the administration which gave him his
assignment.

There is no doubt that he stood very high

in this respect after the election was over.

When he

offered, as a matter of form, to extend his resignation
before the second Roosevelt term began, Miss Marguerite
Le Hand, the President's personal secretary, remarked to
Thomas Corcoran that "the one man in the Cabinet who had
nothing to worry about was the first one to talk about

•^Chloago-Amerloan, November 11, 1936.
•^Baltimore Sun, November 12, 1936.

York:'

•^Harold L. Ickes, The Inside Struggle, (Vol. II
Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 3 vols.; New
Simon and Schuster, 195^*) > P. 2 1 .
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sending in hiB resignation."^

Congressman Maverick

went so- far in early January as to announce publicly his
support for Ickes for president in 19*K).^

This was, no

doubt, exaggerating the Secretary’s political possibili
ties, but it suggests the favorable attitude held by
many Democrats toward their Bull-Moose ally in the cam
paign.

Alsop and Klntner have indicated that Ickes

became muoh closer to the President after the campaign
was over.

In fact, they list him as one of the three

men in the Administration who were closest to Roosevelt
after 1936. 16
More pertinent Is the New Deal attitude after
1936 toward Ickes specifically as a speaker.

Had he

not been regarded as effective in the 1936 campaign, he
would probably not have been used extensively as a New
Deal spokesman in future political struggles.

The fact

Is that he was a leading New Deal speaker in the Supreme
Court fight of 193?, "the anti-monopoly fight in 1937-38,
and the political "purge" of 1938.

^

Then, in 19^0, the

lA<Tbld. , p. 17.
1 5 Ibld., p. 29.
■^The three listed are Ickes, Hopkins, and Cor
coran. Joseph Alsop and Robert Klntner, Men Around the
President (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc.,
P. 9l.
17lbld., pp. 136-39, 183-85.

President, who according to Hosenman "loved to listen to
him /Ickes/ lay it on," gave his Secretary of the Inter
ior the same task he had been given in 1936.‘L®

In July

of 1940, the President told Henry Wallace, vice-presi
dential nominee, to "see Harold, who will have to be our
spearhead in this

campaign."^

On August 14, the Presi

dent assigned to Ickes the radio reply to Wendell
Wlllkle's speech of acceptance, and the political
20
hatohet-man was back at work.
Nineteen-forty-four was
to find him again attacking, this time with Thomas E.
21
Dewey as the Republican target.
When asked to comment
on whether Ickes was effeotlve as a political hatohet-raan
in 1936, Paul C. Aiken responded with a definite af
firmative and suggested the Secretary’s continued use in
that role as eloquent proof.22
Up to this point, only Ickes’ effectiveness as a
speaker has been considered.

No organized attempt has

been made to evaluate his speaking from an ethical point

York:

•^sanmel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New
Harper and Brothers, 1952/, p. 442.

^Harold L. Ickes, The Lowering Clouds. (Vol. Ill
of The Seoret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 3 vols.; New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1955). P* 268.
20Ibld., p. 3 0 3 .
2^New York Times. February 4, 1952, p. 18.
^Interview.
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of view, to determine to what extent he recognized and
demonstrated a sense of responsibility to his audience.
Gray and -Braden say of the speaker’s social respon
sibility:
How one uses his ability in speaking, whether
for the good or ill of society, is essentially a
matter of the speakers’ own sense of ethical and
moral values, of his own motives in speaking, of
the honesty of his own thinking, and of the gen
uineness of his concern for human welfare.23
As a public official and as a man, "Honest Harold"
Ickes had an excellent and well-deserved reputation for
sound ethical values.

Interviews with Ickes’ associates

reveal a deep-rooted conviction of his honesty and in
tegrity.

Others, even some who feuded with the Secre

tary, have generally acknowledged his honesty.

Hugh

Johnson, who had disagreed bitterly with Ickes upon
occasion, said that whatever else might be said of him
"nobody had impugned his integrity.”2^

Rosenman also

has emphasized this aspect of the Secretary:

"Above all

the President felt great comfort and easiness with Ickes
as Seoretary of the Interior because of his rugged
honesty and incorruptibility."2^

2 3Glles Wilkeson Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public
Speaking: Prlnclples and Practice (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1951)> P* 19.
^Washington News, December 1, 1936.
25Rosenman, ojo. olt., p.

kk.
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No serious question seems to arise about the
genuineness of Ickes’ "concern for human welfare."

He

was a progressive by conviction and supported many
losing and hopeless causes for that conviction.

As

noted in Chapter III, he was regarded as a champion of
minority groups and their rights.

Ickes' foes often

questioned his methods, but seldom the sincerity of his
political beliefs.

Nor were the Secretary's general

motives for speaking a matter for serious question.
There is every indication that he sincerely believed
the country would be better served by the re-election
of Roosevelt than by the election of Landon.

After

listening to Roosevelt's acceptance speech, for example,
he made this comment in his diary:
I came away from the meeting feeling that, as
matters stand, I would have no option except to
support the President, no matter what my personal
differences might be with him over policies af
fecting ray department. I simply would have no
other choice in view of what I have believed in
and stood for all my llfe.2°
He later entered comment about Landon which would
Indicate the sincerity of his expressed fears of the
Kansan as President.

After describing him as "mediocre"

and likening him to Harding, Ickes wrote:
As I say, someone will run him, and if it isn't
the big interests I will be very much surprised.

26lckes, Secret Diary, Vol. I, p. 626.

An honest and scrupulous man in the oil business
Is so rare as to rank as a museum piece. And
Landon has been In oil all his life.27
The serious question about the ethics of Ickes
arises In regard to the degree of Intellectual honestyreflected In his speech techniques.

It has been demon-

strated that his appeals were primarily emotional rather
than logical.

Emotional appeals are certainly not of

themselves reprehensible, but they should be accompanied
by sound reasoning and evidence.
put It:

"...

As Gray and Braden

you /the speaker/ will Inevitably appeal

to motives, which are closely related to the emotions.
But when you do, put those appeals on a national basis.
OQ

Back up your emotional appeal by sound reasoning.
Ickes* psychological techniques, especially those of
"name-calling" and "transfer," were often not backed
up by sound reasoning or evidence.

It has been noted,

too, that some of his arguments placed suoh an extremely
partisan Interpretation on events and motives that they
tended to distort the truth.

An analysis of the Secre

tary's persuasive techniques suggests that his partisan
nature led him into excesses as a political speaker
which, despite his basic integrity, did not demonstrate

27ibld., p. 646.
2®Gray and Braden, 0£. clt. , p. 14.

260
a keen awareness of the ethical responsibility of the
speaker to hlB society.

Harold L. Ickes will not be recorded as a great
American orator.

His most noted speeches were directed

toward an Immediate political goal and were neither
timeless nor elevated in theme.

He was an intensely

partisan political speaker; his speeches will not
endure as models of selfless statesmanship.

Viewed,

however, in terms of performance in an unusual and
demanding campaign role, Ickes was an effective politi
cal speaker.

He was, in 1936, the New Deal's hatohet-

man, and he performed his task with apparent success.
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